THE PROCEEDINGS

of

The South Carolina Historical Association

1981

WILLIAM S. BROCKINGTON, JR.
W. CALVIN SMITH
Editors

USC - AIKEN
THE SOUTH CAROLINA
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

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MINUTES

South Carolina Historical Association

Annual Meeting 1981

The Fifty-first Annual Meeting of the Association convened at The Citadel in Charleston on April 4, 1978. After registration and continental breakfast in Duckett Hall, about seventy-five members and guests met in the auditorium, President Jamie W. Moore presiding.

At 10:20 A.M. two sessions met simultaneously. In Duckett Hall Barbara W. Aba-Mecha, Georgia Tech, presented "The History of the NAACP in South Carolina," with Charles Joyner, Coastal Carolina, as moderator and Jack Bass, USC-Columbia, as commentator. George B. Pruden, Jr., Presbyterian, followed with a paper, "Issachar J. Roberts: A Southern Missionary Pioneer in China," moderated by John Wilson, USC-Sumter, and commented on by James W. Gettys, Erskine. L. Wayne Jordan, College of Charleston, concluded the session by reading his paper, "Charleston Intellectuals and the Dilemmas of Modernization on the Eve of the Civil War." G. Wayne King, Francis Marion, moderated, and Carlanna Hendrick, Francis Marion, due to the late hour, postponed her comments until the afternoon session.

Meanwhile, in Byrd Hall, William R. Ferrell, III read to a smaller audience, "Church and State Relations in Mexico from 1910 to 1940." Paul S. Lofton, Spartanburg Methodist, was moderator and William L. Harris, The Citadel, commented. Joseph Wightman, Coastal Carolina, presented a paper, "Persuading a Democratic Society to Rearm: The British Experience, 1933-1937." Jeffrey Willis, Converse, moderated, and Larry Addington, The Citadel, commented.

At 12:30 P.M. the Association enjoyed a Low Country Buffet in Alumni House, followed by the Business Meeting. The Secretary-Treasurer presented the financial report, and Albert Sanders, Furman, presented an appreciation of Delbert H. Gilpatrick. The officers for 1981-82 were elected by acclamation:

President: John B. Edmunds, Jr. (USC-Spartanburg)
Vice-President: Walter B. Edgar (USC-Columbia)
Secretary-Treasurer: A.V. Huff, Jr. (Furman)
Executive Committee: Robert J. Moore (Columbia College)
Editors, Proceedings: William S. Brockington, Jr. and W. Calvin Smith (USC-Aiken)

Two afternoon sessions convened at 2 P.M. George C. Rogers, Jr., USC-Columbia, chaired and commented at the session, The World of the Beaufort Planter, 1788-1930. There were three papers: Beverly Scafidel, S.C. Department of Education, "The Author-Planter William Elliott (1788-1863);" David Moltke-Hansen, S.C. Historical Society, "A Beaufort Planter's Rhetorical World: William Henry Trescott (1822-1898);" and A.V. Huff, Jr., Furman, "Urbane Bourbon: Joseph W. Barnwell and the Search for a New Aristocracy."

A second section, The Nazis: Sadism and Escapism in Wartime, was chaired by Peter Becker, USC-Columbia. Robert E. Herzstein, USC-Columbia, read a paper, "Werner Daitz and Nazi Plans for Postwar Europe," followed by Donald McKale, Clemson, who presented, "Purging Nazis: The Postwar Trials of Women Doctors and Nurses." Becker and Michael Barrett, The Citadel, commented.

After a social hour, the banquet session was held in Mark Clark Hall. Professor Martin Blumenson, editor of the Patton papers, spoke on the personality and career of George S. Patton, Jr.

A.V. Huff, Jr.
Secretary-Treasurer

DELBERT HAROLD GILPATRICK,

charter member and one-time president of the Association, departed this life on March 16, 1981. Born in Saginaw, Michigan, on June 24, 1892, he was reared in Florida and received his baccalaureate from Stetson University in 1914. The first World War interrupted his teaching career but, after serving as a second lieutenant, he entered Columbia University, receiving his masters in 1920 and his doctorate in 1931. He joined the Department of History at Furman University in 1926 and taught at that institution for forty-two years before retiring in 1968.

As an historian, he was a solid scholar with an astute appreciation of historical forces. His Jeffersonian Democracy in North Carolina, 1789-1816, published in 1931, remains the standard work and was reprinted in 1967. As a teacher he had few peers. He possessed the rare gift of being able to excite a young person's intellectual curiosity and to embue a yearning for knowledge. So motivated, many of his students went out from his classes to advanced study in various fields. His charm and wit, his utter rejection of sham and pomposity, his demand for superior achievement, and his genuine and continuing concern made him a master teacher, a congenial colleague, and a valued friend.

We who knew him shall miss him.

SOUTH CAROLINA CONFERENCE OF NAACP: ORIGIN AND MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS, 1939-1954

Barbara W. Aba-Mecha

During the last three decades of the nineteenth century, the Democratic Party of South Carolina wrested political control from the state's Republicans and established its dominance. Both during the process of change and after the fact of Democratic control, organized resistance against the Party was carried out by black South Carolinians until the mid-twentieth century, when the Party was forced to abandon its racist platform. The final abdication of black civil rights came in 1895, with the establishment of the so-called White Codes, "a complex of laws, ordinances, and social customs which constituted the ground rules of segregation and white supremacy," and in 1896, with the establishment of the white Democratic primary.[1] The Democratic Party's takeover was fraught with rampant violence, intimidation, fraud, and devices implemented by the conventions. The organized efforts by blacks to invalidate the racist legal policies resulted in a persistent struggle which lasted over a half century before the laws of the state were changed to reflect true Democratic vistas. These legislative changes came gradually during the 1940's and 1950's after the black leaders across the state organized into one body carrying the name South Carolina Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).

From the 1880's up to the 1940's, black leaders for the most part sought to change their inferior political status through projects taking place on the local level. In general, the blacks used non-disruptive, moral-persuasion type devices, such as letters of protest, petitions, and public meetings, both interracial and all-black. These undertakings were carried out by local civic welfare clubs, professional organizations, fraternal bodies

and social and political groups. Many campaigns were organized to regain the unrestricted ballot and to secure improved community services for blacks.[2] Perhaps the most significant challenge to the status quo was the abortive attempt in 1932 by members of the Columbia branch of NAACP and the all-black Progressive Club to legally abolish the state's white primary.[3]

But the pursuit of full citizenship rights took a new direction when Levi G. Byrd, a black plumber of Cheraw, South Carolina, conceived the idea of forming a state body of the local branches of NAACP within the state. Byrd, a self-taught man, had moved to Cheraw from Wadesboro, North Carolina in 1927. Later on, Byrd spearheaded the establishment of a branch of NAACP in Cheraw; the organization received its charter in 1939. In the same year, Byrd took another progressive step which resulted in the merger which he had envisioned. Defraying his own expenses, he traveled to New York to present his idea to Walter White of the National office of NAACP, who obviously agreed to the project. In the spring of 1939, Rev. Alonzo W. Wright, Mrs. Mattie B. Robinson and Byrd, representing the Cheraw branch of NAACP, traveled to Columbia to meet with the local branch of the NAACP to discuss the possibility of a statewide merger. At the time, the Columbia branch was the largest and the most active within the state. The persons present at this meeting called an organizational meeting in the fall of the year. On November 10, 1939, at Benedict College, a black institution in Columbia, twenty-nine persons assembled, representing seven local branches of NAACP, and formed the South Carolina Conference of NAACP. The founders were a body of nine persons from Cheraw, five from Columbia, five from Greenville, four from Georgetown, three from Charleston, two from Florence, and one from Sumter. There was a branch functioning in Aiken at the time, but they did not have a representative at the organizational meeting. By the first annual meeting of the body, on May 17, 1940, at Benedict College, the Aiken branch had joined the group.[4]

The state conference's first major officers, president, secretary and head of finance committee, were the

three pioneers who had journeyed from the Cheraw branch--respectively Wright, Robinson and Byrd. Other officers elected at the organizational meeting were those who would play major roles in the work of the organization in later years. From the outset, the leaders of the state conference sought to create an organization which would win the respect and support of the masses of the black community of South Carolina. The group initiated membership drives to enlarge the existing branches and agreed to set up new branches as rapidly as they could. By the end of 1939, the group had a membership of 800. At the close of the first decade of its existence, the organization claimed eighty-five branches and a membership of over 14,000.[5] The initial leaders of the state conference were primarily the black intelligentsia, many of whom were militant and outspoken persons. Accordingly, they were to a large extent financially independent of the white power structure.

The headquarters of the new organization was in Columbia, South Carolina, the centrally located capital of the state. Columbia was also the seat of two private black colleges which were available for use by the NAACP. Most important, Columbia had the largest membership of all the local branches of NAACP in South Carolina. The influence of the Columbia body is gleaned from a memo written by Thurgood Marshall to Walter White, Roy Wilkins and E. Frederic Morrow in June, 1942.

> The leadership of the State Conference of Branches of South Carolina is in the hands of the Columbia branch. Mr. James M. Hinton, president of the State Conference, is exceptionally capable, interested in the NAACP, and will build the conference up ...The Columbia branch has 964 members, while Charleston, the largest city in the state, has 67 members. There are less than 600 members in the entire state of South Carolina outside of Columbia.[6]

During the first two years of the new organization, persons who would be major figures in carrying out the

projects undertaken by the state conference were elected to key leadership positions. All rendered their services on a voluntary basis. While there was no complaint with the services of the first president and secretary, the two officers recognized that residing far from Columbia was disadvantageous. The second president and secretary, James M. Hinton and Modjeska M. Simkins, both residents of Columbia, were recruited outside of official meetings to assume their posts. The selection of the new president was done by Byrd, who recognized that while Hinton had opposed the organization of a state body, Hinton had outstanding leadership ability. A committee called upon Hinton and made the offer to him. Simkins was asked by Robinson to assume full secretarial duties.[7]

There were several advantages in having the team of Hinton and Simkins as state officers. Hinton, a respected Baptist minister who was manager of the Columbia district of the Pilgrim Life Insurance Company, was economically independent of the white power structure. On the other hand, Simkins, a former teacher who was employed as director of the Negro program of the South Carolina Tuberculosis Association, was economically vulnerable in terms of her employment, but had private financial holdings of her own and was married to a prosperous businessman in the black community. As Simkins pursued her activist role with the NAACP, she had to choose between keeping her employment and maintaining her role as political activist; she chose to give up her employment. Additionally, Hinton and Simkins were experienced in organizing in the black community. Hinton had traveled through Alabama setting up offices for his insurance company and had moved to Columbia to extend his work into South Carolina. Simkins had traveled to many communities in South Carolina setting up clinics and raising money for the work of the state Tuberculosos Association. Then, in their roles as minister/business and teacher/health activist, they were good public speakers and capable fund raisers who had reputations of being frank and outspoken.[8]

Along with officers Hinton, Simkins and Byrd, there were several persons who made valuable contributions toward the work of the state conference in their home

communities; but three other persons whose influence was exerted on a statewide level deserve special attention. Although they were not part of the founding body, John McCray, Osceola McKaine, and J. Waties Waring became associated with the state conference shortly after its inception and gave important support to its work.

McCray, the progressive editor of The Charleston Lighthouse, a black South Carolina newspaper established in February, 1939, moved to Columbia in 1941 and founded The Lighthouse and Informer.[9] His newspaper, which became the "unofficial" organ of the South Carolina Conference of NAACP, was a source of information on important issued in the black community and news from its pages was picked up by the leading white newspapers of the state. McCray worked closely with other NAACP leaders in planning strategies to combat racism and to advance the programs of the state conference.

Osceola McKaine, another black stalwart who participated, albeit for a short period, was a native of Sumter, South Carolina, who maintained a self-imposed exile in Ghent, Belgium, until the advent of World War II in Europe. Around 1940, he returned to South Carolina, where he remained until 1946, at which time he returned to Belgium. McKaine moved to Columbia, worked as associate editor of The Lighthouse and Informer, and maintained a career as a civil rights activist who made a significant contribution to the work of the state conference.[10]

J. Waties Waring, an aristocratic white native of Charleston, was a federal judge who rendered impartial decisions favoring the plaintiffs of cases brought by the lawyers for the state conference. Waring began his political career as a supporter of politicians who held orthodox views on the race policy of the state. However, after he was appointed a federal judge, with the help of politicians Burnet R. Maybank and Ellison D. "Cotton Ed" Smith, he gradually began to administer the law equitably for all persons who came into his court room. Waring's firm commitment to democratic principle caused him to be the object of vilification and slander

in his home state to the extent that he was characterized by one reporter as "the most bitterly denounced man in recent Palmetto state history." After retiring from the bench, Waring left South Carolina to reside in New York.[11]

Though the major impetus behind the establishment of the state conference was regaining the unrestricted right to vote, the first law suit filed, and later won against the state of South Carolina, was for equalization of teachers' salaries, regardless of race. The national office of NAACP was pushing the teachers' salary equalization cases on a regional level. Particularly in South Carolina, the inequities between the dual system were highly obvious. The national office of NAACP began the salary project in South Carolina by attempting to interest black teachers there in pursuing such a case. At least as early as 1938, Thurgood Marshall, counsel in the National Office of NAACP, began corresponding with the officials of the Palmetto State Teachers Association (PSTA), the all-black body of South Carolina teachers. Writing to inform the officials of PSTA of the regional crusade for equal pay for teachers holding equivalent academic credentials, Marshall sent three thousand copies of related pamphlets to be distributed to members of PSTA. His attempt to work through PSTA in gaining the support of the teachers for a law suit was unsuccessful.[12]

While Marshall was attempting to garner support through PSTA, an active movement to initiate a law suit on behalf of South Carolina's black teachers began in Sumter under the direction of Osceola McKaine. McKaine, who was particularly distressed by the inferior economic status of his fellow blacks at home, worked along with S.J. McDonald, chairman of the Executive Committee of the State Conference, in a project to raise funds to begin a law suit on behalf of the black teachers of South Carolina. Both men were active in the Sumter branch of NAACP, McKaine as executive secretary and McDonald as chairman of the board of directors. Ten black business/professional men of

Sumter agreed to launch the project by pledging $100 each to pay McKaine's expenses for travel across the state to raise funds for the law suit; McKaine began the project with an initial donation of $100, ten dollars from each businessman.[13]

By 1941, the project of the Sumter branch was carried to the state conference for support. Since the teachers, who were the best paid black workers in the state, were not sponsoring the action on their behalf, the state conference was reluctant to undertake the law suit. A compromise was reached whereby the state conference agreed to assist the teachers in a law suit, but refused to take on the law suit as its own project. Additionally, the members of the state conference agreed to pursue a challenge against the inferior conditions in the black public schools after the litigation of the teachers' salary case.[14]

Since funds of the NAACP could not be used in a law suit for the teachers, the state NAACP tried to gain the backing of the PSTA in raising a teachers' defense fund. Both in 1941 and 1942, the representative body, the house of delegates of PSTA, voted for a teachers' defense fund but the executive committee of the PSTA, fearful of reprisals from white educational officials, was reluctant to carry out the demands of its members. As a result of this reluctance, the funds from the teachers' organization were not given to the state conference until 1944.[15] Nonetheless, the Sumter branch continued its pioneering role on behalf of the teachers, laying the financial foundation for the law suit. By February 1943, at which time the state conference took over the project of raising funds for the defense of the teachers, the Sumter branch had raised approximately $700 of the $3000 needed to file legal action.[16] The official attitude of the state NAACP in regard to the teachers' role in the fight is revealed in a news article covering the first quarter meeting of the NAACP executive board in 1942:

> The board held a detailed discussion of certain phases of "Negro" education in South Carolina. It was conceded that

> for certain alleged reasons, the South Carolina Negro teachers are far less interested than they should be in their economic and political welfare and in the general program of the national, state, and local branches of the NAACP. This is quite different from the attitude of teachers in most other southern states it was concluded. It was also concluded that the NAACP is more interested in what can and should be done for teachers and schools than teachers themselves seem to be. Plans for increasing teachers' interest in the South Carolina branch were discussed.[17]

The project of securing a plaintiff to be sponsored in a law suit was undertaken by J. Andrew Simmons, the principal of Booker T. Washington High School in Columbia. His first recruit for a plaintiff was his niece, Melissa Smith, who was unable to participate throughout the proceedings. Thus, Simmons secured another Charleston teacher, Viola L. Duvall for the project. In November, 1943, the Charleston law suit was filed by NAACP on behalf of the black teachers. Judge Waring decided the case in favor of Duvall in February, 1944. Under his ruling, Charleston was given until 1946 to complete the process of equalizing salaries.[18]

Initially, the state of South Carolina attempted to force NAACP to sue each school district separately to equalize salaries statewide. While the Charleston case was in process, the Columbia branch of NAACP was organizing a related case. But even after the Charleston case was won, the Columbia teachers who were spearheading the effort for their case found many of the city's black teachers reluctant to press for legal action on their behalf; apparently, fear of reprisals from the white power structure outweighed the financial rewards of winning their case.[19] Finally, the Columbia case was filed in June, 1944, with Albert Thompson as plaintiff. Rebecca Monteith of school district 2-B in Richland County (on the outskirts of Columbia) was also

represented by the NAACP lawyers but her case was dropped on a technicality. Thompson's case was won in May, 1945. After the favorable decisions in Charleston and Columbia, other school districts in the state began negotiations and complied with black leaders' demands to equalize teachers' salaries without going to court.[20]

After winning the teachers' salary equalization suit, the state conference directed its complete attention to the project of dismantling the white primary, which was the group's major project of immediate concern. Shortly after the state body had been organized, the leaders began to make plans to raise funds to challenge the white primary. At its third annual meeting in June, 1942, the state conference agreed to raise $6000 by July 1st for a defense fund to be used for that purpose. In order to prevent economic reprisals and intimidation against persons who donated to NAACP defense funds, the group formed a companion organization through which funds for support of federal cases could be channeled. Meeting at Zion Baptist Church in June, NAACP leaders formed a statewide organization called the South Carolina Negro Citizens Committee. The governing boards of the two organizations were interlocked. The chairman of the new group was E.A. Adams, the president of the Columbia branch of NAACP; the secretary was Hinton, president of the state conference; and Simkins, the secretary of the state conference, was reporter. At the first meeting of the executive committee, plans were made "for raising an initial five thousand dollars to be used during a proposed legal effort to break down disenfranchisement against Negro citizens in the Democratic Party." The money was raised as planned. The state conference did not press its case immediately because the national office of NAACP requested that it wait upon the outcome of a related case being pursued in Texas to ban that state's white primary. In 1944, the South Carolina Negro Citizens Committee donated $500 to the Texas case.[21]

Along with raising the money in 1942, the South Carolina NAACP had begun to have its members attempt to register to vote in the Democratic Primary. Some members enrolled in wards, but their names were stricken from the books.[22]

The Smith v. Allwright victory in Texas in 1944, in which the Supreme Court decided that the political party was a state agency, and not a private club, challenged the dominant political structure of the southern states. In South Carolina the legislative response to the decision was most radical. At a special emergency session of the state legislature in May, 1944, all of the state primary voting laws were eliminated from the statute books in an attempt to prevent blacks from voting. Governor Olin D. Johnston of South Carolina declared that "white supremacy will be maintained in our primaries; let the chips fall where they may."[23]

The governor's drastic action surely was due in part to fear of local activities undertaken by South Carolina blacks as well as the pioneer ruling in Texas. On March 26, 1944, the Colored Democratic Party was formed by black South Carolinians, under the leadership of John McCray, Osceola McKaine and James Hinton. This was the first separate political party organized by blacks in the South in the twentieth century. Soon after the party's inception, the title, Progressive Democratic Party, was assumed so that interested whites would become members. Headed by John McCray, the party had The Lighthouse and Informer as its news organ. At the party's first convention, there were "172 delegates along with observers from Florida, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Virginia, and North Carolina."[24]

Despite the devices used by the white power structure to thwart the efforts of the state's black leadership, by 1946 the state conference of NAACP was ready to file its law suit against the infamous white primary. According to an account by McCray, members of the Columbia branch of NAACP had organized motorcades to assist in getting blacks to centers of enrollment. The white registrars had been instructed not to allow blacks to sign the books so their efforts were futile until George A. Elmore, a light complexioned black, walked in alone at one of the voter registration centers and was allowed to register. This act by Elmore provided evidence that registration privileges were assigned to one according

to color.[25] Elmore, a Columbia taxidriver who was secretary of the Richland County Progressive Democrats, became the logical choice to serve as the plaintiff in a law suit filed in 1947 to challenge the Democratic Party's political machinery. This was the first case which challenged southern attempts to invalidate the 1944 Supreme Court ruling which outlawed white primaries. The Elmore v. Rice case was decided in favor of Elmore in July, 1947.[26]

Yet, adhering to tradition in its defiance of the courts, the South Carolina Democratic Party adamantly refused to accept blacks as equal participants. Immediately, methods were devised to circumvent the ruling. Their policy created two categories for participation in the South Carolina Democratic Party. The whites were considered as full members and the blacks as pseudo members who could come in only after taking an oath in which they stated that they believed in total separation of the races and that they, too, opposed the Fair Employment Practices Commission of the national administration.[27] Thus, the state conference was forced to return to the drawing board and frame a second federal case to secure full participation in the Democratic Party of South Carolina. The plaintiff for the case was David Brown of Beaufort, treasurer of the local unit of the Progressive Democrats. That case, Brown v. Baskin, was won in July, 1948. Specifically, this decision required that party officials abide by the Elmore v. Rice decision and open all of the polls to all of the people, regardless of race.

Although the federal courts had guaranteed black South Carolinians definite political rights, decades of conditioning under terror and oppression had left their mark. Several officials of the NAACP remember that in many places blacks were either reticent or afraid to register and/or vote, although they knew their legal rights. The Rev. Matthew McCollom recalled that the night after the voting, in some areas of the state, black residents were afraid to come out of their homes. It was alleged that some whites in Charleston had circulated the rumor that blood would run in the streets

if blacks voted. However, except for one report of violence, the election ran smoothly.[28] There were also inherent obstacles in the path to becoming first-class citizens. NAACP officials had to teach the people how to vote; volumes of literature which explained and illustrated the procedures for voting were sent to the local branches and distributed generally.

Black South Carolina leaders were as committed to improving the state's public school system for blacks as they were to obtaining voting rights, and in 1946, the NAACP sponsored John Wrighten, a former president of the Charleston NAACP youth council, in a law suit to gain admission to the law school of the University of South Carolina. Judge Waring took the Wrighten case concurrently with the Elmore case. Wrighten's case against the University began on June 5, 1947, one day after the end of the Elmore trial. In this case, Judge Waring ruled that the state had one of three choices: admit the plaintiff to the university's law school, provide a separate law school equal to the one at the university, or close the law school at the university. To prevent Wrighten's admission to the university law school, the power structure set up a makeshift law school at South Carolina State College, the only public college for blacks in the state. Six students and six faculty members began the law program for blacks in the fall of 1947.[29]

The next law suit undertaken to provide equal educational conditions began in Clarendon County where bus transportation for black students was entirely lacking. Clarendon, a heavily black county, used tax monies to provide free bus transportation for white public school students. At certain times of the year, the black students had to travel on roads that were so inundated with water that they were forced to use a rowboat to get to school. A law suit, brought in the name of Levi Pearson, a farmer of that county, was thrown out of court on the grounds that Pearson lived in overlapping school districts in which jurisdiction was not clear. This incident led to a change in scope of the bus transportation case.[30]

At a meeting of NAACP officials and Clarendon County representatives held in Columbia in March, 1949, the

officials decided to push for equal educational opportunities as well. At the meeting, the NAACP members agreed to enlist twenty plaintiffs for a law suit in Clarendon County. This was a formidable task because NAACP members knew that intimidation and economic sacrifice would be the lot of those who dared to challenge the established order. Levi Pearson had already suffered with his credit being cancelled by "every white-owned store and bank in the county;" he was in economic distress as he struggled to make a living from his farm. After the efforts to bring a law suit were begun, economic reprisal followed swiftly in Clarendon County. Several persons were fired from their jobs, others were ousted from rented properties, and credit was terminated for those involved. The state conference played an important role in providing relief for the persons persecuted because of their participation. Funds both for loans and for emergency relief, and tons of food and clothing were sent to the victims under the direction of the state conference.[31] Consequently, the Briggs v. Elliott case from Clarendon County was filed in the United States district court on May 16, 1950.

All of the suffering and injustice was the impetus for a change that would be felt far beyond the borders of the state of South Carolina. In the Deep South, South Carolina would provide the dynamics for a change of national and international significance. By the time that the Clarendon case was filed, Judge Waring, aware of all that was taking place in the county, decided that he would no longer accept separate-but-equal strategy cases. His determination proved to be a catalyst for change in national NAACP strategy. At the October, 1950, meeting of the National Board of Directors of NAACP, it was agreed that the NAACP would no longer sponsor cases for the purpose of equalization of the races. Upon Judge Waring's insistence, the national NAACP decided to attack segregation in the public school system; the cases being prepared by the NAACP were revised.[32]

At the pre-trial hearing of the Clarendon case in November, 1950, the NAACP attorneys presented a suit

intended to eradicate segregation in the public schools of South Carolina. A three-judge court, in which Waring sat, heard the case and upheld the principle of separate-but-equal. Of the three justices, Waring was the dissenter. He wrote that separation brought on inequality. The case was sent to the Supreme Court and became the only case filed by blacks from the Deep South in the United States Supreme Court's 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka decision. The significance of this extreme case of inequality has been explained by historian Howard Quint:

> This was the key case in the NAACP's nationwide campaign to break down racial segregation in public schools. Negro leaders purposely singled out Clarendon County because it presented racially segregated schools in the worst possible light ...The suit represented the first all-out attack in the Deep South of the system of racial segregation on the public school level.[33]

Thus the state of South Carolina, which had played a significant role in the nineteenth century in reinstating permanent servitude and inferiority upon the black race, was later the arena for bringing about a radical change for black Americans. It played a major role in invalidating racial segregation in public schools and creating a national consciousness among blacks which would later have a profound effect on race relations in America. A movement would result which would alter the traditional public school educational pattern of the United States and would tear apart the fabric of southern life as it was then constituted.

In conclusion, South Carolina's black leadership consolidated forces under the umbrella of the South Carolina Conference of NAACP to carry forth the struggle to gain legal rights and privileges guaranteed to other Americans generations earlier by the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. The program of the state conference was carried out by the executive

committee of the body, which met quarterly at various localities in the state. As an agency of propaganda and uplife, NAACP provided an outlet for leadership. In giving direction to a movement, it worked through the system by using the slow process of the courts to its favor. Ironically branded as a Communist organization by southern legislators, the NAACP was truly American in its organizations, orientation and set-up. It was perhaps one of the few organizations operating in the South which sought to live up to the American ideal of democracy for all. In South Carolina, black leaders saw themselves as Christian soldiers setting out to reform their society and make the promise of America real. They had to have faith, patience, dedication, determination and a vision of a better tomorrow. In their meetings, a prayer and an inspirational Christian song provided the opening. Patriotic songs such as "America" and "My Country, Tis of Thee," traditional black spirituals such as "We Are Climbing Jacob's Ladder," hymns such as "Faith of our Fathers" and "The Battle Hymn of the Republic," and the black national anthem, "Lift Every Voice and Sing," were part of the program.

Much of the success of the South Carolina Conference of NAACP was due to the fact that it could mobilize persons to enroll as members and to raise funds for the projects which were undertaken by the group. Because of its financial independence, it could operate relatively autonomous of the national office. In 1944, the organization hired a field secretary, Eugene A.R. Montgomery, to devote full-time to its projects. Modjeska Simkins, in 1981, described the financial status of the early organization.

> Through 1955, the State Conference fully sustained itself with absolutely no financial assistance from the national body. Funds for all projects and services, including federal court costs, subsistence of visiting counsel, and salary of a later employed executive secretary, were financed by black victims of taxation without representation ...Ironically, while during the

> long and highly expensive federal and state cases, batteries of state paid attorneys--once described as a "million dollar defense"--were arrayed against black citizens, conference funds came often from nickels, dimes and quarters garnered--sometimes painfully--in group meetings of the disadvantaged in the backwoods of South Carolina.[34]

The willingness of black South Carolinians to support the state conference suggests that the interest was already implanted among them; they were in need of a large scale method and plan. The large public meetings, held by the state conference at black private colleges and black churches, attracted people to the cause, publicized the group's message and programs, and gave impetus to organization of new branches. Beginning in 1939 with eight local adult branches in South Carolina, the state conference assisted in organizing eighteen branches by 1944, sixty-three by 1947, ninety-one by 1950, and 110 by 1955. Additionally, by 1950, there were twenty-two youth councils and two college chapters, at Allen University, Columbia, and at Claflin College, Orangeburg.[35]

Before the emergence of the new black civil rights organizations of the mid 1950's and the 1960's, the NAACP was the most militant regional spokesman for black civil rights and the southern establishment hated it. By 1956, members of the NAACP in South Carolina were forbidden to work in any agency of the state government. Attempts to disband NAACP in the South continued until the southern establishment directed its attention to the more radical attacks of the young revolutionists.[36]

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[1]Idus A. Newby, Black Carolinians: A History of Blacks in South Carolina from 1895 to 1968 (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1973), p. 36. For other studies of devices used to abolish the black vote in South Carolina, see George

Brown Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900 (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1952), pp. 69-91; and August Meier, Negro Thought in America, 1880-1915, Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1963), pp. 39-40.

[2]Barbara Woods Aba-Mecha, "Black Woman Activist in Twentieth Century South Carolina: Modjeska Monteith Simkins" (Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1978), pp. 154-158.

[3]"Complaint Against the Board of Commissioners of Elections of Columbia, filed by E.A. Adams, et. a., State of South Carolina, County of Richland," 22 April 1932, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Aba-Mecha, pp. 166-169.

[4]"Branch News," The Crisis XLVI (December, 1939), 374. Butler W. Nance to William E.B. DuBois, 5 June 1915; Roy Nash to N.J. Frederick, 19 February 1917; NAACP Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Aba-Mecha, pp. 160-164. Interview with Levi G. Byrd, Cheraw, South Carolina, 18 September 1980. South Carolina State Conference of NAACP, "First Annual Meeting," Columbia, South Carolina, 17 May 1940; According to the programs of the state conference from 1952, 1964 and 1976, the eight local branches were organized and/or received their charters in the following years: Charleston, 1917; Columbia, 1917; Greenville (conflicting dates--1928 and 1938); Florence, 1937; Aiken, Cheraw, Georgetown and Sumter, 1939.

[5]"1939-Ten Years of Progress-1949," The Lighthouse and Informer (Columbia, South Carolina), 15 October 1949. Levi G. Byrd to Walter White, 18 June 1941. NAACP Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Interview with Levi G. Byrd and Modjeska Simkins, Cheraw, South Carolina, 23 July 1977.

[6]A memorandum to /Walter/ White, /Roy/ Wilkins, and /E. Frederic/ Morrow, from Thurgood Marshall, 17 June

1942. The memorandum is located in the NAACP Records, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

[7]Aba-Mecha, pp. 166-169.

[8]Aba-Mecha, pp. 169-171. "Testimonial Honoring Dr. James M. Hinton, Sr.," held at Second Calvary Baptist Church, Columbia, South Carolina, 26 February 1965. Manuscript Division, Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia.

[9]Interview with John McCray, Talladega, Alabama, 8 June 1978. John McCray to Barbara W. Aba-Mecha, 6 March 1981; John McCray to Barbara W. Aba-Mecha, 8 June 1978. McCray stated that Attorney E.A. Parker, who was editor of The People's Informer, a small newspaper in Sumter, and he consolidated their newspapers to found The Lighthouse and Informer. A condition of the merger was that Osceola McKaine be retained as an assistant editor. McCray had been a leader in the Charleston branch of NAACP before moving to Columbia.

[10]McCray interview. Interviews with Modjeska Simkins, Columbia, South Carolina, 2 August 1977 and 11 August 1977. Various documents in the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW) Papers, Tuskegee Institute, Tuskegee, Alabama. McKaine worked as a field director for the SCHW. He also ran unsuccessfully as a candidate in South Carolina for the United States Senate in 1944.

[11]Robert Lewis Terry, "J. Waties Waring: Spokesman for Racial Justice in the New South" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah, 1970), pp. 30-267.

[12]Thurgood Marshall to John P. Burgess, 25 February 1938. Thurgood Marshall to Paul Webber, 11 March 1938, NAACP Papers, Washington, D.C.

[13]South Carolina State Conference of NAACP, Minutes of Meetings of the Executive Committee, 1941-1944. Personal files of Modjeska M. Simkins, Columbia, South Carolina; Sumter Branch of NAACP, Minutes of Meetings,

12 April 1942--28 September 1952. Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina at Columbia.

[14]South Carolina State Conference of NAACP, Minutes of Meetings of the Board of Directors, 1941-1944, meeting of 14 February 1941. Personal files of Modjeska M. Simkins.

[15]"Palmetto Teachers End Great Session," Palmetto Leader (Columbia, South Carolina) 15 April 1944. Interviews with NAACP members, such as Simkins, McCray, Byrd and Anna D. Reuben, revealed that many teachers or teachers' associations donated to NAACP but asked that their names be withheld. One such confidential donation came from the Dorchester County Teachers Association. A letter to Modjeska M. Simkins from James M. Hinton disclosed such. Hinton to Simkins, 9 March 1944. Interview with Anna D. Reuben, Sumter, South Carolina, 27 March 1980.

[16]South Carolina State Conference of NAACP, Minutes of Meetings of the Executive Committee, 1941-1944, meeting of 28 February 1943, Personal files of Modjeska M. Simkins.

[17]"State NAACP Board Meets Here," ?, 14 February 1942. The article appears to be from The Palmetto Leader or The Lighthouse and Informer. It is located in the files of Modjeska Simkins.

[18]McCray interview. "Negroes Sue to Equalize School Pay: Ask United States Court to Bar Differentials in Compensation," The Columbia Record, 10 November 1943.

[19]Simkins interview, 18 November 1975. Interview with Septima P. Clark, Charleston, South Carolina, 11 April 1977. McCray interview.

[20]"1939-Ten Years of Progress-1949." Rebecca Monteith was the sister of Modjeska Simkins.

[21]"South Carolina Primary," The Crisis XLIX (July, 1942), 228-229; "Report of the South Carolina Conference of NAACP, 1942 Annual Meeting," Personal Files of

Modjeska Simkins; Memo to White, Wilkins, and Morrow, from Thurgood Marshall, 17 June 1942. "Negro Citizens Committee of South Carolina Organized," Palmetto Leader (Columbia, South Carolina), ? 1942. James M. Hinton to Director of Branches of NAACP, 17 June 1942, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. "Carolinians Contribute to White Primary Case," The Crisis LI (March 1944), 87.

[22]McCray interview; "South Carolina Primary," The Crisis; Memo to White, Wilkins, and Morrow from Thurgood Marshall, 17 June 1942.

[23]V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 627.

[24]Hanes Walton, Black Political Parties: An Historical and Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1972, pp. 71-74. McCray interview.

[25]McCray interview.

[26]"Legal," The Crisis LIV (July 1947), 218.

[27]Newby, p. 286. Further, the blacks were not allowed to participate in activities at the precinct level. They were only to have the right to vote in the primary.

[28]Interview with Rev. Matthew M. McCollom, Orangeburg, South Carolina, 3 February 1977. McCray interview. Clark interview, 11 April 1977. McCray to Aba-Mecha, 6 March 1981; James M. Hinton, "Backward Glance of Past Nineteen Years," October 20, 1958. NAACP Records, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. In his letter of March 6, 1981, McCray stated that "there had been one incident in Calhoun Falls where a group of young whites attacked the 66 year-old Rev. Archie Ware after he voted."

[29]Newby, pp. 350-351; Terry, pp. 35-45. Some of the black lawyers who prepared the later cases of NAACP against the state of South Carolina were graduates of the school at Orangeburg, e.g. Matthew Perry. The Orangeburg law school was closed in 1966 because no

students had enrolled in the freshman class. Enrollment in black law schools throughout the South declined at this time because of recruiting efforts by major universities across the country.

[30]Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), pp. 14-17. Howard Quint, Profile in Black and White: A Frank Portrait of South Carolina (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958), pp. 12-20.

[31]Aba-Mecha, pp. 228-232; Kluger, p. 18.

[32]Aba-Mecha.

[33]Quint, pp. 12-13.

[34]Modjeska Simkins to Barbara Aba-Mecha, 9 March 1981.

[35]See annual programs of the South Carolina Conference of NAACP. Personal Files of Modjeska Simkins.

[36]Robert Brisbane, Black Activism: Racial Revolution in the United States, 1954-1970 (Valley Forge, Pa., The Judson Press, 1974), p. 28.

Commentaries On

"South Carolina Conference of NAACP: Origin and Major Accomplishments, 1939-1954"

Jack Bass - University of South Carolina

Professor Aba-Mecha's paper provides insight into how South Carolina blacks responded from a position of political powerlessness to challenge their exclusion from meaningful participation in the political system.

The paper provides significant background for understanding the period that followed, beginning in the mid-1950's, in which the NAACP remained the dominant civil rights group in South Carolina to an extent unmatched elsewhere in the South. In South Carolina, the NAACP demonstrated a level of organizational and fund-raising skills that created a statewide organization with established leadership capable of responding with a high level of unity. The early decision to concentrate on fighting in the courts and engaging in dialogue with the white power structure helps explain why the dominant official response by South Carolina during the most turbulent period of the civil rights era was one of accommodation rather than confrontation. In no state did change come so quickly, so completely, and with fewer jagged edges.

Although the paper mentions the interaction between the NAACP strategy and U.S. District Judge J. Waities Waring, it lacks an adequate analysis of the importance to the NAACP in South Carolina of having a judge with Waring's advanced and innovative concept of the meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments. Obviously, his opinions served to encourage an organization such as the NAACP in South Carolina that they could achieve much of what they wanted through the courts.

The paper also fails to sufficiently develop the background and personalities of the major actors. For example, Osceola McKaine was a half-brother of James McCain of Sumter, who became a national officer with the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). McKaine returned to Europe after World War I service there and opened a restaurant that attracted a socially elite clientele in Belgium. He returned to Sumter after leaving Europe on the eve of the battle of Dunkirk, played the activist role in civil rights described in the paper during the years of World War II, then returned to Europe and successfully reopened his business.

The paper clearly reveals the degree to which the NAACP in South Carolina played a pioneering role in the Southwide legal challenge to de jure segregation and to the entire structure of political, social, and economic discrimination that flowed from the 1896 Supreme Court decision, Plessy v. Ferguson, that established the doctrine of "separate but equal." The readiness in 1942 to challenge in court the white primary, two years before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Smith v. Allwright that settled the issue, is one example. Another was the Wrighten case in 1947, three years before the first of the Supreme Court decisions that chipped away at segregated facilities in higher education, which resulted in establishing a law school at South Carolina State College. The most important of all, as Professor Aba-Mecha points out, was the Clarendon County case that was consolidated in Brown v. Board of Education.

Professor Aba-Mecha's paper suggests the historical richness and regional significance of the civil rights movement in South Carolina that remain to be explored.

Charles W. Joyner - Coastal Carolina College

This paper is something of a spin-off from Professor Barbara Aba-Mecha's extremely important doctoral dissertation, "Black Woman Activist in Twentieth Century South Carolina: Modjeska Monteith Simkins" (Emory, 1978).

The importance of Mrs. Simkins in the history of the South Carolina N.A.A.C.P.--and in the pursuit of equal justice in South Carolina--would be difficult to overstate.

I wish you could all see the intensive documentation of this paper in Professor Aba-Mecha's footnotes. Some years ago, in an otherwise favorable review in one of the historical journals of a book by an old friend, I complained mildly that the author had relied too heavily on South Carolina newspaper sources and had failed to utilize oral history techniques. "The real history of black Carolina," I wrote then, "still awaits intensive field work." Professor Aba-Mecha's coverage of secondary sources, of N.A.A.C.P. files, of public records, and especially of oral interviews and correspondence with the living veterans of that struggle, is impressive. The real history of black Carolina has begun.

The N.A.A.C.P. for a long time was the only national organization with chapters in South Carolina which was explicitly dedicated to racial advancement. Its first two chapters were formed long before Professor Aba-Mecha's paper begins--in early 1917 in Columbia and in Charleston. By 1920 there were chapters in Aiken, Anderson, Beaufort, Darlington, Florence, and Orangeburg, with more than a thousand members. When James Weldon Johnson, national field secretary, visited South Carolina in 1917 he noted, "In every city that I have visited I have found the thinking men and women of our race alive to the situation and ready to take part in the work that must be done."

The N.A.A.C.P in those years between 1917 and the formation of the South Carolina Conference in 1939 was a cautious and conservative organization which quietly pursued limited objectives. It attacked conspicuous racial incongruities rather than challenging the official racism of the state's segregation system. Its purpose was seen as an effort to improve black life within the segregated system. Even after 1939, when the state conference launched an attack on segregation

itself, it did so completely within the framework of the law and the courts. In emphasizing a legal approach, the N.A.A.C.P., as James McBride Dabbs noted, "was exemplifying the Southern stress upon law, a stress upon both the importance of the word and the need for a traditional legal structure to contain an explosive social situation." Unfortunately, this cautious approach enhanced the white stereotype that blacks were "contented."

With the organization of the South Carolina Conference of the N.A.A.C.P. in 1939, however, there was a shift of emphasis from "uplift" within segregation to a challenge to segregation itself. This shift was made perfectly clear in the Cheraw Manifesto: "What the Negro needs is INTEGRATION, instead of SEGREGATION. These conditions are exact opposites. They are to each other as plus is to minus. The one affirms, the other denies."

Of the three major N.A.A.C.P. legal cases of the 1940's--the teachers' salary equalization suit, the challenge to the all-white Democratic Party, and the suit for admission to the University of South Carolina law school--only the first represents a continuation of the separate-but-equal tradition, although the law school case was compromised by the establishment of a law school for blacks (separate but makeshift) at South Carolina State College. Ironically, some of the major legal talents who helped to overthrow the system of segregation were trained at South Carolina State Law School, such as Matthew C. Perry (as Professor Aba-Mecha indicates in a footnote).

But the attack on the white primary in Elmore v. Rice and in Brown v. Baskin represented increased pressure against the system of segregation itself. After Judge J. Waties Waring's ruling for the plaintiffs in Brown v. Baskin, Congressman William Jennings Bryan Dorn asked Congress to investigate the Judge's conduct in office. Under that ruling, which struck down the closed Democratic primary, Dorn complained that "a Communist, a Negro, a Fascist, or a Republican could vote in the Democratic party of South Carolina." And of

course with Briggs v. Elliott, filed in 1950, the most significant phase of the court struggle began--the all-out attack on public school segregation. Briggs v. Elliott was the only case from the Deep South in the package of cases upon which the United States Supreme Court ruled May 17, 1954, striking down racial segregation in public schools.

It is good to be reminded of the achievements of the N.A.A.C.P. in the 1940's and 1950's. As one of those "young revolutionists" of the early 1960's that Professor Aba-Mecha refers to, I did not properly appreciate either the depth or staying power of their achievement. Since they thought of our approach as "radical," we sneered at the N.A.A.C.P as a bunch of Uncle Toms. I remember Cleveland Sellers' complaining that blacks in South Carolina had not pushed hard enough for change. "Their minds are chained," he said. We, of course, were going to change the world and create the beloved community. Well, we did not change the world; the world changed us. But at least, from our present perspective, looking back nostalgically across our flawed successes and our glorious failures, we can look back on the N.A.A.C.P. of the 1940's and 1950's not merely with more charity, but with more deserved respect and gratitude.

It is very difficult now to remember the climate of fear in which blacks--and even dissenting whites--lived throughout those years. Howard Quint reported accurately as late as 1958 that "South Carolina has not yet embraced democracy as the term is generally defined by Americans outside the South" and that "many white South Carolinians still accept a racism which in its most extreme forms approaches that of Hitler and the Nazis." We have come a long way since then. Some of us have dragged our heels all the way, but we have come. Some of us had to be carried, kicking and screaming, but we have come. We are not where we want to be, and we are not where we ought to be. We are not even where we are going to be. But we are not where we were.

But of course that wise and wonderful Old Testament prophet James McBride Dabbs predicted all of that way

back in 1954. "The majority of white South Carolinians today," he wrote then, "are waging a fight which they will lose as surely as the sun will rise tomorrow, and about which, when they have lost it, they will wonder why they fought so hard to stave off so small a change."

ISSACHAR J. ROBERTS:
A SOUTHERN MISSIONARY PIONEER IN CHINA

George B. Pruden, Jr.

On the night of May 23, 1847, a mob of angry Chinese broke into a Christian mission located on the waterfront of Canton. Taking advantage of the missionary's absence, they ransacked it. A floating chapel was chopped up and sunk; a bell was torn from the steeple; and books, furniture and papers were carted away. When Issachar Roberts returned later, he surveyed the damage and wrote ruefully to his mission board that for the first time he had "suffered the loss of all things: for the sake of Jesus Christ.[1]

Roberts reported the attack to American officials the next morning, and the claim they lodged with local Chinese officials became the first and most celebrated of American damage claims against the Chinese government.[2]

It is almost fitting that Roberts has that distinction. He was the first Baptist from the United States to devote most of his adult life to missionary work in China. When Hong Kong was taken by the British in the Opium War, he had been one of the first to move there from Macao. And he established the first Protestant mission outside the foreign factories in Canton. Besides these "firsts," he also pioneered missionary methods in an unknown and often hostile mission field. He cannot serve, therefore, as a typical Protestant missionary to China. And his difficult relationships with mission boards, Baptist colleagues, and missionaries of other denominations do not allow him to be considered a paragon of missionary virtue.

He came from humble beginnings, yet was never a humble man; he felt called to the mission field in China, yet he was almost unable to answer that call;

he devoted thirty of his seventy years to China, yet his efforts gained few Christian converts. He stoutly maintained that his conduct was always right, but he was criticized and ridiculed by other missionaries as well as by diplomats who considered him an embarrassment. He was a bona fide character whose story recounts one man's headlong plunge into issues and a milieu he did not fully understand. Yet it is interesting not only in itself, but as well for the light it can shed on some important aspects of the earliest contacts between the United States and China. The purpose of this paper, then, is to describe Roberts's background, early adult life, and his first ten years in China. In doing so, I hope a clearer picture of early Protestant missions in China will become apparent as well as some of the important issues in early Sino-American relations.

Issachar Jacob Roberts was born on a farm in Sumner County, Tennessee, on February 17, 1802. His mother was a devout Baptist, and an older brother preceded him into the ministry.[3] Few details of his earliest years are known, but one can imagine the hard life of pioneers scattered thinly through an untamed wilderness. Tennessee had been admitted to statehood in 1796 and formed part of the frontier area that was the seedbed of "rugged individualism" where survival depended mainly on one's own efforts.

The uncertainties of earthly life promoted pious religion. Indeed, the Great Revival that occurred in the early decades of the Republic was particularly strong in and west of the Appalachian Mountains.[4] Roberts was exposed to the brush-arbor meetings that generated emotional fervor and proclaimed the Bible as the only assurance of eternal salvation. It may have been at one of these outdoor revivals that he made his profession of faith when he was nineteen. He was baptized by immersion in the Baptist Church of Shelbyville, Tennessee.[5]

Not too long afterwards he felt called to the ministry and was licensed by the Shelbyville church. This

status afforded him practice in preaching but no pay. He supported himself by teaching school and saddlery until 1827. He heard of a new school in South Carolina that was opening principally to train young men for the ministry. So he went to Edgefield and attended the first term of the Furman Academy and Theological Institution.[6]

This school was one of the long-held dreams of Richard Furman, who had died two years earlier. This nationally respected Baptist leader had, like Moses, almost single-handedly organized and led South Carolina Baptists out of the wilderness. Furman's vision had encompassed far more than a school for aspiring preachers. Another of his many interests was foreign missions,[7] no easy task for a denomination that had no state-wide organizations, much less a national organization, in 1800.

Two impulses--one theological and one practical--merged in the early nineteenth century to thrust Baptists into foreign missions. And Issachar Roberts became a part of this global effort.

The theological impulse came from the doctrine of the Millenium. One aspect of the Great Revival was the belief in the literal truth of the Bible, even the esoteric Book of Revelation. Accordingly, the thousand-year reign of Christ that is foretold in Chapter 20 could only occur after most of the world had been saved. Starting locally, then spreading among the Indians, the call and commitment to spreading the Gospel gathered strength.[8] Americans also became aware of far-off regions through the experiences of traders and seamen seeking markets as the effects of the Industrial Revolution extended around the world. Missionary efforts by individual Englishmen and Scotsmen as well as the establishment of several missionary societies in Great Britain and Europe about the same time excited their imaginations.[9] A life devoted to foreign missions would fulfill Christ's Great Commission: "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations ..." (Matthew 28:19-20);

the results of such a holy enterprise would also be instrumental in ushering in the Millennium and hasten the final triumph of good over evil.

Some religious leaders, Richard Furman among them, also interpreted the birth of the United States as a vital element in the divine plan. In the year of Issachar Roberts's birth, 1802, Furman had preached a sermon in which he asserted that America would

> participate, largely in the fulfillment of those sacred prophecies which have foretold the glory of Messiah's kingdom ...Hence God has prepared this land for a great mission, to lead the world into the millennium.[10]

That this vision was shared by others can be seen in the organization of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in 1810. This agency, acting on behalf of several Calvinist denominations in northern states, sent its first missionaries to India in 1812. Three of them--Luther Rice, Adoniram Judson, and Ann Judson, the recent bride of Adoniram--became convinced during the long voyage that Baptist doctrine regarding believers' baptism by immersion was more scripturally correct. All three requested and received baptism by immersion from a British Baptist missionary when they arrived in Calcutta. This step severed their connection with the American Board of Commissioners and presented American Baptists with an unprecedented opportunity to undertake foreign missions.[11]

Here, then, was the practical impulse: there were Baptist missionaries already in India, but they had no organization to support their efforts. So Luther Rice returned to the United States to plead for such support. Those who were already committed to foreign missions theologically--and Richard Furman was foremost among them--began to seek ways to establish a national Baptist organization devoted to missions overseas in general and to support in particular the Judsons in India. A meeting in Philadelphia in 1814 produced the General Missionary Convention of the Baptist Denomination in the

United States of America for Foreign Missions--an unwieldy name that soon was replaced in popular usage by the name, Triennial Convention, because it met once every three years. Richard Furman was elected president of both the first and second sessions, in 1814 and 1817.[12]

Ten years later, when Issachar Roberts enrolled at the Furman Academy, Baptists had made little progress in foreign missions. An extension of their work into Siam in 1832 brought about the first Baptist contact with Chinese people. A missionary couple, William Dean and his wife, was sent to Siam in 1834 specifically to work among the Chinese there, because foreigners were not permitted to enter China.[13]

The immense possibilities for Christian missions in China were, however, recognized by Baptists. A year before the Dean sailed for Siam, the Baptist Board of Missions, which was the executive body of the Triennial Convention and now located in Boston, had resolved "to commence a mission to China, so soon as God's Providence shall put the facilities for doing it within our reach."[14]

After his term at the Furman Academy, Roberts was ordained and tried his hand at domestic missions. He traveled as an agent of the Colonization Society and Sunday School Union. He met and married a yound lady near Augusta, Georgia, in 1830, but she died the following year.[15] Roberts continued his itinerant ministry in Mississippi, which had become a state only in 1817. He followed the prevailing custom of supporting himself independently of his ministerial functions. Small rural churches, even where they were organized, rarely were able to provide a sufficient salary. Besides, many frontier Baptists mistrusted preachers who were educated and expected payment just for preaching and performing weddings, funerals, and baptisms. They preferred one of their own number who felt inspired by the Holy Spirit to preach the Word of God.[16] So Roberts acquired a farm and resumed his trade in saddlery. He was successful at it; his holdings in Mississippi were later valued at $30,000.[17]

By 1834, Roberts felt called to the foreign mission field. Since he knew no language but English, he first considered service in Liberia; he would have to learn no foreign tongue to work among the freed American slaves who lived there. He wrote to the Baptist Board of Missions and offered himself to the mission field.[18] Before much could come of this, he had changed his mind and felt God was directing him toward China. His interest in China stemmed from the deep impression a religious tract had made on him and later finding out that the Chinese were "a reading people." He became convinced that useful missionary work could be accomplished by distributing tracts among the Chinese.[19] He no doubt read at least some of the articles that were appearing in larger numbers in religious publications. Besides publishing letters and pleas for help from European missionaries already in China,[20] Baptist periodicals also urged their American readers to take up this greatest challenge. "Nowhere," one article stated, "has Satan a seat on the earth to be compared in extent with that he holds in ...the so-called 'celestial empire.' " Then the article summarized the reasons why this challenge could be met: European missionaries had already begun the work; travel opportunities were increasing through more frequent trading voyages; and Europeans assured those who might come that their efforts would bear fruit. A clarion call to Protestant pride and Christian duty concluded this article:

> Shall Protestants shrink from entering a field where the emmissaries of Rome do not fear to adventure? Is there nothing in the cross, nothing in the command of Him who bled on it for our redemption, nothing in His promises of protection, support, and everlasting reward, nothing in China and her future destinies for this world and the next, to fill and inflame the soul of him who burns to preach Christ among the heathen ...?[21]

Even if Issachar Roberts did not read this article--though its publication coincided with his decision for service in China--he began to act upon his resolve with an initiative that did not violate his frontier background. He set out in March, 1835, just a month after his decision was reached, on a tour through the Mississippi Valley "to secure," he wrote, "the cooperation of my brethren ...in the promotion of my contemplated Mission." In eight months he traveled 2,263 miles in five states, visiting "eight associations, two State Conventions, two ministers' meetings, two protracted meetings, besides many churches and brethren of influence." Although his out-of-pocket expenses exceeded his collections, he was sufficiently encouraged by his reception along the way to notify the Baptist Board of Missions of his intentions and the journey he had made.[22]

Roberts was only the second man to volunteer for Baptist mission work in China, so the Board hastened to get the recommendations of the men he had named as references. None was enthusiastic about his qualifications, and one--a former president of the Triennial Convention--was adamantly apposed to Roberts as a foreign missionary. Not surprisingly, then, when his application came up for consideration in March, 1836, the Board rejected it.[23] This was only the first disappointment Roberts experienced at the hands of the better-educated, more cultivated leaders of the denomination, all of whom were from the original, seaboard states.

But Roberts was undaunted in his determination to answer God's call to China. If he could not obtain an appointment in the normal way, he would try another approach. Frontier life, after all, required flexibility and adaptability mixed with some stubbornness, and Roberts exhibited all these traits. He consulted with his western supporters and organized the Roberts Fund and China Mission Society of the Mississippi Valley with headquarters in Louisville, Kentucky. It was capitalized by the income from his property in Mississippi and the contributions from individuals and religious bodies that joined it. After the Society had been established,

Roberts again approached the Board and asked that it agree only to underwrite his work as an independent Baptist missionary. The Board, uncertain of the value of his property and unwilling to allow him unconditional use of all funds supplied by his Society, refused to approve this arrangement either.[24]

Roberts finally found a way around the Board's reluctance. It did agree to accept funds for his support from the China Mission Society and transmit them to its business agents in the Far East for transfer to Roberts. He felt satisfied with this arrangement and sailed from Boston in October, 1836. He arrived in Java more than three months later and began to study Chinese while he waited for a ship and favorable winds to take him to Macao.[25]

When Roberts reached Macao in May, 1837, he found a situation that was not conducive to Protestant Christian missions. Foreign activities revolved around commercial interests. The Chinese government restricted trade to a small area outside Canton and permitted foreigners to conduct business there only six months each year. All trade had to go through a group of thirteen Chinese merchants who were licensed by the Chinese government. During the off-season foreigners lived at Macao, which was administered by Purtugal even though China claimed ultimate sovereignty. Imperial edicts had forbidden Christian missionary activity among Chinese, but the Portuguese authorities were relatively tolerant of Protestant work so long as it did not offend Chinese officials. The American Board of Commissioners had sent a few missionaries out to China in the early 1830's. They joined several Europeans, yet there were altogether less than a dozen when Roberts arrived in 1837. In order not to arouse opposition from Chinese and Portuguese officials, they had worked quietly. Instead of preaching openly, they translated scripture and composed tracts in Chinese that could be distributed in the ports or taken into the interior by even fewer Chinese converts.[26]

Roberts was not the first Baptist missionary from the United States to reach China. J. Lewis Shuck and

his wife had reached Macao nine months earlier. The Board had sent Mr. and Mrs. Shuck to Bangkok to work among the Chinese with Mr. and Mrs. Dean until China itself opened to Protestant mission work. Upon arriving in Singapore, however, the Shucks decided to go instead to Macao. His letter notifying the Board of this unauthorized move was not received in Boston until after they reached Macao. The Board reluctantly acquiesced in their removal to Macao.[27]

The time required for communications between the Board and its missionaries in China presented a real problem at home and in the field. After a letter was written it did not leave until a ship sailed in the right direction. Roberts made a habit of sending at least two copies of his letters to the Board by different ships. Either copy might not reach Boston for four or five months. The letter would then be presented at the next meeting of the Board, which would act on it if necessary and possible to do so, and direct the corresponding secretary to send a reply. Irregular shipping schedules might mean as much as a year would pass between the time the missionary's letter had been written and when the Board's response was received. Under those circumstances missionaries were given general guidance and broad policies to follow, but they were relatively autonomous in their daily activities and missionary work. In some special cases, where the Board's decision was required before some action could be taken, the time lag in communications raised yet another problem the missionaries had to face. Effective Christian work in these earliest days in China therefore required industrious, perceptive missionaries who could find opportunities among these obstacles. Accomplishments not only had to satisfy their desire to further the Kingdom of God, but also had to meet with the approval of the Board sitting half a world away. Its interests, which included a firm foundation for the denominational effort in China, did not always coincide with its missionaries' efforts to achieve relatively short-term gains that would justify their efforts.

This divergence of interests can be seen during Roberts's five-year stay at Macao. He was surprised to find the Shucks there to meet him. He had known of their departure from Boston before he left, but he--like the Board--expected them to end up in Bangkok. They welcomed him and boarded him in their house for awhile, but differences between Shuck and Roberts soon became apparent.[28] Shuck not only had arrived first, but was a regular missionary of the Baptist Board. He expected Roberts to accept his leadership in missionary matters, but Roberts was independently supported as well as being independently minded.

Another independent missionary, the Prussian Karl Gützlaff, also welcomed Roberts to Macao. He had been in East Asia for ten years and wrote several letters that appeared in Baptist periodicals in the United States in the early 1830's. Roberts knew of him and his work from his writings and had suggested before he left for China that the president of the Roberts Fund and China Mission Society write and invite Gützlaff to join it. The Prussian replied enthusiastically, saying he had long prayed for a mission society devoted solely to China and had been "moved to tears" when he read that Roberts had devoted his life to mission work in China.[29]

The two independent missionaries, Roberts and Gützlaff, became friends and often worked together, to the obvious chagrin of Shuck. Roberts moved in with Gützlaff and his English wife when his relationship with Shuck became strained. Despite the numerous obstacles to Protestant mission work, Roberts exhibited perseverance and vigor in doing what he could. He wrote and distributed tracts at Macao and in a nearby leper colony. To supplement the funds sent from his China Mission Society, he once again took up saddlery.[30]

His trade brought him into conflict with one of the Board's regulations which prohibited missionaries from engaging in other gainful employment. But because he did not depend upon the Board for his salary, Roberts chose to ignore this regulation. He even commented

that his trade allowed him to be independent. He also chose to ignore another regulation that required missionaries "however supported" to submit regular reports of their activities. His letters to the Board during this period were irregularly written and not very detailed.[31]

Roberts may have been inattentive to the Board's desire to keep informed of his activities, but he had a wider readership in mind. The constitution of his China Mission Society called for the publication of a periodical entitled China Mission Advocate. Evidently the need to establish himself at Macao delayed work on it for about a year, and it did not appear until 1839. It was nonetheless an ambitious project for which he deserves some credit as a pioneer. Each of its thirty-two-page issues contained articles on Chinese life and customs as well as letters and information supplied by Roberts. It may have been the first publication of its kind to attempt a systematic treatment of the diversity of Chinese life aimed at American readers at home. The underlying motive behind all these articles (most of which Roberts "borrowed" from other authors) was to show that China desperately needed Christianity, hence support for his missionary efforts was vital.[32]

This missions-related periodical concentrating on China was not the only pioneering effort that Roberts was involved with. Mention has already been made of his work in composing religious tracts in Chinese.[33] He followed the lead of Gützlaff and the American Board missionaries in this approach, because he shared with them the realization that the degree of literacy in China afforded a means for spreading the Gospel that could easily be exploited. Not only were simple tracts inexpensive to produce; the missionary authors expected them to be shared by Chinese and eventually penetrate the interior where the missionaries themselves were still unable to go.[34]

The political crisis that had been developing over the illegal importation of opium came to a head in 1839. Apparently the sensitivity of Chinese officials to this

activity caused them to be more alert to other signs of foreign encroachment. Roberts was beaten once and his life threatened by the Chinese for distributing Christian literature. The Portuguese governor of Macao called him in to say that Christianity could not be preached or tracts distributed outside his own house. This order plus the impending conflict between Britain and China caused Roberts to become concerned over the future of missionary work there. But with characteristic faith he noted that other means for spreading the Gospel nevertheless still existed. He had taken in four young Chinese boys to live and study in the school he had established in his home and expected to atke in several more. "This now seens," he wrote, "to be the most promising method of doing good."[35] He continued to operate a school to train young Chinese men to become Christian evangelists in their own country, because he recognized that foreigners would never be able to reach the "teeming millions" that needed to hear the message of salvation.

War did break out between China and Britain, as the missionaries expected, but they were not forced to leave Macao, as they had feared. Roberts, however, was confronted with another dilemma he had not foreseen. An economic depression swept the United States about the time he had left for China,[36] and it soon affected the source of his independent support. The China Mission Advocate ceased publication after only a year of monthly issues due to a lack of patronage,[37] which may have been the result of the general economic situation. In early 1841 he tried to have the Roberts Fund and China Mission Society incorporated in Mississippi so he could sell stock, but neither his directors nor the State agreed to this plan. The Baptist Board of Missions accepted him as one of its regular, supported missionaries, and for his part Roberts agreed to abide by all its regulations.[38]

About the same time that Roberts was accepted for support by the Baptist Board, Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain in one of the premature conventions that punctuated the Opium War. His personal and Britain's territorial victories were interpreted by Roberts as a

two-fold sign "that all things work together for good to them that love God ..." (Romans 8:28). Not only would he himself be able to remain to spread the Gospel, Hong Kong too would be instrumental in the advance of God's kingdom:

> Hong Kong is a British possession here now, thank God, on which as a fulcrum may be fixed the gospel lever to move and raise the Chinese nation ...A new era commences in China; and the circumstances of the case most urgently call upon us to improve this favorable change for the renewal of our zeal & labors in behalf of this perishing nation![39]

Almost as if he had read Roberts's letter, Sir Henry Pottinger, the ranking British official in China, encouraged Protestant missionaries to relocate on Hong Kong, but his motives were probably more political than religious. Few missionaries accepted this invitation at first. Roberts and Shuck, now on better terms, decided about a year later that they should make this move. They solicited funds from the foreign community at Macao so they could erect a chapel on the island. In early 1842, when pledges and donations reached $1200, they moved to Hong Kong. Unlike Macao, Hong Kong had recently and indisputably been part of China, so Roberts and Shuck were among the first American Protestants to establish a Christian mission on Chinese soil. They looked forward eagerly to working among the growing Chinese population on the small island free from Chinese and Portuguese interference.[40] The Treaty of Nanking was signed later that year. It ceded Hong Kong to Great Britain permanently and opened five ports, including Canton, to foreign trade and residence. The Baptist Board, believing this was the long-awaited opening of China, formally established a China Mission at Hong Kong. William Dean was sent from Bangkok to work with Roberts and Shuck.[41]

Roberts was persuaded to go to Chekchu, a small fishing village on the south side of the island, to work

independently. He readily agreed and took up his new responsibilities with enthusiasm. He preached regularly to a nearby British garrison, but devoted most of his efforts to the Chinese he had come to save. He walked around the village and in the countryside daily, speaking to the inhabitants and inviting them to services he conducted several times each week in his residence. Shortly after his arrival in Chekchu, his efforts were rewarded when a middle-aged man named Ch'en made a profession of faith and requested baptism. After five years in China, Ch'en was Roberts's first convert. Despite his elation he questioned the man carefully for eleven days to make sure Ch'en fully understood Christian salvation. Roberts was finally satisfied and baptized Ch'en on June 12, 1842. He thereupon hired Ch'en to assist him in preaching and to help him learn more of the Cantonese dialect.[42]

No other Chinese followed Ch'en in Christian baptism at Chekchu, and Roberts began to grow restless in this small backwater. When Shuck and Dean repeatedly voted against his requests to leave Chekchu, Roberts took his case directly to the Baptist Board. He complained that his health was suffering there and that other locations, especially Canton, offered far better opportunities for Christian evangelism. Shuck and Dean relented to the extent of voting to permit Roberts to join them in Victoria, as the British settlement on Hong Kong was named.[43]

In Victoria, Roberts tried to fit in with the foreign community and with the missionary work Shuck and Dean had begun. He participated in an interdenominational conference on translating the Bible into Chinese. He joined his Baptist colleagues in an appeal to the Baptist churches in six American cities. They wanted each city to sponsor one missionary family in each of the five treaty ports and on Hong Kong.[44] Roberts hoped to be sponsored as the missionary in Canton, which was looming larger in his view as the most fertile mission field in China.[45]

His desire to work in Canton became more acute with the treatment he received at the hands of Shuck and Dean.

They were more polished in their manners, more highly educated, and resented it when Roberts wrote to the Board with petty complaints. Missionaries of other denominations also considered Roberts somewhat inept. Dr. Peter Parker, one of the founders of the American Board mission, called him "an illiterate man ..ignorant of the peculiarities of the Chinese mission."[46] Shuck shared this opinion of Roberts.[47] He and Dean were able to use their two-to-one voting majority to assign Roberts to traveling among outlying villages and islands in order not to damage the reputation of the Baptist Mission.

The highly respected Karl Gützlaff returned to Hong Kong and accepted Roberts's invitation to live in his house until he left on another journey. He no doubt heard Roberts's side of the dispute and repaid Roberts's hospitality with a glowing letter to the Baptist Board on Roberts's behalf. "Of all the men in the field, whom I have known these 17 years," he wrote, "he is the most devoted to his Saviour and active in the work of evangelizing the Chinese."[48]

Dean may have had mixed motives, but a few days after Gützlaff's letter was written, he voted with Roberts to allow him to go to Canton for six months. Roberts wasted no time. He left Hong Kong on May 14, 1844, with two native assistants, and as soon as he arrived in Canton the following day, he rented a house about a mile from the foreign factories. This has been called the first Protestant mission on mainland Chinese soil.[49]

Roberts may not have realized this aspect of his relocation to Canton, but he finally felt free to serve God as he believed God intended. He did not suffer from the same summertime malady that had bothered him on Hong Kong, and he found some immediate and positive response to his efforts. A Chinese official came to his house for lunch and stayed for prayer, kneeling with the others. Roberts baptized his second convert and found several who seemed interested in learning about salvation. He conducted daily Bible classes and distributed tracts in Chinese shops without any interference.[50]

Interference did come, but not from the Chinese. Shuck complained to the Board that Roberts had left Chekchu prematurely. Shortly after his departure some Jesuits arrived and reaped the harvest that Roberts had sown. Moreover, in Shuck's judgment, Roberts was too greatly influenced by Gützlaff. The Prussian had offered to support Roberts, so Shuck wondered whether it would not be better to let him do so. The Board could then use Roberts's salary to provide a "proper Missionary and one who will act with this Mission."[51] This was the first but not the last suggestion from the field that the Board should replace Roberts.

When Roberts returned from Chekchu, Shuck and Dean had also suggested to the Board that Roberts be assigned to Wongnichung, another small village on Hong Kong. Roberts may not have been aware that this request had been made. He returned from Canton in September, before his six months were up, full of good news about the prospects there. He asked Shuck and Dean to approve his residence in Canton as a permanent station of the Hong Kong Mission, but they agreed only to an extensiton of his stay there until December.[52] After he returned to Canton, Roberts received word that the Board had concurred in the proposal that he go to Wongnichung. This was a crucial turning point for Roberts. If he obeyed the Board and went to Wongnichung, he would be abandoning the host of lost sinners in Canton, some of whom had responded positively to his efforts. So he informed Shuck and Dean as well as the Board that if he could not remain permanently in Canton as a separate mission, he would resign.[53] Roberts knew it would take about a year for the Board's answer to arrive. He hoped his ultimatum would cause it to change its decision and approve his place in Canton as a separate mission where he would not have to deal with Shuck and Dean. So he continued his work in Canton and hoped for the best.

What came instead was Shuck, who visited Canton in early 1845 and told Roberts that he intended to relocate the entire Hong Kong Mission to Canton. Roberts may have begun to think he was about to be rid of Shuck for good and was dismayed at the possibility of having to

deal with him again. He lost no time in expressing his displeasure to the Board:

> I have discovered that from the peculiar temperament of his mind & mine that I love him the most when I see him the lest /sic/, and therefore I do most earnestly desire that he may never come to Canton to live under any circumstances![54]

Two circumstances did occur to bring about just what Roberts hoped would not happen. The Board approved Canton as a permanent station of the Hong Kong Mission, and Shuck and a newly arrived colleague decided that they should operate the Canton station instead of Roberts. Shuck, Dr. Thomas Devan, and nine Chinese assistants moved to Canton in early April, 1845, and immediately organized the First Baptist Church of Canton City with 24 members. In reporting this move to the Board, Shuck suggested that it sever its connection with Roberts "as soon as possible."[55]

The Board's notification that Canton was to be a station of the Hong Kong Mission also included a request that Roberts return to the United States. He interpreted this request as the prelude to his dismissal. He refused to go back. He could not return, he replied, because he had a "duty to obey the Saviour's command and preach the gospel to the Chinese." Should he be dismissed in absentia, the Board was to inform his China Mission Society and make any necessary settlement of funds he had continued to receive from it through the Board.[56]

The Board was spared a contentious dismissal action by a division among Baptists in the United States. The sectional dispute over slavery and other issues caused Baptists in the southern and western states to separate and form their own organization in May, 1845. Baptist foreign missionaries, having come from all parts of the United States, were allowed to choose between the two Baptist bodies. Shuck and Roberts, both southerners,

decided to join the new Southern Baptist Convention.[57] In an amicable settlement, the Canton Mission property was transferred to the Foreign Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, while the Hong Kong Mission remained with the reconstituted American Baptist Missionary Union.[58]

The Southern Board adopted China as its first mission field, which Roberts not only approved of, but which gave him great personal satisfaction:

> See what God has wrought in his providence for us--even exceeding our most sanguine expectations, as to openings for the reception of the gospel. Who knows whether the Southern Baptist Board has not been constituted for such a time as this.[59]

The Southern Board knew that Roberts was a difficult missionary. In addition his China Mission Society redirected its partial support of him to the new Board. For its part, the Southern Board agreed to a special arrangement whereby Roberts was to be supported separately from its other missionaries and he would be "permitted to labor without sustaining any official connexion with them."[60] By this time Roberts had a great deal of experience in acting independently. While his status with the Southern Board was being determined, he organized the Canton Baptist Missionary Society. He was designated as its "general agent," and five prominent American and British merchants served as its trustees. He continued his activities with this agency even after other Southern Baptist missionaries arrived in Canton. This affiliation was not the only issue that soon disturbed the new men. Theological and personality differences became so great that one of them requested that Roberts be dismissed.[61]

Besides these difficulties with his Baptist colleagues, Roberts became involved in controversy with some of the native inhabitants of Canton. In late 1844 he had moved to another, larger house. It was

located in a rough waterfront area, and his neighbors let him know that he was not welcome.[62] He antagonized them by beating a gong to announce services and later erected a steeple from which he rang a bell he had received from New York. A local geomancer determined that the steeple disturbed the balance of natural forces protecting a nearby temple,[63] but Roberts considered this just so much native superstition. It only indicated that the Chinese needed Christianity even more desperately than he had thought before.

His attitude was not very helpful considering the prevailing state of affairs in Canton. The Chinese and English versions of the Treaty of Nanking differed on the vital point of foreign residence in the treaty ports. Ever since 1842, Cantonese officials had kept all foreigners outside the city walls, Roberts and his mission residences included. Foreigners knew that most Cantonese disliked them, so the issue had remained a point of diplomatic negotiations for five years. Anti-foreign sentiment intensified in March and April, 1847. Some Englishmen out on a hike had been stoned by a mob, and the British retaliated by attacking some Chinese forts on the Pearl River below Canton. A hasty truce was arranged to prevent a resumption of hostilities, but this agreement only angered Cantonese even more, as it promised that foreigners would be allowed to enter the city two years hence.[64] It was in the context of this highly charged atmosphere that the mob attacked Roberts's residence and chapel on May 23, 1847.

It is not altogether fair to attempt an assessment of Issachar Roberts based only on the first ten of his thirty years in China. His greatest claim to fame--as the foreign teacher of Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, leader of the Taiping Rebellion--came later than the period covered in this study. The two basic influences on Roberts's actions and attitudes were nevertheless evident even in his first decade on the mission field. First was his deep religious faith, without which he would not have gone to China--or stayed there in the face of formidable obstacles. And second was his upbringing and experiences in the frontier area of the United States in

the early nineteenth century. He tended to see each obstacle he faced as a frontier farmer would: if he could not cut it down or move it out of the way, he plowed around it. He also viewed China as a sort of spiritual wilderness, where the accumulated sinfulness of centuries had to be cleared away before the seeds of righteousness could be planted.

Moreover, the personal aspects of Roberts's experiences can help focus and explain some of the key elements in the early contacts between the United States and China: the rise of foreign missions, the logistical and administrative problems of operating a mission enterprise half-way around the world, the resistance to foreigners in China, and the means by which foreigners were able to enter and influence Chinese life. In all these elements Issachar Roberts was not only a participant but a pioneer. Despite all his difficulties, it was a role he seemed to relish.

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[1]Roberts to Dr. J.B. Taylor, Corresponding Secretary, from Canton, May 23 and 27, 1847, Southern Baptist Foreign Mission Board Archives; hereafter cited as SBA. (The author of this paper gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of the Foreign Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, Richmond, Virginia, for its permission to cite material from its archives.)

[2]Alexander H. Everett, U.S. Commissioner to China, to Secretary of State James Buchanan, from Canton, June 20, 1847, National Archives, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Despatches from United States Ministers to China: 1843-1906, Vol. 3; hereafter cited as NA-DD with appropriate volume number. See also Te-kong Tong, United States Diplomacy in China, 1844-60 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), pp. 91, 249.

[3]H.A. Tupper, The Foreign Missions of the Southern Baptist Convention (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publishing Society, and Richmond, Va.: Foreign Mission

Board of the Southern Baptist Convention), p. 83. See also Margaret M. Coughlin, "Strangers in the House: J. Lewis Shuck and Issachar Roberts, First American Baptist Missionaries to China," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1972), pp. 37-38.

[4]John B. Boles, The Great Revival, 1787-1805: The Origins of the Southern Evangelical Mind (n.p.: The University Press of Kentucky, 1972), pp. x, 183, 188.

[5]Coughlin, p. 38; Tupper, p. 83.

[6]Joe M. King, A History of South Carolina Baptists (Columbia, S.C.: The General Board of the South Carolina Baptist Convention, 1964), p. 189.

[7]King, p. 183.

[8]Boles, pp. 101-106.

[9]Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China (reprint; Taipei: Ch'eng-Wen Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 201-202, 211-212.

[10]Boles, pp. 106-107.

[11]Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of the Expansion of Christianity, Vol. IV, The Great Century, A.D. 1800-A.D. 1900: Europe and the United States of America (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1945), pp. 79-83.

[12]King, pp. 167-168; see also Oliver Wendell Elsbree, The Rise of the Missionary Spirit in America, 1790-1815 (Williamsport, Pa.: The Williamsport Printing and Binding Co., 1928), pp. 113-117.

[13]Kenneth Gray Hobart, Early American Baptist Missions to the Chinese (Shanghai: n.n., 1939), pp. 10, 94.

[14]Hobart, p. 10, citing Minutes of the Executive Committee, August 5, 1833.

[15]Coughlin, p. 38; Tupper, p. 83.

[16]Boles, p. 119; see also T. Scott Miyakawa, Protestants and Pioneers: Individualism and Conformity on the American Frontier (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 33-35, 88-89, 103-104, 145, 148-149, 153, 155-156.

[17]Tupper, p. 83.

[18]Roberts to the Rev. Lucius Bolles, Corresponding Secretary, from Mount Asylum, Mississippi, July 5, 1834, American Baptist Foreign Mission Society Archives; hereafter cited as ABA. (The author of this paper gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society, Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, for its permission to cite material from its archives.)

[19]Roberts to the Rev. Solomon Peck, Corresponding Secretary of the Baptist Board of Missions, from Chekchu, July 15, 1842. ABA.

[20]Coughlin, p. 39; see also Eugene P. Boardman, Christian Influence upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion, 1851-1864 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1952), pp. 43-44, 49.

[21]"Mission to China," Baptist Missionary Magazine, 14:94-96, March, 1834.

[22]Roberts to the Committee on Foreign Missions, from Cincinnati, November 5, 1835, quoted in George H. Danton, The Culture Contacts of the United States and China: The Earliest Sino-American Culture Contacts, 1784-1844 (reprint; New York: Octagon Books, 1974), pp. 84-85.

[23]William B. Johnson to Bolles, Edgefield, South Carolina, December 23, 1835; and Jeremiah Burns to Bolles, LaGrange, West Tennessee, January 15, 1836, ABA. See also Coughlin, pp. 39-41.

[24]Coughlin, p. 41. The Constitution of the China Mission Society appears as Appendix I to her study, pp. 242-243. See also Encyclopedia of Southern Baptists (Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press, 1958), II, 866.

[25]Roberts to Bolles, Batavia, Java, January 25, 1837, ABA.

[26]Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China, pp. 207-217, 216-219, 222-224.

[27]Coughlin, p. 19-32; Hobart, pp. 15, 34.

[28]Roberts to Bolles, Canton, May 22, 1837; and Shuck to Bolles, /Macao/, May 3, 1837, ABA.

[29]Coughlin, p. 42, citing the Baptist Banner, 3.28:2-3, July 18, 1837.

[30]Tupper, pp. 83-84, 86.

[31]The full text of the Board's regulations is appended to Roberts's letter to Peck, Macao, April 19, 1841, ABA.

[32]China Mission Advocate was obtained on microfilm from Greenwood Press, Inc., Westport, Connecticut 06880.

[33]See Boardman, pp. 46, 50 n.20, 144-145 on Roberts's religious tracts. Roberts's monthly journal for December, 1840, ABA, contains the complete English text of one of these.

[34]Roberts to Waller, Macao, /probably May, 1838/, China Mission Advocate, 1:27, January, 1839.

[35]Roberts, "China Mission," China Mission Advocate, 1:322-323, November, 1839.

[36]John D. Hicks, The Federal Union (2nd ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 405.

[37]China Mission Advocate, 1:379, December, 1839.

[38]Roberts to the Board of the China Mission Society, Macao, February 18, 1841; and Roberts to Peck, Macao, April 19, 1841, ABA. The change in Roberts's status was noted in the Baptist Missionary Magazine, 22.7:203, July 1842, and 23.1:20, January, 1843.

[39]Roberts to the Board of the China Mission Society, Macao, February 18, 1841, ABA.

[40]Annual letter of Roberts and Shuck, Macao, February 17, 1842 (Roberts's fortieth birthday), Baptist Banner and Western Pioneer, 9.34:6, August 25, 1842, in Coughlin, Appendix III, pp. 296-303; Roberts to Peck, Hong Kong, April 23, 1842, ABA.

[41]Roberts's Journal, Hong Kong, March 21, 1843, ABA; Baptist Missionary Magazine, 23.6:156-157, June, 1843.

[42]Roberts to Peck, Hong Kong, April 23, 1842; and Roberts's Journal, Chekchu July, 1842, ABA; Roberts's letter, Chekchu December 2, 1842, Baptist Banner and Western Pioneer, 10.21:1, May 25, 1843, quoted in Coughlin, pp. 305-310; Baptist Missionary Magazine, 23.1:20, January, 1843; 23.6:157, June, 1843; 23.11:281, November, 1843.

[43]Roberts to Peck, Chekchu, July 15 and October 25, 1842; and Roberts's Journals, July, 1842, and February, 1843, ABA; Baptist Missionary Magazine, 23.11:281, November, 1843.

[44]Roberts to Peck, Hong Kong, August 23, 1843, ABA; Baptist Missionary Magazine, 23.12:315-316, December, 1843.

[45]Roberts's Journal, February and April, 1843, ABA.

[46]Quoted in Coughlin, p. 47.

[47]Shuck to Peck, Macao, January 1, 1841, ABA.

[48]Gützlaff to Peck, Hong Kong, May 10, 1844, ABA (in Roberts's file).

[49]Roberts to Peck, Canton, May 31, 1844, ABA; Coughlin, p. 87.

[50]Roberts to Peck, Canton, August 14, 1844, ABA.

[51]Shuck to Peck, Hong Kong, August 14, 1844, ABA.

[52]Roberts to Peck, Victoria, October 1, 1844, ABA.

[53]Roberts to Hong Kong Mission, Canton, November 15, 1844; and Roberts to Peck, Canton, December 14, 1844, ABA.

[54]Roberts's Journal, Canton, February 28, 1845, ABA.

[55]Devan to Peck, Victoria, March 4, 1845; and Shuck to Peck, Canton, April 7, 1845, ABA.

[56]Roberts to Peck, Canton, April 10, 1845, ABA.

[57]Roberts' Postscript, August 4, 1845, to his July Journal, Canton; and Shuck to Peck, Fredericksburg, Virginia, April 4, 1846, ABA.

[58]Sophie Bronson Titterington, A Century of Baptist Foreign Missions (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1891), pp. 149, 163.

[59]Quoted in Tupper, p. 84.

[60]Roberts to Taylor, Canton, September 28, 1846, SBA.

[61]Francis Johnson to Taylor, Canton, November 25, 1847, cited in Coughlin, p. 98; see also Coughlin, pp. 88, 94-96.

[62]Roberts /to Gützlaff/, Canton, December 3, 1844, SBA: U.S. Consul Paul S. Forbes to U.S. Commissioner John W. Davis, Canton, January 27, 1849, NA-DD:5, cited in Tong, p. 91.

[63]Roberts /Gützlaff/, Canton, February, 1846; and Roberts to Taylor, Canton, July 21, 1846, SBA.

[64]Frederic E. Wakeman, Jr., Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorders in South China, 1839-1861 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), passim.

Commentary On

"Issachar J. Roberts"
A Southern Missionary Pioneer in China"

James W. Gettys, Jr. - Erskine College

Mr. Pruden notes that Issachar J. Roberts devoted thirty years of his life to foreign missions in China. This paper covers only the first of Roberts' three decades in East Asia. The title, "Issachar J. Roberts: A Southern Missionary Pioneer in China," is somewhat misleading. Roberts's major significance, his association with Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, occurred after the period covered by this paper. Although this association is noted, the reader could be misled by the title. A more precise title might indicate the span of years under consideration. Perhaps a better title might be "Issachar J. Roberts: A Southern Missionary in China Before the Taiping Rebellion."

Roberts arrived in Mississippi around 1831 and left for the mission field in 1836. His Mississippi farm was reputed to be worth $30,000. Since he supported himself working as a saddler when he arrived in Mississippi, one must assume he made his fortune on his farm between 1831 and 1835. Was he a slaveholder? What was his attitude toward the peculiar institution?

Before his arrival in Mississippi, Roberts was an agent for the "Colonization Society and Sunday School Union." Was the "Colonization Society" the American Colonization Society? Liberia, Roberts's first choice as a mission field, was settled under the auspices of the American Colonization Society. The publication of Children of Pride, Roll, Jordan Roll, Slaves Without Masters, and other recent works describe the relationship among slaves, free blacks, and white protestant clergy in the antebellum South. Did Roberts wish to serve in Liberia because he accepted black Christians in a fashion similar to that of Charles C. Jones?

If this was his attitude toward blacks, why did he not serve as a home missionary to slaves as Jones did? Was Roberts's attitude toward blacks similar to that of Samuel A. Agnew? Agnew was described by Eugene Genovese in Roll, Jordan Roll as a racist clergyman. Why would Liberia (or China, for that matter) be attractive as a mission field to a racist? Perhaps Roberts's attitude toward blacks fell somewhere between Jones's pollyanna paternalism and Agnew's patronizing racism. Some consideration of how Roberts's attitude toward blacks related to his mission work would strengthen this paper.

The Dictionary of National Biography reports that Roberts once "ignored a dying missionary with the remark, 'Let the dead bury their dead, but I must preach the gospel.' " In addition to his irascibility, this source attributes Roberts's difficulties with other missionaries to his ostracism following his service to the leper colony in Macao. Perhaps this ostracism was not without reason for Roberts died of leprosy at Upper Alton Illinois in 1871.

Neither his "strikingly uncouth and ...marked eccentricities," nor his association with lepers fully explains Roberts's failure to relate with his fellow missionaries. As Mr. Pruden notes, Roberts was able to create the Canton Baptist Missionary Society with five prominent American and British businessmen serving as trustees. These businessmen, whose educational, social, and economic status must have equalled that of missionaries, evidently accepted Roberts fairly well. Karl Gützloff, the "highly respected" Prussian missionary, established a close and enduring relationship with Roberts. Gützloff wrote that Roberts was the most "active in the work of evangelizing the Chinese" of all the missionaries he had encountered in seventeen years of service.

There are some indications that theological differences between Roberts and other missionaries contributed to his difficulties. This paper gives the reader little insight into Roberts's personal beliefs and teachings.

Although an understanding of Roberts's theology may help to explain his differences with other missionaries, his personal beliefs are of greater significance because he instructed Hung Hsiu-ch'uan for two months around the year 1847. Hung developed pseudo-Christian teachings including the novel idea that he was Christ's younger brother. As the "Heavenly King," Hung led the Taiping Rebellion during the period Americans were absorbed with the Civil War. Perhaps Roberts's religious instructions did not contribute to Hung's pseudo-Christianity. In 1853, after he had attracted a huge following, the "Heavenly King" asked Roberts to join him and instruct his followers. Roberts not only joined Hung in 1860, but the former served as the latter's minister for foreign affairs. This good Baptist missionary not only wore yellow robes but even donned a crown to enhance his image as the Taiping Rebellion's foreign minister. Roberts's abrasive personality resulted in his alienation from Hung in 1862.

If Hung's pseudo-Christian teachings were utterly alien to Roberts, why did the latter consent to join the Taiping Rebellion? Did Roberts's religious beliefs and teachings during the period covered by this paper include ideas later developed or twisted by Hung Hsiu-ch'uan?

Mr. Pruden's failure to specify Roberts's theological position may be the most serious flaw in this paper. This contention is qualified because the available sources may not provide a description of Roberts's theology. If this is the case, an explanatory footnote would satisfy the quizzical reader.

Most Westerners, including this reader, know nothing of the Taiping Rebellion which was of major significance to Chinese history. Few persons anywhere understand or appreciate the role of pioneer missionaries such as Issachar Jacob Roberts. Mr. Pruden has done a service by presenting this paper on Roberts's first decade in China.

BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: CHRISTOPHER G. MEMMINGER OF CHARLESTON AND THE OLD SOUTH IN MID-PASSAGE, 1830-1861

Laylon Wayne Jordan

I

> The conflicts that have been so much a part of the Southern experience have occurred ...between Southerners and within Southerners, as much as between North and South.[1]

The United States in the first half of the nineteenth century was a nation in motion. "Change crowded on the heels of change."[2] Nurtured by nature and will, the republic evolved a more democratic political system, the result of a social, psychological, and institutional process which had roots in Renaissance and Reformation Britain but culminated on American soil in the 1830's in the Age of Jackson. It began an economic transformation, the Industrial Revolution: created a new transportation system based on canals and railroads and a vastly larger and more diversified economic capacity based on machines and an expanded and newly-accessible internal market. Its citizens, essentially settled on the Atlantic, increased six-fold and leaped the Mississippi River, spreading out in irregular patches to the valleys of Oregon and California, while fresh masses from Europe filled places and jobs left in industrializing northeastern cities. Meanwhile, a prolonged religious revival waxed and waned, at once denying rationalism and materialism absolute ascendance in the American heart and mind and lending support to myriad movements of benevolent and moral reform. And a several-decades long search for aesthetic and cultural distinction seemed of a sudden to meet fulfillment, in Thoreau, Hawthorne, Whitman, Poe, and other giants of the "American Renaissance."[3] That "this land of contemptuous youth" was fated for an even greater destiny was clear to acute observers like Alexis de

Tocqueville: that is, if it did not explode from an excess of energy or simply dissolve into anarchy.[4]

No section of the United States was untouched and unmoved, in this age of transition, not even the Old South. While the rest of the nation moved rapidly into the modern world--altered the landscape, piled factories and people upon factories and people in huge metropolitan centers, mechanized agriculture, and transformed the law, abolishing chattel slavery in favor of free labor--the South changed more slowly and less completely: but it changed. By 1840 the economy of the Southern states was profoundly less industrial and technological and its population and values more "traditionalist" and rural than the Northeast, and the polity and society less egalitarian than the Northeast and West; and on all sides consciousness of these differences was well-developed. Most important, the Southland's essential and now "peculiar" institution, chattel slavery, still relegated bout one-third of its people, almost all blacks, to a protean condition of servitude and exposed itself to a torrent of moral condemnation from pious reformers, citizens of states and nations which had put such barbarism behind them.[5] Yet the South was not without entrepreneurial and cultural ebullience and indeed as a whole experienced economic "flush times" and marked material change.[6] Charleston, not one of the most dynamic cities in the nation or even the South, managed three-fold advances in both land area and population between 1790 and 1850, built a railroad of 136 miles to the lower-state cotton center Hamburg which when completed in 1833 was the longest in the world, absorbed a substantial immigration from other American locales and Europe, and made manufacturing and free labor a significant part of its economic life, supplementing black slaves and free Negroes and seaport and marketing and social facilities for plantation agriculture. If real prosperity was elusive for Charleston because its sea commerce, always the central source of wealth, was stagnant if not declining, it was not merely because of want of will and enlightenment on its part but powerful natural disadvantages: the two most successful rivals, New York and New Orleans, were much better situated, with vast river systems and hinterlands and deeper harbors.[7]

II

When Southerners at the cross-roads of the 1830's, 1840's, and 1850's addressed strategic and tactical questions about the future of America and the particular destiny of the South, they did not return one monolithic response. There were, of course, men like John C. Calhoun and Robert Barnwell Rhett, both South Carolinians and sometime residents of Charleston, who set their faces firmly against "modernism" in every form: free labor, immigration, industrialism, urbanism, commercialism (beyond a bare minimum), and democracy (despite a few unconvincing disclaimers). They argued that critics of traditional Southern ways were deluded. What the modernists called progress was truly backwardness: modern society was a breeding place for crime and vice, free-labor cruel and irresponsible exploitation, and industrialism discredited by blighted environments, chronic depressions, endless class strife, and a permanent threat of revolution. Backwardness, so-called, was beneficial and the South an antimodernist utopia: a wholesome pastoral world of hospitality and elegance, where capital and labor were joined, without smokestacks and without money, in a happy organic mutuality of master and servant which not only provided for the needs of both parties but produced in masters the highest type of leader while it permitted true liberty and fraternity among all white men. Any problems in this ideal society resulted from misguided and partial policies of the federal government like the protective tariff and innovations (like steam engines, which people of traditionalist attitudes managed to exclude from the Charleston city limits until 1845) which dishonored Southern traditions. Such attitudes were expressed with what appeared to be complete assurance. Yet to the historian the aggressive defensiveness of Old South radical conservatism--Admit no fault in oneself or virtue in the other camp. Meet the enemy at the frontier. Go headlong into secession (and war) for time is not on our side--suggests that Calhoun, Rhett, and similar spirits harbored unspoken misdoubts.[8]

The doubts came from other lips, for some Southerners were unwilling to let the issue rest in the care of conservative sectional patriots. Opposition to slavery, the primary test of loyalty in South Carolina from 1820, virtually disappeared from the state as time went on, but dissent from other planks of conservative doctrine long remained possible. Between the Calhoun-Rhett conservatives and a small group of absolute dissenters from regional norms who were driven, like Charleston's Angelina and Sarah Grimke, to take up residence outside the South,[9] emerged spokesmen of a third persuasion. These moderates were often townspeople.[10]

However much they might take slavery and staple agriculture for granted, many inhabitants of Baltimore, Richmond, Charleston, and New Orleans had little relish for the other antimodernist desiderata of the radical conservatives. Their "seaward orientation of life" made them people of the world. The idea of a "fortress South" set apart, safe from the threatening implications of economic growth and new values but sterile, dishonored, and desolate, they had difficulty adopting. Indeed, to have accepted conservative arguments entire would have been to deny themselves and their familiar milieu, for Southern seaport towns represented the farthest extension of just those "alien" influences--the steam engine, immigration, the capitalist spirit and mere monies wealth--which Southern purists wished away, and gave witness to the same human and environmental problems--congested living, visible poverty, a volatile mixing of cultures, "uppity" blacks, disputes between capital and labor, vice and crime, turbulent politics--which conservatives everywhere were wont to cite in condemnation of modernity.[11] Problems which the unsympathetic conservative and countryman disdained citizens of towns had to accept or ameliorate or suppress. As a group, urban leaders of the Old South pursued many of the same ends as civic stalwarts and businessmen elsewhere: prosperity, order, and cultural distinction, and used the same means: free enterprise, governmental action, and exhortations to "progress." In the process, they affected Southern life sufficiently in the middle third of the nineteenth century "to transform towns to

modern cities on the threshold of maturity."[12] But for all their best intentions and strenuous effort, they were finally unable to arrest either a fateful regional drift toward cultural isolationism or the "perfect whirlwind of public feeling" which brought the Old South to disunion, and for two reasons. First, they were too few and too weak politically. Their respective urban enclaves were after all smallish islands in a Southern mainstream that was essentially rural and dominated by rural values and planting interests. And second, at a certain level, the level of unspoken assumption and emotion, urban moderates were, inextricably and for better or worse, children of Southern pride.[13]

III

Christopher Gustavus Memminger was a distinguished representative of the "progressive" urban leaders of the Old South. His personal background was anomalous. He was born into a middle class household in Nayhingen, in the duchy of Wurtemberg, Germany, in 1803 in the midst of war and revolution. His father died a soldier against Napoleon; his mother and maternal grandparents and he himself were uprooted and propelled to America; his mother succumbed to disease in Charleston; and his grandparents consigned Gustavus to the Charleston Orphan House and moved to Philadelphia: all before Memminger was four years old. When he was eleven he was adopted by Thomas H. Bennett, merchant, landowner, and future governor of the state of South Carolina, and by that event was transformed from a lowly orphan lad into a favored-son in an old-stock patrician family. Educated at the College of South Carolina, he entered the law offices of a foster-uncle in Charleston and was drawn into politics, a fairly common course for a lawyer of ability and connections. He secured election as city alderman in 1833 and membership in the state legislature in 1836, where he bacame a powerful force and was continued by his constituents year after year through the 1850's.[14]

What difference did Memminger's early life and associations make? Perhaps a good deal. It seems

likely that the young lawyer took from the merchant-foster father his edifying "progressivism."[15] It is equally probable that his foreign birth and sojourn in the Orphan House helped preserve him against local and class prejudices of the most emotional and unreasoning kind.[16] It is a fact demonstrable from his utterances and actions that, although he came to feel real affection for his adopted city and state, his patriotism always comprehended (in words he used in a college essay) "nations, dynasties and empires"--or at least an extended region.[17] In the first great crisis of the American union triggered by federal tariff policy in 1832, he was aligned with his foster-father and foster-uncle (and most other notables of the local mercantile and legel communities) in vehement opposition to the Calhoun-Rhett party of "nullification," although significantly not against "state rights," contributing a pamphlet satire to the Union cause which attracted some notoriety and may be said to have launched his political career.[18] As he established his own identity in public affairs, Memminger was consistently the peacemaker and adjuster--and promoter, in something of the mode of the Great Pacificator Henry Clay. Twenty years after he got his initiation in politics, at a meeting of Charleston Democrats which in 1852 endorsed the Democratic Presidential nomination of Franklin Pierce, he assumed a position in the on-and-off again sectional conflict well in advance of other major South Carolina politicians: Give up the agitation which has only divided us. Seek redress of grievances within the system, without a fierce struggle, in cooperation with sympathetic Northern men like Pierce. Make use of a respite from political contention to build present and future wealth and power in Southern and white unity and economic growth. If this policy fails, South Carolina may mobilize for disunion in truth, with a just claim to the approbation of all Southern people and indeed all fair-minded people everywhere, and with a fair chance of creating a viable new political constellation, a Southern confederacy.[19] The two episodes illuminate a profound shift in Memminger's personal attitude toward "disunion." His loyalty to the United States had been shaken and broken "under the impulse of deep-felt wrongs," pri-

marily verbal arrows and threats by abolitionists and the Wilmot Proviso, a failed Congressional effort to preclude slavery from the territory acquired from Mexico in 1848.[20] But he still repudiated separate secession as he rejected the wisdom of haste, for his hopes for the future rested not upon South Carolina, but the South--and an "up-dated" and "perfected" version of that.

Which brings us to the matter of Memminger's temperament. Everything that we know about him suggests that he was little affected by romanticism, supposedly a congenital Southern predilection and certainly a powerful force in men like Rhett.[21] He was logical and utilitarian. Not emotion but analysis, not fancy but realism, not form but function and consequence, not serenity but power: these were his ordinary standards.[22] Although he seems never to have questioned the Southern caste system or the orthodox doctrine that the Southern way of life was superior to others in some ways, he was too penetrating not to perceive shortfalls between ideal and real achievement, even in the South's special metier, social stability, and to know that in certain respects, especially in cultural distinction and general prosperity and power, the South lagged badly behind the Northeast, as Charleston trailed New York. Rhett and other Southern patriots claimed for the South an exemplary social harmony. Very well, this must be realized in fact. One "Laertes," in an anonymous letter published in the Charleston Mercury, the mouthpiece in lower South Carolina of Rhett and radical conservatism, asserted that the South abounded in people "of the highest moral and intellectual culture" and possessed all the natural elements that constitute "the wealth and power of a nation." Memminger was driven by his temperament and his values to nurture them and endeavor to make them flourish.[23]

IV

During his years of greatest vigor, the 1840's and 1850's, Memminger was intensively involved, both as a

private and a public man, in more varigated and numerous civic pursuits than one can easily warrant. He was avid in quest of culture--a central figure in several "circles" who numbered among his intimates leading men in science, humanities, and arts--as if he could by his own zeal make up for deficiencies in Charleston and in the South generally.[24] He was much identified with philanthropy, serving for many years as a trustee of the "noble charity" which had once befriended him, the Charleston Orphan House.[25] As an alderman, he was instrumental in the substantial improvement and expansion of King Street, Charleston's principal business street and its link, via a wagon road, with the capital at Columbia and its commercial hinterland. He was always ready "to advance any public movement that would in his judgment, promote the business interests of Charleston," and to oppose any measure injurious to what he considered the city's general and permament welfare. He waged a long and losing fight against acts of the state legislature, passed in 1822 and subsequent years, which as a foil against servile insurrection restricted the landing of Negro seamen at South Carolina ports, in part because he believed they discouraged sea commerce, and an equally long and successful struggle on behalf of Charleston bankers as well as democracy against the state-owned and Columbia-based Bank of South Carolina, a "great central money power,"[26] He spent more time and effort, beginning about 1835, promoting the building of railroads, especially one which would "scale" the Blue Ridge Mountains and bring into being "a union of friendship and profit" between Charleston, the eastern terminus, and urban centers of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys like Cincinnati. (Underwritten by Charleston money and state-subscribed bonds, the ribbon of iron was begun toward the end of the 1830's, but intercity and interstate rivalries combined with conservative opposition and the disruption of the Civil War, prevented its ever being completed, even within South Carolina).[27] Memminger never tired of exhorting Charleston to develop a varied industrial and mercantile life, the better to meet the competition of new ports and farmlands in the Deep South, reduce the drain of resources which paid for the finished products and shipping of the Northeast,

and promote prosperity which did not exclude the lowliest citizen.[28]

By far the most important social issue Memminger addressed and acted upon as a public servant concerned the condition and role, in region, state, and city, of the numerous class of common white people, neither masters nor slaves, who thus did not fit into the traditional ethical and social and economic system of aristocratic paternalism and slave labor. When he first took notice of the matter, in 1849, it was in the context of a newly burgeoning competition between Irish immigrants and free and enslaved blacks for employment in the shops, wharves, and streets of Charleston and the emergence of a public debate over the relative expense and social impact of slaves and free whites as artisans and operatives in factories. Initially he assumed what was for him an uncharacteristically doctrinaire and conservative position. In a letter to James Hammond, who strongly favored white labor in an urban context because he apprehended that city employment permitted slaves a dangerous measure of freedom, Memminger expressed a strong contrary fear of a white proletariat, with all the supposed implications of moral decay, criminality, and social instability which worried Southern ideologues like Calhoun and Rhett. A free white working class was "the only party from which danger to our institutions is to be apprehended among us," he wrote.

> Drive out negro mechanics and all sorts of operatives from our Cities, and who must take their place[?] The same men who make the cry in the Northern Cities against the tyranny of Capital ...and would soon raise hue and cry against the Negro, and be hot Abolitionists--and every one of those men would have a vote ...The scheme by which ...[the most fiendish of abolitionists] has expected to foment division among us is based on this element of Discord.[29]

If Memminger's analysis was close to correct, it followed that Charleston and other Southern cities had

open two possible courses of action. Conservatives and pro-slavery enthusiasts suggested that the better course was to suppress further immigration and create codes that favored slave over free labor.[30] The approach that Memminger came around to, after it was brilliantly espoused by James Taylor, a pioneer in textile manufacturing in the state, and that Charleston adopted was to assume that the fate of the city, state, and region was inseparable from the fate of the "vague race lumped together indiscriminately as ...poor whites," that the "forgotten" people of the South, including the worthy among the immigrants, had the potential for much good as well as evil, and should be cultivated. This line of reasoning led him to undertake what was in some ways his most consequential public career: as the "father" of modern public schools in Charleston.[31]

V

In 1854 Memminger received an appointment from the South Carolina legislature to the Board of Commissioners of Free Schools in Charleston and was able to give direction to a dramatic reform movement that was already underway. Under the tutelage of Henry Barnard, a noted educator of New England, he had to believe that, important as were railroads and steam engines, the innovation of singular importance if Charleston and the South aspired to corporate "strength and consideration" was the transformation of education, the means by which standards of feeling and thinking and living are transmitted from generation to generation.[32] The existing system in city and state left a large proportion of ordinary white people illiterate and unskilled--relatively useless to society and possibly aggrieved against it. White children were effectively, though not as a matter of policy, segregated in two types of schools. Most children, if they went to school at all, had the barest introduction to the three R's in ungraded, poorly-financed, and badly-staffed free schools; private tutors and fashionable academies maintained by tuition offered somewhat richer intellectual fare for children of the well-to-do.[33] Although Memminger's efforts to erect a superior and uni-

tary system for white children, including females, were not without intrinsic justification, his primary concern was extrinsic, the needs of society. In a public campaign for support from gentlemen who doubted and an apathetic common citizenry and excuses about short public funds, he urged that money spent for a kind of educational establishment that had been "thoroughly tested ... and approved in the various nations on the continent of Europe, and in most states of the Union," was money for prosperity and cultural tone, and against corporate problems: vice, immorality, crime, and revolution. "Knowledge is power and wealth. It is cheaper for the State to educate a child to virtue and usefulness than to maintain them [sic] as vagabonds and paupers, or hang them as malefactors."[34] It was crucial that rich and poor attend common schools: "Bringing together the children of the rich and poor will benefit both, by removing from one any disposition to arrogance and self-will, and from the other the spirit of envy and jealousy. Talent and merit will take its proper place, and all classes will be better united, as they grow up, in advancing the public welfare."[35] Of course these are the same ideas and premises which, springing from the Enlightenment in the 18th century, nurtured the public school movement across the Western world in the 19th century.[36]

During 1855 and 1856, Christopher Memminger spent several weeks in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and other Northern cities, studying public schools, purchasing school furniture, and recruiting experienced teachers and administrators "to commence" a new system of education in Charleston.[37] Upon his return to Charleston, the school board launched a major program of building and consolidation. Using funds drawn from state, city, and private sources, Memminger and his associates within three years built three commodious new buildings to house two large primary schools with graded classes for children ages four through fourteen and a high school for girls. (The well-established Charleston High School, private but subsidized by the city, continued to serve as the most important secondary

school for boys.) These were designed to be common schools. The quality of their facilities, instruction and curriculum--which combined the 3 R's and classical and vocational courses--quickly secured a general public patronage, including many children of the well-to-do. Of course, children of color, free and slave, were rigidly excluded. But if the quality of education available to any group of citizens is "a critical determinant of the chances its members will have to acquire the benefits of society" and share in political power, the new schools constituted a significant, though limited, democratization. In 1857, 1618 pupils were enrolled; in 1861, more than 4000, a four-fold increase in public school enrollment over 1854.[38]

"In organizing the Charleston Free Schools, the other day, a troop of Northern teachers was imported, when no one doubts there are sons of the South sufficient for the work."[39] This passing comment from DeBow's Review during 1857 was part of a general radical-conservative attack upon the new system. It had only been five years since an author in a local magazine had expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of intermixing or "leveling" classes. The common white people did not need education beyond the humblest; indeed they might be unfitted for their common work and would certainly acquire ideas about playing an independent political role, when for the good of all "the privileged few must govern." "The diffusion of education in New England," this author had written, "is likely to effect the dissolution of the Union." Now traditionalists rushed into public disputation with adjectives like "wild" and "utopian" and predictions that popular education led inevitably to "free love" and socialism.[40]

Probably the most persistent complaint was the idea that the reorganized system was an alien transplant, a presumption clinched by the presence in Charleston of a "troop" of "imported" educators. Memminger himself would much rather have employed local people, for he knew the importance of the moral and political side of pedagogy[41] and certainly wished to encourage Southern

self-sufficiency. But he had discovered that expertise in the most modern education techniques was not prevalent among "sons of the South." And unlike the radical conservatives he believed there were people of good will in the North who could be trusted to teach Southern children. Memminger's expectation was that Charleston should in a reasonably short time develop its own educators and have no further need for outsiders. However, the final crisis leading to the Civil War intruded. After South Carolina's formal secession in December 1860, Charleston became a closed city: outsiders could not be condoned, whether in Fort Sumter in the harbor or in the offices and classrooms of the city schools. Inevitably, the Northern accents of many of Memminger's teachers and administrators drew increasing complaint. "I sincerely regret," understated "Blue Cockade," an anonymous correspondent of the Charleston Mercury, "that Charleston should be presented to the world in so humiliating a light as to acknowledge her unfitness to educate her children by her own people."[42] Defended by Memminger and others against the imputation that they constituted a source of sectional humiliation and, worse, "wolves in sheep's clothing,"[43] the "Yankee teachers" hung on until the spring of 1861 and the battle of Fort Sumter, then departed for the North, leaving their schools and pupuls in native hands: new-minted graduates of the girls' high school.[44]

VI

Memminger got his wish--that if secession came the South should act in concert. But he was substantially defeated in his efforts at modernization. His most conspicuous achievement was only temporary: the public schools did not survive the Civil War.[45] He went on to become Secretary of the Treasury of the Confederate States of America and to learn the full extent of the new nation's backwardness.[46] The judgment of historians has most often been that Memminger's vanquishment was inevitable, that his ends and means were hopelessly confused and that the conservatives were right after all--

the demands of traditional Southernism based on aristocratic values, agriculture, and slaveholding could not be reconciled with trains and factories and free labor and public schools.[47] Yet the crazy quilt system of free enterprise and welfare state under which Americans live in the last quarter of the twentieth century shows that human society may embrace apparent opposites. And it is not impossible that, but for the crisis of the Union which followed Old Brown's raid at Harper's Ferry and Lincoln's election, the Old South might have coexisted indefinitely with elements that were new, and subsequent times might have presented a different story.

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[1]Charles G. Sellers, quoted in Dewey W. Grantham, The Democratic South (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1965 /1963/, 3-4.

[2]Avery O. Craven, "Why the Southern States Seceded," in George Knowles, ed., The Crisis of the Union (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), 76.

[3]Marcus Cunliffe, The Nation Takes Shape (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The National Experience (New York: Random House, 1965); John F. Kasson, Civilizing the Machine (New York: Grossman, 1976); J. Meredith Neal, Toward a National Taste: America's Quest for Aesthetic Independence (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1975); Henry F. May, The Enlightenment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1951); Aileen S. Kraditor, Means and Ends in American Abolitionism (New York: Random House /Vintage/, 1969).

[4]Frances Anne Kemble, Journal of a Residence on a Georgia Plantation in 1838-1839 (Chicago: Afro-Am Press, 1969 /1864/, 285; George T. McJimsey, The Dividing And Reuniting of America, 1848-1877 (St. Louis, Mo.: The Forum Press, 1981), 2.

[5]See Boorstin, The Americans 169-218; Raimondo Luraghi, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation South (New York: Franklin Watts, 1978); Rollin G. Osterweis, Romanticism and Nationalism in the Old South (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949); William R. Taylor, Cavalier and Yankee (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), chapter 1.

[6]Charles G. Sellers, "Comment on 'Why the Southern States Seceded,' " in Knowles, ed., The Crisis of the Union, 80-89.

[7]Ernest Lander, "Charleston: Manufacturing Center of the Old South," Journal of Southern History, 26 (1960), 331-351; D.D. Wallace, South Carolina: A Short History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1951), 372-382, 445-457; Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the Cross (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 167-169; Christopher Silver, "A New Look at Old South Urbanization," South Atlantic Urban Studies, 3 (1979), 152-153.

[8]Richard N. Current, John C. Calhoun (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1963), 37-154; Laura A. White, Robert Barnwell Rhett (New York: The Century Company, 1931), 3-84; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York: Random House /Vintage/, 1948), 80; Craven, "Why the Southern States Seceded, 66-77; William L. Barney, The Road to Secession (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), chapter 3; Luraghi, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation South 87-90; George C. Rogers, Jr., Charleston in the Age of the Pinckneys (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 160-161.

[9]Carl Degler, The Other South (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 13-96.

[10]For the dynamic quality of urban life in America (including the South), see Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in the Wilderness (New York: Ronald Press, 1938); Constance M. Green, American Cities in the Growth of the Nation

(New York: Harper & Row, 1965), passim; and Richard Wade, "The City in History--Some American Perspectives," in Werner Z. Hirsch, ed., Urban Life and Form (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963), 59-79.

[11]Taylor, Transportation Revolution, 10; John McCardell, The Idea of a Southern Nation (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979), 96, 230, and passim; Leonard P. Curry, "Urbanization and Urbanism in the Old South: A Comparative View," Journal of Southern History, 40 (1974), 43-60; Lyle W. Dorsett and Arthur H. Shaffer, "Was the Antebellum South Antiurban?" Journal of Southern History, 38 (1972), 93-100. Fanny Kemble wrote (Diary, 302) of urban Southerners in 1839: "They are softened and enlightened by many influences--the action of city life itself, where human sympathy and human respect, stimulated by neighborhood, produce salutary social restraint ...They travel to the Northern states and to Europe, and Europe and the Northern states travel to them, and, in spite of themselves, their peculiar conditions receive modifications from foreign intercourse. The influence, too, of commercial enterprise, which in these days is becoming the agent of civilization all over the earth, affects even the uncommercial residents of the Southern cities, and, however cordially they may dislike or despise the mercantile tendencies of Atlantic Americans or transatlantic Englishmen, their frequent contact with them breaks down some of the barriers of difference between them, and humanizes the slaveholder of the great cities into some relation with the spirit of his own times and country. But these men are but an inconsiderable portion of the slaveholding population of the South ..."

[12]David R. Goldfield, "Pursuing the American Urban Dream: Cities in the Old South," in Goldfield and Blaine A. Brownell, eds., The City in Southern History (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977), 59.

[13]Craven, "Why the Southern States Seceded," 78; McCardell, Idea of Southern Nation, chapter 3; Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974); Harold S. Schultz, Nationalism

and Sectionalism in South Carolina, 1852-1860 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1950).

[14]Henry D. Capers, Life and Times of C.G. Memminger (Richmond, Va.: Everett Waddey Company, 1893), 7-36, 106-108; Schultz, Nationalism and Sectionalism, 5.

[15]The point of view was well expressed by Charleston native E.J. Pringle, who had moved to San Francisco and wrote an old friend William P. Miles, recently a professor at the College of Charleston but now in 1855 a candidate for mayor: "Save Charleston, or whatever is left of it .../Dredge/ the harbor and build multitudes of railroads. Charter steamboats and send shiploads of the populace away to liberalize their minds. And ...remember those pledges which you gave ...some... years ago about the improvement of White Point Garden." (Pringle to W.P. Miles, November 3, 1855, Miles Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill). In his mayoral campaign Miles promised publicly "to sweep away the remains of old fogyism" and went on after his selection to win acclaim as a reform mayor. (Charleston Courier, November 29, 1855; Laylon Wayne Jordan, "Police Power and Public Safety in Antebellum Charleston: The Emergence of a New Police, 1800-1860," South Atlantic Urban Studies, 3 /1979/, 130-133; Clarence M. Smith, Jr., "William Porcher Miles, Progressive Mayor of Charleston, 1855-1857," Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association: 1942 /Columbia, 1942/, 30-39).

[16]In an essay he wrote as a college sophomore, Memminger precociously defined "a genuine love of country" as arising not from emotional attachment to one's native turf but a rational process increasing with "increases in knowledge." The essay is reproduced in Capers, Memminger, 490-493; quotation on p. 491.

[17]Ibid., 492. Compare Osterweis, Romanticism and Nationalism in the Old South, 6.

[18]Capers, Memminger, 107. The pamphlet, "A Book of Nullification," written in biblical-verse style, is reproduced in Capers as an appendix: 569-599.

[19]Charleston Courier, June 17, 1852; Schultz, Nationalism and Sectionalism, 48-49.

[20]"The various propositions now before Congress, such as the Wilmot Proviso, the admission of California with restrictions as to slavery, the laws on the same subject promised as to the Territories and the District of Columbia ...all embrace the same principle, and evince the same spirit; they equally assert a right to govern us in matters of the last importance, by rulers who are ... foreign to our institutions and interests." (a public address by Memminger at Charleston, April 3, 1850, Charleston Mercury, April 4, 1850. See also Capers, Memminger, 211).

[21]"While New England and New York extolled commerce ...Southern heroes were the figments of Sir Walter Scott or the caricatures of rural gentility found in the novels of John Pendleton Kennedy and Nathaniel Beverley Tucker." Thus Boorstin, The Americans, 176. Memminger did admire the work of Sir Walter Scott. When he visited the British Isles in 1854, he spent most of his time going through abbeys and castles with romantic associations--with Rob Roy, Wordsworth, and especially Scott. (Memminger to his wife, August 21, 1854; August 23, 1854, Memminger Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).

[22]In youth he vibrated to "the glittering visions of Helvetius" on the progress of the human mind but in moments of sober reflection he most admired the man of action. "Why lives the memory of Homer and Ossian: but because the themes of their verse were the valor of Achilles and the doing of Fingal." "It is to actions, which in their general tendency ameliorate the condition of millions, that we are to ...affix the stamp of immortal fame." (Memminger's "Eulogy on President Maxey," South Carolina College, 1819; and essays on "The Influence of Pupular Opinion" and "Immortality of the Soul," also written in 1819; Capers, Memminger, 494, 500, 503, 504).

[23]Craven, "Why the Southern States Seceded," 75; Letter to editor, Charleston Mercury, May 18, 1858.

[24]Rogers, Charleston, 157-160; Capers, Memminger, 29-30; William Gilmore Simms, "Charleston: The Palmetto City," Harper's New Monthly Magazine XV (June, 1857), 1-22.

[25]Simms, "Charleston," 10; Capers, Memminger, 17-18.

[26]Rogers, Charleston, 145-146; Wallace, South Carolina. 426-427; Lillian A. Kibler, Benjamin F. Perry: South Carolina Unionist (Durhan, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1946), 236-238.

[27]Charles R. Schultz, "Hayne's Magnificent Dream: Factors which Influenced Efforts to Join Cincinnati and Charleston by Railroad, 1835-1860" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1966), 13n, 20, 48-49, 54-55; John van Deusen, Economic Bases of Disunion in South Carolina (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), 225-226, 236-237.

[28]See an address by Memminger to state legislature in 1858 entitled "To Afford Aid to the Blue Ridge Railroad," in Capers, Memminger, 514-520.

[29]Robert Starobin, Industrial Slavery in the Old South (New York, 1970), 9, 193, 199; Silver, "Old South Urbanization," 144-148; Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross, 101, 102.

[30]See Eugene Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery (New York: Vintage Books edition, 1967 /1965/, 232-234; Barney, Road to Secession, 37-39.

[31]Genovese, Political Economy of Slavery, 228-231, 234-235; W.P. Miles, notes for a speech, 1855, in Miles Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; quotation on "poor whites": W.J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Vintage Books edition, 1941), ix.

[32]Merle Curti, The Social Ideas of American Educators (Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1959 /1935/, chapter IV; quotation: Memminger in Capers, Memminger, 531.

[33]Rosser H. Taylor, Antebellum South Carolina: A Social and Cultural History (New York: Da Capo Press, 1970 /1942/, chapter 8; J. Isaac Copeland, "The Tutor in the Ante-Bellum South," Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association: 1965 (Columbia, 1965), 46-47.

[34]"Minutes of the Commissioners of Free Schools for the Parishes of St. Philip's and St. Michael's, January 22, 1855 (manuscript in City of Charleston Archives).

[35]Ibid. See also M.C. Kneece, The Contributions of C.G. Memminger to the Cause of Education, Bulletin of the University of South Carolina, no. 177 (Columbia, 1956), 25-26.

[36]Memminger's arguments were close analogues of arguments made by reformers of the North. See Michael Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform: Educational Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969). See Lawrence A. Cremin, The Genius of American Education (New York: Vintage, 1965), 63-72, for a discussion of the problematical character of common schools as means of social integration and discipline.

[37]New York Times, April 28, 1856; Charleston Daily-Courier, May 1, 1856; "Minutes of the Commissioners of Free Schools, May 15, 1856."

[38]"Minutes of the Commissioners of Free Schools, January 28, 1856; Mary Taylor, A History of the Memminger Normal School, Charleston, S.C. (Charleston: Walker, Evans & Cogswell, 1941), 4-9; Ordinances of the City of Charleston, 1854-1859 (Charleston: Walker, Evans & Cogswell, 1859), 22, 28; John F. Thomason, The Foundations of the Public Schools of South Carolina (Columbia: The State Company, 1925), 126-165. Quotation on schools and democracy: David Boesel, "Teachers in Urban Public Schools," Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), 133.

[39]"School Books," DeBow's Review, XXII (1857), 556.

[40]"Slavery and Freedom," Southern Quarterly Review, I (1856), 62-65; "Instruction in Schools and Colleges," Ibid., VI (1852), 467-469.

[41]"The value of each individual member of society depends more--much more--upon his moral training, his principles, than upon his intelligence. If superior intelligence be directed to evil ends, it becomes only a more efficient instrument of evil," he declared upon the occasion of the opening of the girls' high school. (Charleston Daily-Courier, May 24, 1859).

[42]Charleston Mercury, December 6, 1860. See also Steven Channing, Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina (New York: Norton Library edition, 1974 /1970/.

[43]Charleston Mercury, December 6, 1860.

[44]Anna C. Brackett, "Charleston, South Carolina (1861)," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, 88 (March, 1894), 941-950.

[45]Thomason, Foundations of the Public Schools, 165, 176-231; Elizabeth Rice, "A Yankee Teacher in the South: An Experience in the Early Days of Reconstruction," The Century Magazine, 62 (May, 1901), 151-154; Rogers, Charleston, 168-169; Silver, "Old South Urbanization," 162-163.

[46]"Our friend Memminger is in trouble at Richmond; no Treasury notes can he get, no paper, ...no Engraver to get them up," wrote Alexander Robertson to Robert F.W. Allston, August 22, 1861: J.H. Easterby, ed., The South Carolina Rice Plantation as Revealed in the Papers of Robert F.W. Allston (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), 420. See also retrospective in The Advertiser-Journal, Montgomery, Alabama, February 19, 1961.

[47]Barney, Road to Secession, 31, and passim.

Commentary On

"Between Two Worlds: Christopher G. Memminger of Charleston and the Old South in Mid-Passage, 1830-1861"

Carlanna Hendrick - Francis Marion College

Dr. Jordan's paper is well researched and documented. Indeed, had it not been for the extensive use of secondary sources, it would seem that the nineteenth century's florid style had captured his pen. Paragraphs run on for pages as do his sentences which relentlessly pursue the flavor of the Old South. One heroic sentence runs on for eleven lines (p. 59). Additionally, Dr. Jordan waxes Hardingesque in his description of Memminger's character expressing "not emotion but analysis, not form but function and consequence, not serenity, but power" (p. 62). Dr. Jordan's language is eloquent, with precise words carefully chosen to convey the sense of change permeating the Old South one would only wish for a period here and a paragraph there to order the splendid flow.

The opening two sections are particularly effective. A light touch is shown briefly sketching the flow of change in the nation and the South--and deftly describing the challenge of "modernism;" free labor, immigration, industrialism, urbanism, commercialism and democracy (p. 62).

Dr. Jordan seems fully to share what must be anyone's fascination with the multi-faceted character of Christopher Memminger. The two-thirds of his paper devoted to Memminger endeavor to cover most aspects of the philosophy and public life of Memminger. It may be, however, that, with one half of the information relating to Memminger's work with the free schools in Charleston--a topic obviously not exhausted in that space--Dr. Jordan might well have used that single fact of Memminger's work as an illustration of life "between two worlds." Or, on the other hand, Dr. Jordan might have more fully developed Memminger's

change of position on disunion as reflecting in a single individual the changes directing the course of Southern history.

However, it is the very diversity of Memminger's life which makes the paper fascinating. The South Carolina Historical Association should be hearing from Dr. Jordan again, and again, as he develops one or more of the roles played by Christopher Memminger in the mid-passage of the South. The paper shows flashes of brilliance in developing what is, rather than a single paper, a smorgasbord of potential for developing more precisely the tempting tidbits begun in his paper. Like his title, Dr. Jordan's paper stands, "Between Two Worlds," unwilling to relinquish all aspects of Southern change or to move forward single-mindedly with change personalized in Christopher Memminger.

CHURCH AND STATE RELATIONS IN MEXICO FROM 1910 TO 1940

William R. Ferrell, III

The relationship between the Catholic Church and the Mexican government from 1910 to 1940 was one of serious trial. The Church made a desperate attempt to maintain its influence and secure a position of political power. The state, viewing the clergy as reactionary, opposed that effort and sought to regulate the Church to a purely spiritual role. The resulting conflict saw both sides taking unjust and sometimes violently excessive stands. Those differences continued until the late 1930's, when the Church began to align itself with Mexican national aspirations. It became, in the end, an important element of Mexican nationalism.

The Church, during the early colonial period, was the conscience of the Spanish Empire as it sought to prevent abuses of the Indians. As it aged, however, the Church lost some of its zeal for protecting the less fortunate and became, instead, a wealthy institution under the leadership of a tradition-bound hierarchy. It, likewise, owed its allegiance to the Spanish crown which made it an opponent of the Wars of Independence. Since the right of patronato did not fall on the new government, the Church felt itself politically independent. The Constitution of 1857 ended that privileged position. It prohibited the Church from owning any property, nullified religious vows, established free public education, and extended religious freedom to all denominations. Allied with conservative elements, the Church took up the challenge, provoking a civil war which ended in a victory for the Liberals under the great Mexican hero, Benito Juárez.

Profirio Díaz became president in 1876, establishing what was to be a long dictatorship. Under his regime, the laws of the 1857 Constitution remained in effect,

but with little or no enforcement. The Church adjusted to state control under Díaz, acquiring property, maintaining convents, and opening religious schools. A recent historian described the relationship as a formal dance "in which each step by one elicited a predictable response from the other, with both steps and response being essentially meaningless.."[1]

That condition changed dramatically in 1910 when a young liberal, Francisco Madero, opposed the re-election of Díaz. He succeeded in creating a movement which led to the collapse of the Díaz regime and the beginning of the Mexican Revolution. The Church hierarchy, surprised at that turn of events, formed a Catholic Party to protect Church interests. It was described as a group of Catholic citizens who wished within the law to defend the rights of Catholics, which the Constitution recognized, and to work for the good of the country by applying Christian principles to the problems of agricultural and industrial workers.[2] With capital assets of two hundred million dollars and tremendous influence through the priests, the party was able to have its recognized leader and former Díaz ambassador to the United States, Francisco De La Barra, appointed interim president on May 25, 1911.[3]

In August of that year, the Catholic Party held a convention to nominate its candidate for the October election. Archbishop Jose Mora y del Río's presence gave the affair the moral endorsement of the Church. The party acknowledged the popularity of Madero and nominated him for president but chose De La Barra for the vice presidential spot.

The 1911 election resulted in a victory for Madero and his personal choice for vice president, Jose Maria Pino Suárez. Relations between the Catholic Party and Madero were strained when the new president opposed a Catholic contender for the governorship of the state of Michoacan. Similar episodes occurred in Jalisco, Mexico, Queretaro and Zacatecas.[4] From that point on, the Catholic Party ceased to actively support Madero but never developed a program of opposition. It was successful

in other endeavors, electing twenty-nine federal deputies, four senators, four state governors and winning control of the legislatures of Jalisco and Zacatecas.

Madero, unable to consolidate the forces of the Revolution, faced several revolts. In February, 1913, he placed one of his generals, the hard-drinking Victoriano Huerta, in command of the Mexico City garrison to confront one of them. Instead of attacking the rebels, Huerta overthrew the hapless Madero and made himself president. Playing no part in the change, the Church watched passively from the sidelines. Huerta, seeking support from all quarters, invited the Catholic Party leader, Francisco De La Barra, to join his cabinet. Opposition to Huerta soon appeared in Congress, which forced the dictator to arrest all but members of the Catholic Party. Unfortunately, in the eyes of Huerta's enemies, that action put the Church firmly in the ranks of those opposed to political and social changes. That belief persisted in spite of the fact that Church leaders began to oppose Huerta's ruthlessness. In May of 1914, Archbishop Mora y del Rio was driven out of Mexico for suggesting that Huerta resign.[5] By July, revolts throughout Mexico had forced the dictator to follow the Archbishop into exile.

That victory was due to the forces led by Venustiano Carranza, governor of Coahuila. Ignoring the fate of Archbishop Mora y del Río, Carranza's followers believed that the Church had been the primary support for the brutal Huerta. Churches were desecrated and priests attacked. One of Carranza's lieutenants, Pancho Villa, threatened to kill all who "thrust on us the greatest superstition the world has ever known."[6] Others forced foreign priests to flee the country or imprisoned Church leaders for supporting Huerta. The ubiquitous Church became a target for those who had not yet formulated a program for the Revolution.

Carranza assumed the leadership of the country in 1915 by incorporating into what had been up to that time a political revolution, the social questions of land reform and rights of labor unions. He called a constitu-

tional convention in 1917 to address those and other problems. The majority elected to that assembly saw the Catholic Church as the impediment to progress in all areas of reform. Carranza, never a deeply-rooted anticlerical, sought to moderate their influence. His efforts were unsuccessful as the new constitution, in its final form, curtailed much of the Church's activities.

Article Three of that document required non-religious education in government and private schools and forbade all religious primary schools. Article Five granted freedom of religion, but only in places of public worship and under government supervision. Article Twenty-seven prohibited Church ownership of property including places of worship. Articles Fifty-five and Fifty-nine forbade any religious minister from political office. Article One hundred and thirty, proposed by Carranza himself, prohibited Congress from barring any religion and established marriage as a civil contract. The convention went far beyond his proposal, establishing that the priesthood was to be considered a profession, state legislatures were to be given the power to limit ministers within their borders, only Mexicans by birth were to officiate at religious services, no member of the clergy was to have the right to vote, and political associations of a religious nature were to be prohibited.

There was a curious lack of enforcement of those provisions by Carranza. He governed in the familiar manner of a caudillo, allowing few meaningful reforms. The constrained forces of the Revolution erupted when Carranza sought to remain in power by selecting a political nonentity to succeed him in 1920. As the old constitutionalist leader fled Mexico City, the Catholic Party temporarily regained new life. It met in convention to nominate a presidential candidate and, attempting to move with revolutionary forces, advocated Catholic trade unions as an answer to the growing labor movement. The Party, however, turned its face against land reform through its call for recognition of property rights.[7]

Alvaro Obregón, a former general under Carranza, winning handily over all opponents, assumed the presidency.

Under his leadership, Mexico moved forward, re-distributing land to Indians and promoting unionization of workers. Attacking the Church played no part in his political philosophy. Obregón accepted the need for the Church in education when he declared that "at present, there is not money enough for facilities for the government to teach all Mexican children. It is preferable that they receive any instruction rather than grow up illiterate."[8] As long as Church activities supplemented a financially strapped government, Obregón would take no action.

That policy was briefly altered in January of 1923 when a ceremony in Guanajuato, attended by the apostolic delegate, dedicated a monument to Christ "the King of Mexico." Fearing that the monument was meant, in the popular psychology, to erect Christ as the supreme law of the land, the government expelled the delegate as an unwanted alien.[9]

That same year, without direction from Mexico City, several states limited the number of priests. Yucatan and Durango set the figure at sixteen and twenty-five, respectively. Those events alarmed Church leaders, who called an Eucharistic Congress to convene in October of 1924 to study ways to prevent enforcement of the 1917 Constitutional provisions. Obregón acted swiftly, ordering an investigation of the group to see if any laws had been violated.[10] While finding none, the President had shown his willingness to act when he felt governmental authority challenged.

Obregón's successor and another ex-general, Plutarco Elías Calles, was not one to ingore the Church. Before assuming the presidency in December of 1924, he had gained the reputation of being violently anticlerical. As governor of Sonora in 1916, Calles had expelled many priests from the state. In 1922, as secretary of the interior under Obregón, he called on the states to limit the number of priests. Later in 1924, he said: "I am an enemy of the priest caste which regards its position as a privileged one and not as an evangelical mission. I am an enemy of the priest politician, of the priest

intriguer, of the priest exploiter, of the priest who seeks to keep our people in ignorance, of the priest who is allied with the hacendado to prey upon the laborer, of the priest who joins with the industrial proprietor to exploit the worker."[11] Calles clearly regarded the Church as a reactionary institution intent upon quieting the demand for revolutionary change.

Several months after the new president assumed office in 1925, Church leadership was alarmed by the formation of the schismatic Mexican Catholic Apostolic Church. It did not recognize the leadership of Rome, opposed celibacy, and exempted the faithful from tithes. Calles ordered that the Church be given one of the larger churches in Mexico City. That action resulted in a violent street demonstration which required the use of fire hoses to regain order.

On January 27, 1926, El Universal, a leading Mexico City newspaper, carried an article quoting aging Archbishop Mora y del Río's statement that the Church would resist any attempt to put the anticlerical articles of the Constitution into force. Those words were actually issued in 1917, but were republished by the newspaper. The old Archbishop, surprised to see them in print, insisted they were still true and signed the copy that was published February 4, 1926.[12]

Calles immediately accepted what he considered to be a challenge to his authority and closed all churches functioning without government permission. His secretary of the interior, Adalberto Tejeda, notified state governors of the necessity of closing convents and expelling foreign priests. In July of 1926, a new penal code was issued requiring all priests to register with the government.

Fearing the government would register individuals not approved by the Church, the Catholic clergy decided on a drastic step. An Episcopal committee of church leaders made the momentous decision to suspend religious services beginning July 31, 1926. They believed that the people of Mexico denied their priests would rise

up, forcing the government to alter its anticlerical regulations. Pope Pius XI supported the decision proclaiming: "May it be God's will that those who have responsibility for so many and such grave crimes return to their right minds and appeal in repentance and in tears to God's mercy. We are convinced that this is the only noble revenge that our children ask of the Almighty."[13]

Such appeals made no impression on Calles. He refused to meet with any Catholic leaders to discuss the conflict. The Chamber of Deputies refused a petition from Church leaders for relaxation of the laws on the dubious grounds that all who opposed the Constitution were not citizens. Such intransigence led to violence in the conservative states of Guanajuato, Colima, and Michoacan. Those opposing the government adopted the slogen "Cristo Rey," or "Christ the King," and made plans for an armed revolt. Their poorly organized and financed bands never amounted to more than fourteen thousand men throughout Mexico.[14] The most serious event of the conflict was the attack on the Mexico City-to-Guadalajara train in February of 1927 that resulted in the deaths of one hundred people.

Calles acted swiftly deporting Archbishop Mora y del Río and other prelates who were accuses of supporting the violence. There appeared to be no hope of reconciliation while Calles was in office. At that juncture, a new ambassador from the United States, Dwight D. Morrow, arrived in Mexico City. Unlike earlier emissaries, Morrow had a sincere respect for Calles. That enabled him to influence the Mexican President to meet a prominent American Catholic leader, Father James Burke. Calles made no concession but guaranteed that "it is not the idea of the Constitution or the laws or of my own to destroy the identity of any Church."[15]

Opportunities for further dialogue were suddenly dashed when President-elect Obregón, whose succession had been engineered by Calles, was assassinated in July of 1928 by a lone religious fanatic, Jose de Leon Toral. In spite of charges made, the Church was not

involved in the murder and openly mourned the loss of Obregón. He had secretly been in contact with several Church leaders seeking a solution to the conflict.[16]

Calles allowed Congress to select a little-known former secretary of the interior, Emilio Portes Gil, as interim president. Portes Gil assumed office in December of 1928. It appeared to the Church that the new leader would be a powerless protégé of Calles. However, forces were shaping up that would alter that unflattering picture of Portes Gil. In March of 1929, General Gonzalo Escobar led a rebellion in Coahuila calling for an end to the anticlerical provisions of the Constitution. He received no support from the Church in the abortive coup. Portes Gil recognized that fact when he stated that the revolt was the result of ambitious generals and not related to the Church.[17] In May of 1929, the President proclaimed that the Catholic clergy, when they wished, could renew the exercise of their rites with only one obligation--that they respect the laws of the land.[18] Archbishop Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores quickly obtained an audience with Portes Gil.

The meeting resulted in an agreement on June 22, 1929. In it, Portes Gil affirmed that the government did not wish to destroy the Church. He further agreed that the government would not register any priest not approved by the Church, that religious education could be given in churches, and that anyone could request the repeal of any laws. Praising the goodwill of Portes Gil, the Archbishop announced that on June 27, 1929, after three years, Church doors would open again. The laws of the Constitution remained in effect. Only the non-Constitutional provision allowing the government to register priests had been dropped.[19]

Pascual Ortiz Rubio succeeded Portes Gil in December of 1929. With the apparent approval of ex-president Calles, he went about implementing the Portes Gil settlement with the Church. The National Cathedral was quietly returned to the Catholic clergy while several thousand churches were returned in the states by the middle of 1930.

It was then that the religious conflict shifted from Mexico City to several state capitals. Veracruz approved only one priest for every one hundred thousand people. Under its famous anticlerical governor, Tomas Garrido Canabal, Tabasco outlawed all priests. Garrido had been governor since 1922, waging a total war on God. Farm animals on his estates were named "Christ" or "God." Even gravestones were not permitted to bear any religious significance.[20] A visiting French priest felt that "these acts cannot with fairness be blamed on the federal government. They are due to lack of cooperation and to the reactionary tendencies of certain political personages in the states."[21]

Another long-planned event, however, brought the issue back to Mexico City. On December 12, 1931, the four hundredth anniversary of the apparition of the Virgin of Guadalupe was celebrated. Five hundred thousand people packed into Mexico City. The crowds showed fanatical devotion crawling to the altar on bloody hands and knees. Such a spectacle could not go unnoticed by the government.

A spokesman for the governing National Revolutionary Party declared that the "heathenish feast" of Guadalupe made it imperative for the government to analyze this exploitation of the Mexican people. An army band that played at the affair was dismissed while a senator was expelled from the Revolutionary Party for attending. The government announced that the number of priests in Mexico City was being reduced to twenty-five for a population of one million.[22]

The Church leaders, taken by surprise, suspended services in the capital but quickly changed their minds after reconsidering the lack of support for their previous boycott. An appeal to the president fell on deaf ears. Other states, watching the events in Mexico City, took their cue to limit the number of priests. Chihuahua set the figure at one for every forty-five thousand people; Queretaro made it one for every sixty thousand; while Mexico approved thirty-four for the entire state.

Ex-president Calles, the jefe máximo of Mexican politics, appeared ready to bait the Church once again. He dismissed Ortiz Rubio in 1932 for showing signs of independence in cabinet appointments and replaced him with Abelardo Rodríguez, a wealthy banker. Pope Pius XI issued an encyclical comparing Mexico to the Soviet Union and advising the president that the 1929 agreement had been broken. Rodríguez replied that he might turn all the churches into schools or factories if the Vatican continued to interfere. To emphasize that point, in October of 1932, the government deported the apostolic delegate, Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores, as a foreigner who held allegiance to a foreign sovereign, the Pope.[23] Several state governments, not to be outdone, deprived priests of their citizenship.

The controversy continued through the administration of Rodríguez. The clergy acted with restraint, hoping for better relations with the next president. In December of 1932, a convention of the National Revolutionary Party met to nominate a candidate for that office. Its first session witnessed an attack on the Church by the delegation from Tabasco: "There is no God, we should forget God and the clergy, God exists only in petrified souls. The Mexican Revolution wants no God and the Revolutionary Party wants no God."[24] That statement was greeted by wild applause and cheers.

The same convention nominated Lázaro Cárdenas as its candidate for president. In the nominee, the Church saw no friend. Never a practicing Catholic, Cárdenas blamed many of the problems of Mexico on religion. His nomination offered no hope to Church leaders who were watching the birth of open persecution of the Catholic Church. Still the power behind the throne, Calles, along with many of his friends had grown wealthy and nurtured anticlericalism as the least dangerous outlet for their revolutionary zeal. Without an aggressive constituency, the Church offered a more tempting target than social reforms which could be potentially costly to the Callistas.[25]

The jefe máximo drew up a six-year plan to govern Cárdenas' term. One of its primary objects was the

complete secularization of schools so that the minds of the young would belong to the Revolution. Accordingly, in November of 1934, Article Three of the Constitution was amended to read: "Education imparted by the state shall be socialistic and combat fanaticism and prejudice. Only the state, the federation of the states, and municipalities shall impart primary, secondary, and normal education."[26] Socialistic education in that context was designed to give students an awareness of Mexico and the ideals of a collective life.

Lazaro Cárdenas became president in December of 1934. In the largely symbolic election in July, he had, ominously for the Church, cast his personal vote for the anticlerical firebrand from Tabasco, Tomas Garrido Canabal. Cardenas brought him to Mexico City as his minister of agriculture. For the Church, that meant the frightening possibility that Garrido's war on religion would erupt throughout the nation. Evidence of spreading religious persecution soon appeared. One of the more bizarre measures was the oath required of teachers in the socialist schools by several of the states. In Michoacan, the home state of Cardenas, one went as follows: "I declare categorically that I do not profess the Catholic religion nor any other. I declare categorically that I will not practice any act of private or public worship of the Catholic Church or any other. I declare categorically that I will fight by every means the Catholic Religion and other religions."[27] Such avowals went beyond anything in the 1917 Constitution and were aimed at the complete destruction of religion in Mexico.

Cárdenas appeared to be in accord with such procedures when he signed a decree prohibiting religious correspondence in February of 1935. By the middle of that year, there were only one hundred and ninety legal priests in the country to officiate for a population of seventeen million people.[28] The government had removed the only weapon the Church had, a boycott of its religious services by instituting a boycott of its own. While few believed it possible to eradicate the Church completely, such blatant persecution would reduce it to political impotence.

Clerical protests during the crisis were couched in the mildest of terms almost pleading to be spared. Such entreaties reached the president, who observed in April of 1935 that "excesses are apparent in any political maneuver."[29] Church leaders speculated that Cárdenas was being critical of the government's religious policy. Answers to those speculations came quickly.

Ex-president Calles, angry at the manner in which Cárdenas had increased land redistribution and his energetic support of labor, warned the President in June of 1935 of the fate of Ortiz Rubio. Cardenas acted with characteristic decisiveness, removing all of Calles' supporters from his cabinet. The jefe máximo protested bitterly but soon found himself on a plane bound for Laredo, clutching a copy of Mein Kampf.[30] Overnight, Cárdenas made himself master of Mexico.

Quickly moving to form his own cabinet, Cárdenas removed his minister of agriculture, Garrido Canabal, and replaced him with a devout Catholic, General Saturnino Cedillo. Those events in June of 1935 marked a turning point in the government policy toward the Church. In a speech in Tamaulipas, Cárdenas said it was not his policy to combat any religious beliefs but only to seek compliance with the law.[31] In March of 1936, he reassured the Church: "The government will not commit the error of previous administrations by considering the religious question as a problem preeminent to other issued involved in the program. Anti-religious campaigns would only result in further resistance and definitely postpone economic revivals."[32] The Revolution had moved away from anticlericalism as its chief focal point and on to more important social issues.

The Church's condition improved throughout 1937 with Cárdenas sometimes taking direct action in the states repealing state laws without the help of state legislatures.[33] Pope Pius XI in his Easter Encyclical of 1937 attacked conditions in Germany and the Soviet Union but praised those in Mexico. He advised the Mexican clergy to identify with the cause of the people in

their spiritual and material needs.[34] Cárdenas responded to that goodwill gesture by granting amnesty to all exiled clerics.

The Mexican leader sought unity among his countrymen as he faced the greatest test of his administration. On March 18, 1838, he announced that the properties of seventeen British and American oil companies had been nationalized because of their failure to pay equal wages to Mexican employees. The international explosion and demands for restitution gave the Church an opportunity to express its support for the government. On May 3, 1938, the Episcopal Committee, representing all Mexican Bishops and Archbishops, approved contributions by Catholics to pay the oil companies. "No exhortation has been necessary," the Committee declared, "to induce Catholics to contribute generously to the government of the Republic to pay the debt contracted with regard to the nationalization of the petroleum companies." Importantly for the final solution to the religious question in Mexico, the Committee maintained "that the contributions will be an eloquent testimonial that the Catholic doctrine is a stimulus to carry out citizenship duties and gives solid basis to true patriotism."[35]

Another step toward resolution of the conflict was the appointment of Luis Maria Martínez, Archbishop of Mexico. From the home state of Cárdenas and a personal friend of the President, Martínez was in frequent contact with the government. When, for example, he complained about offensive murals at the Mexico City airport, authorities wasted no time in having them removed. Those amicable relations continued for the rest of Cárdenas' term. Anticlerical laws remained on the books but ceased to be enforced. In 1940, Avila Camacho succeeded Cárdenas proclaiming, "I am a believer."[36] That admission of faith ushered in a new era of Church-State relations.

Camacho's administration proposed that Article Three of the Constitution be changed to allow Catholic schools to reopen. Archbishop Martinez effusively declared that

it would be a sin for Catholics not cooperate with the government. Article Three was amended eliminating socialistic education, but schools remained secular.

Since the presidency of Camacho, the relationship between Church and State has remained constant. The major political party, The Party of the Institutionalized Revolution, has refrained from anticlerical activities. The lack of enforcement of constitutional provisions corresponds to the Profirio Diaz dictatorship. The Church, however, has changed in Mexico from a universal institution to a peculiarly Mexican one, attempting to associate itself with the problems and needs of the country. Emphasizing social questions along with spiritual ones, the Church has become a vital element of the Mexican national consciousness.

A country with a religion as pervasive as the Catholic Church in Mexico compelled the government to take decisive action to ensure its authority. The Church, on the other hand, overestimated its influence among the masses, mistaking intensely personal worshippers as political supporters. Learning a painful lesson, therefore, the Church began to march in unison with the government. That sharing of common goals with the Church in a conspicuously subordinate role to the government has been one of the lasting legacies of the turbulent years from 1910 to 1940.[37]

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[3]Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1927), p. 217.

[4]Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 228.

[5]The New York Times, May 20, 1914.

[6]Mexican Constitutionalists and the Church Question, Current Opinion LVII (September 1914), p. 194.

[7]The New York Times, July 18, 1920.

[8]Ernest Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage (New York: The Century Company, 1929), p. 220.

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[11]Plutarco Elia Calles, Mexico Before the World, trans. R.H. Murray (New York: The Academy Press, 1927), p. 59.

[12]John W.F. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution 1919-1936 (Austin, University of Texas, 1961), p. 301.

[13]The New York Times, November 21, 1926.

[14]Antonio Uroz, Hombres de la Revolucion (Mexico City: Editorial Hemisferio, 1970), p. 191.

[15]Dulles, op. cit., p. 460.

[16]The New York Times, July 31, 1928.

[17]Ibid., March 14, 1928.

[18]J. Floyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 401.

[19]Emilio Portes Gil, Quince Anos de Politica Mexicana (Mexico City: Edicione Botas, 1941), p. 312.

[20]Dulles, op. cit., p. 620.

[21]Abbe Alphonse Lugan, "Church and State in Mexico," Current History XXXIII (February 1931), 672.

[22]Earl K. James, "Church and State in Mexico," Foreign Policy Reports XI (June 1935), 111.

[23]The London Times, October 5, 1932.

[24]The New York Times, December 6, 1933.

[25]Frank Tannanbaum, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 135.

[26]Mecham, op. cit. p. 406.

[27]Kenneth Grubb, "The Political and Religious Situation in Mexico," International Affairs XIV (September 1935), 689.

[28]Ibid.

[29]The New York Times, April 14, 1935.

[30]Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), p. 401.

[31]Lázaro Cárdenas, Cárdenas Habla (Mexico: La Impresora, 1940), p. 56.

[32]The New York Times, March 6, 1936.

[33]A young girl was killed in a police raid on a Mass being held in a private home in Veracruz on February 1, 1937. That evening Cárdenas reported that the extreme anticlerical laws had been repealed even though there was no record of the state legislature meeting. The London Times, February 12, 1937.

[34]The New York Times, March 30, 1937.

[35]Ibid., May 3, 1938.

[36]Bailey, op. cit., p. 297.

[37]It might be argued that there were many legacies. One was the distribution of land to Indian communities beginning in 1915 with 872,725 acres under Carranza; 3,849,768 under Obregón; 7,526,171 under Calles; and 43,512,182 acres under Cárdenas leaving roughly fifty-three percent of the arable land in the hands of the large land owners. Another was the growth of labor unions who lost their syndicalistic tendencies under Carranza and assumed a more important role in politics with a closer relationship to the government. See Tannenbaum, op. cit.

Commentary on

"Church and State Relations in Mexico From 1910 to 1940"

William L. Harris - The Citadel

Professor Ferrell should be complimented on preparing a study on Church and State Relations in Mexico from 1910-1940. While his primary field is Anglo-Irish history, he has recently been studying Mexico as his wife is a native of that country.

Now to the question at hand. In a grammatical sense, I find ten errors associated with punctuation and quotation marks. It is entirely possible that these errors were incurred because the final typist was a Spanish-speaking person. Even so, the errors should have been corrected because the paper was presented in English. In a bibliographical sense, basic reference works are cited. However, a broader base is recommended, even including an examination of the literature of the time. The work of Carlos Fuentes, for example. His La Muerte de Artemio Cruz, is very revealing about things political and social in regard to the great revolution early in this century.

The paper could have been improved with a broader perspective. For example, one cannot appreciate the poor public image the 20th Century Church has in Mexico unless he understands the extensive land holdings and financial control of the colonial church in Mexico. Also, all emerging Latin American countries in the wake of their independence assumed they would gain control of the old colonial royal patriotism. Continuing in the same vein, the significance of the death of Madero definitely should have been touched upon. A broader perspective of Zapata, Villa, and Carranza is called for and the importance of the Constitution of 1917 should be emphasized, Carranza notwithstanding.

Historically, at times for reason and at times without reason, the church has been a target of criticism for many Mexicans. Over the centuries even devout Mexicans have resented foreign priests. Simultaneously, the importance of the Virgin of Guadalupe should be emphasized as a national rallying point. Finally, when President Avila-Camacho publicly stated he was a believer, peace seemed to be at hand. This latter point definitely should have been mentioned.

In sum, additional details such as those cited above and additional perspective, particularly with regard to liberalism, anti-clericalism and even positivism, would have made this paper much better.

REARMING A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1932-1937

Joseph Wightman

In 1981 the Reagan administration has taken office with a commitment to rearm. There is concern that the American nuclear arsenal is vulnerable to a Russian first strike, while it is widely believed that our conventional armaments are inadequate to defend vital interests. On the other hand, there are Americans who argue that in these days of "overkill" the national defenses are already powerful enough. The argument is complicated by the fact that the nuclear capability is virtually unusable; as Henry Kissinger expresses it, "the super-powers found that the awesomeness of their power increased their inhibitions."[1] As the debate continues it may be instructive to see how another democratic society faced the challenge of rearmament.

One factor that the leaders of a democracy have to contend with is the almost universal abhorrence of war. It is now widely believed that thermonuclear war would see the end of civilization. In the 1930's there was likewise a strong feeling that another world war would bring doomsday. With the advent of air power it was believed that in the future there would be no civilians and that women, children and old people would be at the mercy of bombing aircraft which would bring havoc to the cities.

Leading British politicians reflected these fears in their speeches. Dominating the scene until his retirement in May 1937, was Stanley Baldwin, the Conservative party leader who Winston Churchill was later to classify as "the most formidable politician I have ever known in public life."[2] Baldwin constantly reiterated his abomination of war and his conviction that "it would mean the end of western civilization as we know it." An emotional speech which he made on the menace from the air in the Commons on November 10, 1932, had a deep

impact and echoed and re-echoed in defense debates over the next few years. "The bomber will always get through," he said. "The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves."[3] Churchill was to become the spokesman for more rapid rearmament, but his speeches too emphasized the horror of modern warfare. He talked of London as "the greatest target in the world, a kind of tremendous fat cow ..." He spoke of heavy casualties and of the danger of the breakdown of order and social services in the big cities under wartime conditions.[4]

Thus the leaders of the thirties had to face the same feeling of revulsion to the prospect of major war as we do today, but in some ways their task was even more difficult. Since the Vietnamese war the United States has been a semi-pacifist country, so that even mild measures like requiring young men to register for the draft are met with loquacious opposition. Inter-war Britain was much more pacifist after the bloodletting of the first World War. None who lived through those years will forget the moving Armistice Day services, with the two-minute silence, the prayers, and invariably the hymn, "Oh God, Our Help in Ages Past." Novels, plays and memoirs all stressed the squalor and the futility of war. These productions met their apex in 1933 with the publication of Vera Brittain's Testament of Youth and of Beverley Nichols' Cry Havoc. A recent study of pacifism in Britain has drawn a very useful distinction between "pacifism," meaning a refusal to take any part in war, and "pacificism," the attempt to prevent war while accepting that "the controlled use of armed force may be necessary to achieve this."[5] This pacificism, growing in strength from 1933 owing to the ominous international developments, showed itself in support for "collective security" through the League of Nations and to a lesser degree in striving for world socialism.

Events of 1933 and 1934 which had a deep impact on public opinion and hence on the attitude of politicians included the Oxford Union "King and country" debate of

February, 1933, the East Fulham by-election of October, 1933, which witnessed an enormous swing to the Labour party, and the commencement of the "Peace Ballot" sponsored by the League of Nations Union.[6] At the time, these events were taken to represent the peace-loving attitude of public opinion. When commenting on the East Fulham by-election, opposition newspapers saw the Labour gain as a victory for peace and disarmament.[7] The victor's maiden speech in the house was on the theme of war and peace and argued that people were "demanding that disarmament shall proceed at a faster pace."[8] Recent revisionist attempts to show the peace issue as only equal with other themes, such as housing and unemployment, are unconvincing.[9]

In 1981 there is a widespread belief in armaments, on the principle "if you seek peace, prepare for war." In the early thirties there was the conviction, going back beyond World War I, that large armaments were themselves a cause for war. Some progress had been made at Washington and London in naval disarmament, and the World Disarmament Conference assembled in Geneva in February, 1932, to extend this to land and air. The conference ended in failure in the early summer of 1934, a victim of France's insistence on security first, of Germany's demand for equality of rights, and of Hitler's rise to power. Well into 1935, however, British politicians talked the language of disarmament while they switched gears to a posture of national preparedness.

If a democratic and open society is to rearm with reasonable consensus, there must be agreement on the nature of the menace to be faced. In the United States today Russia is clearly regarded as the potential enemy. There was no such clarity in Britain a half century ago. The first cloud on the horizon was Japan's aggression in Manchuria in the fall of 1931. The British government was alarmed by its weakness in the orient and sought to avoid war, whether as a member of the League or alone. The Chiefs of Staff in their report in 1932 pointed out the weakness of imperial defenses.[10] The government believed that the United States could not be relied on for effective support. Baldwin's judgment

was "you'll get nothing out of Washington but words, big words, but only words."[11] The impact of this crisis led to the abrogation of the "ten year rule" in March, 1932, a rule in force since 1919 by which British defense policy rested on the assumption that there would be no major war during the next decade.

Manchuria was half way round the world, but in January, 1933, Hitler became chancellor of Germany. Here surely was a menace almost on Britain's doorstep. Years later, with the advantage of historical hindsight, Winston Churchill in The Gathering Storm (1948) was to brand World War II as "the unnecessary war" and to say that Germany could have been stopped by the western powers in 1935, or certainly by the spring of 1936.[12] The picture was by no means so clear at the time, either to Churchill or to the ministers who had the responsibility of power. Apprehensions concerning the new regime were indeed expressed in parliament, by the professional diplomats from Berlin, and in the press.[13] On the other hand, British opinion toward Germany was decidedly ambivalent. There was a good deal of public respect for "Jerry," the doughty opponent of 1914-1918. There was a feeling that the treaty of Versailles had been harsh toward Germany.[14] Some saw Nazism as a bulwark against communism.

In November, 1932, just a few weeks before Hitler attained power, Churchill said in the house that "the removal of the just grievances of the vanquished ought to precede the disarmament of the victors."[15] It was difficult to be tough and resolute toward a potential foe almost universally believed to have "just grievances." Hitler was adept at playing on the guilt complex of the British, in speeches like those of May 17, 1933, May 21, 1935, and March 7, 1936.[16] Hitler seemed to have an almost hpynotic effect on distinguished Britons who visited him.

Another potential menace was Soviet Russia. Among left wingers there was a belief that the Russian experiment was a constructive one, but among conservatives

there was often a hope that Russia and Germany would fight it out while the west stayed neutral. When Captain Basil Liddell Hart went to the war office to see Brigadier-General John Dill--the future Chief of the Imperial General Staff in World War II--Dill asked "could we not let Germany expand eastwards at Russia's expense?" He made it clear that he disliked Russia's system and doubted her efficiency as an ally.[17] Prime Minister Baldwin expressed the same sentiments at the end of July, 1936, when he received a deputation concerning the pace of rearmament. He said that if Hitler moved east, "I shall not break my heart ...If there is any fighting in Europe to be done, I should like to see the Bolsheviks and the Nazis doing it."[18] Russia's entry into the League in 1934 and her new zeal for collective security were widely distrusted. Thus it may be argued that the British public was much less united in its view of the potential menace abroad than its American counterpart today.

Nevertheless, the situation in the Far East, the growing tension in Europe climaxing in Hitler's withdrawal from the League and from the Disarmament Conference, and the imminent collapse of that conference, led the British government to form an official committee on November 9, 1933, to review the defense situation. This group was to make recommendations on the assumption that the United States, France and Italy would be friendly powers. It was this committee, which reported on February 28, 1934, which decided that Germany should be taken as the ultimate potential enemy when planning defense policy.[19] The speed with which this body worked owed much to the chairmanship of Sir Maurice Hankey, who had been secretary both to the Committee of Imperial Defence and to the Cabinet since 1916. The report then went before a ministerial committee, to which the ubiquitous Hankey acted as secretary, and it was not until the end of July, 1934, that this group's recommendations were accepted by the cabinet. In the view of Hankey's biographer the delays at this stage were due to the fact that Prime Minister MacDonald was sick and did not really want rearmament, that Baldwin was alarmed about the air threat and wor-

ried about convincing the electorate of the need to rearm, and that Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain "held the purse strings tightly in his hand."[20]

This brings us to another important consideration that has to be faced by a democracy as it rearms. All nations have finite resources and allocation has to be made if inflation is to be avoided. Defense spending tends to be especially inflationary since the goods and services provided are not themselves economically productive. In this respect the American task today seems more difficult than that of the British in the thirties. We live in a stretched economy, with inflation running at high levels. British rearmament, on the other hand, was undertaken in a deflationary period, with high unemployment. Yet it was also a time of old-fashioned orthodox economics, and the restraining hand of the Treasury was exerted from the commencement of the discussions on rearmament. Sir Warren Fisher represented the Treasury on the official committee and Chamberlain himself on the ministerial committee in 1933-1934.

Chamberlain insisted on a sharp cut in projected expenditure, writing in his diary on June 6, 1934: "I have now just completed a paper making revised proposals, which bring the 5 years' expenditure down from 76 to 50 million, excluding ship-building."[21] Chamberlain was a highly competent administrator whose influence on rearmament was profound. He was constantly interested, however, in a balanced budget and in trade considerations. He regarded Britain's financial strength as in itself a safeguard of eventual victory if war should come. As late as 1937 he was arguing in cabinet that while recognizing the priority of defense, "our resources are not unlimited and we were putting burdens on future generations."[22]

Once the difficult decision has been made to allocate extra resources for defense, to forego some butter for more guns, important further choices have to be made as to how to spend the new defense funds most wisely and effectively. Basically, the British decisions were made within the existing committee struc-

ture, with new ad hoc committees appointed as required. Pressure for a Ministry of Defense and a Ministry of Supply did lead to the creation of a Minister for the Coordination of Defence in March, 1936. Baldwin's selection of Sir Thomas Inskip for this position led to the gibe that it was the most curious appointment since Caligula had made his horse a consul, but Inskip was a capable and conscientious man. Churchill, who wanted the appointment, was ruled out by the widespread belief in his lack of political judgment.[23] No Ministry of Supply was appointed until 1939.

Some of the problems that had to be faced were inter-service jealousy, the innate conservatism of many defense leaders, the belief of the government that the British public would only accept a limited program--and above all the limitations imposed by finance. The Royal Air Force was regarded with jealousy by the other two services, and there was a dispute of long duration between the Navy and the Air Force over the control of naval aviation, in the solution of which Inskip played an important role.

The Army was the cinderella at this time. Britain had two of the foremost military thinkers of the age in Captain Basil H. Liddell Hart and Major-General J.C. Fuller, both of whom stressed the value of the tank in modern warfare, in order to overcome the superiority of the defense which had been demonstrated 1914-1918. Generally their views were more readily accepted in Germany than in Britain. Liddell Hart was exasperated by the slow rate of mechanization. This was due partly to lack of money, partly to conservative leadership. One old soldier referred to tanks as "those petrol things" while War Minister Duff Cooper when announcing the transition of some cavalry regiments from horses to tanks said apologetically: "It is like asking a great musical performer to throw away his violin and to devote himself in future to the gramophone."[24] Early on the plan was to develop an expeditionary force to defend Belgium, which would be a valuable help in the air defense of Britain and would also facilitate the development of the bombing deterrent. No money could be spared for the development of such a force. It was only in 1939 that the

plan for a continental expeditionary force was revived, joined with a plan to double the reserve Army and to introduce the draft for the first time ever in peace.[25]

The Royal Navy as the "senior service" enjoyed more prestige and it was widely believed that Hankey as a former Marine officer favored the Navy.[26]

In the defense white paper of 1936 it was announced that the Navy would lay down five King George V class battleships. This was a type of conservatism, looking back to Jutland and rather than forward to the probable conditions of the next war.

Financial stringency constantly warped the development of the defense program. This was so in 1934. Since resources were considered unavilable for a balanced development of the services, the decision was made to concentrate on strengthening the Air Force by providing a deterrent of bombers. It was considered that this would relieve the concern of the general public about bombing and would also serve as a warning to Germany. It has been described as "show window" rearming, with more shadow than substance to it.[27]

As rearmament was stepped up in 1935 and 1936, the R.A.F. retained the priority. The emphasis was still on bombers to act as a deterrent, but the situation on air defense was beginning to change. New fighters were developed, the Spitfire and the Hurricane--although it was the end of 1937 before the government gave a high place to fighter production. Radar was invented through the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence, commonly known as the Tizard Committee.[28] Baldwin generously involved Churchill in this program, although the result was not very happy, and Churchill's scientific advisor and friend, Professor Lindermann, became embroiled with Tizard.[29]

On the whole, the British rearmament effort was an impressive one, on the prevailing assumptions that Germany would not be ready for aggressive war for some years, and that Britain could not afford to move on to

a semi-war footing. Strong efforts were made to mobilize industry on sensible and cooperative lines. Industrialists were used as advisors, such as Lord Weir, while efforts were made to reassure the labor unions concerning the dilution of standards. Shadow factories were built in order to create extra wartime capacity. Efforts were made to tax excess profits, to avoid the recriminations of profiteering which had arisen 1914-1918.[30]

Finally a democracy has to convince the general public that its defense program is a reasonable one in the prevailing world situation and that the financial sacrifices being demanded are necessary. Complete consensus is impossible, but the more agreement there is the better the program will proceed, and the less divisiveness there will be should the worst befall, as in Europe in 1939. The National Government had to face the steady opposition of the Labour party, who as late as 1936 moved token reductions in the defense estimates, and only fully swung behind the rearmament program in 1937. The government's most realistic and most persistent critic was Churchill. His consistent theme was that the government had the prerogative to ensure the safety of the realm, and that the performance of this duty did not demand a mandate from the people. He argued thus in the house on February 7, 1934,[31] and again a month later on March 8, when he made a special appeal to Baldwin, then Lord President of the Council:

> He has the power. He has the power not only because of the confidence placed by large numbers of people in the sobriety of his judgment and in his peaceful intentions, but also because, as leader of the Conservative Party, he possesses the control of overwhelming majorities of determined men in both Houses of the legislature.[32]

The warnings and exhortations were often repeated, culminating in the famous philippic of November 12, 1936, when he accused Baldwin and the government of being

unable to make up their minds on defense: "So they go in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all powerful to be impotent."[33] Churchill was right, of course, in saying that the government had the responsibility for public safety. In conditions of crisis, the executive may have to act abruptly without reference to the legislature or to the electorate. If such actions are taken in more normal conditions, they are calculated to cause bitter dissent and division in a democratic society.

Churchill was, of course, a freelance from 1929 to 1939, and it was certainly not his best decade. A recent study sees his career from 1900 to 1939 as "a study in failure."[34] His violent opposition to the Government of India Bill appeared archaic. His romantic support of Edward VIII at the time of the abdication led to an astonishing repudiation in the house.[35] Even on defense, his early warnings appeared strident and hysterical. Sir Herbert Samuel on July 13, 1934, accused him of using "the language of a Malay running amok rather than of a responsible British statesman ..."[36] Only gradually did his expertise in defense begin to impress the house.

In contrast to Churchill, Baldwin held responsibility and, as the former said, was admired for his sober judgment and peaceful intentions. Baldwin had a very strong political base and was a most effective speaker in the house, on the hustings, and over the radio. Although highly strung, he was a genial man who was liked even by his political opponents. He went out of his way to reconcile the Labour Party, a typical example being on May 22, 1935, when he paid a graceful tribute to George Lansbury and his small group of followers for keeping alive the traditions of the opposition since 1931.[37]

In a smooth, unobtrusive manner Baldwin explained the need for the rearmament program; he was the government's main spokesman for defense in 1933, 1934 and 1935. As soon as he believed it politically possible

he called for a general election, in which one of the main themes was rearmament. During the campaign he called clearly for rearmament, although in a low key, stressing the need to repair deficiencies in the armed services. The Labour opposition certainly understood the issue. In their election manifesto they accused the goverment of "planning a vast and expensive rearmament programme which will only stimulate such programmes elsewhere."[38] During the campaign Baldwin addressed the Peace Society in Guildhall and pledged: "I give you my word that there will be no great armaments."[39] In later years, critics were to pluck this phrase out of its context and charge that Baldwin was implying that the defense program would be window-dressing rather than real. In context, Baldwin clearly meant that the government would rearm to the extent of the danger, but would not go overboard like the dictatorships. Baldwin won a comfortable victory, which he firmly saw as a mandate for the rearmament program.[40]

In 1936 Baldwin continued to speak out on defense, both in the country and in parliament, although for much of this year his political prestige fell as a result of the fiasco of the Hoare-Laval pact of December, 1935. Also he was plagued by ill health, which culminated in a complete nervous breakdown in the later summer. On November 12, 1936, he responded to Churchill on defense, although by this time he was very preoccupied by the "King's matter." In his so-called "appalling frankness" speech he described his philosophy over rearming in a democratic and free society. He said that the early stages of a defense program were easier in a dictatorship, where swift executive action could be taken without reference to public opinion. A democracy had to convince its people, but once that was done such a society would be stronger than a totalitarian regime. He explained why in his judgment it had been impossible to have a general election on the defense issue in 1933 or 1934. The Labour Party might have won, at that time totally opposed to rearmament. In this speech, Baldwin expressed himself less clearly than usual, so that critics who did not follow the whole thread of his thought could allege that he had acted cynically and selfishly,

by postponing a necessary election until he was sure that he and his party would triumph.

Baldwin's political career ended on a high note. His handling of the abdication crisis was almost universally admired, and soon afterward he retired, in May, 1937, amidst public adulation. Although not a strong administrator, by his prestige and benign influence he had done more than any person to convince the British public of the need for rearmament. As the United States faces a somewhat similar problem, we need a political leader to show the need for a strong defense posture. Following the secretiveness of Johnson, the duplicity of Nixon, the naivity of Ford, the political ineptitude of Carter, we now have an articulate president, who seems open enough to appeal to all sections of society. The task will not be easy, but perhaps a consensus on defense may now be built.

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[19]Gibbs, Grand Strategy, pp. 93-94.

[20]Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, III, 1931-1963 (London: Collins, 1974), pp. 89-93, 97-110.

[21]Keith Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain (London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd., 1946), p. 258.

[22]Robert Paul Shay, Jr., British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits (Princeton U.P., 1977), p. 143.

[23]Roskill, Hankey III, pp. 206-8.

[24]Liddell Hart, Memoirs 1895-1963, pp. 242, 277.

[25]Gibbs, Grand Strategy, I, pp. 491-526.

[26]Shay, British Rearmament in the Thirties, pp. 68-69.

[27]Ibid., pp. 46-47.

[28]Ronald W. Clark, Tizard (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1965) pp. 105-68.

[29]Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill V, 1922-1939 (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 750-52.

[30]Shay, British Rearmament in the Thirties, pp. 92-133.

[31]285 H.C. Deb. 5s., 119-1200.

[32]286 H.C. Deb. 5s., 2074.

[33]317 H.C. Deb. 5s., 1107.

[34]Robert Rhodes James, Churchill: A Study in Failure, 1900-1939 (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1970).

[35]Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, V., p. 822.

[36]292 H.C. Deb. 5s., 675.

[37]302 H.C. Deb 5s., 359-73.

[38]Times, October 26, 1935.

[39]Ibid., November 1, 1935.

[40]The handling of the defense issue in the November 14, 1935, election is still highly controversial. For a pro-Baldwin interpretation, see Middlemas and Barnes Baldwin, pp. 859-69. For a critical account, see Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, V. pp. 677-87.

Commentary On

"Rearming A Democratic Society: The British Experience, 1932-1937"

Larry H. Addington - The Citadel

Mr. Wightman's essay concentrates specifically on the role of Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin's position on rearmament until his retirement from public life in May, 1937. Perhaps it is fair to say that the traditional view of Baldwin in this regard has been one of a conservative who refused to recognize the growing danger posed by the rearming of Germany and of the aggressive actions of both Germany and Fascist Italy during his time in office. Together with Neville Chamberlain, Baldwin's successor in office and a chief architect of the Munich Pact in 1938, he has been considered one of the "hollow men" who led Britain to the outbreak of World War II.

Mr. Wightman presents a different picture of Baldwin. In his interpretation, Baldwin is a practical politician (indeed none other than Winston Churchill classified him as "the most formidable politician I have ever known in public life"), and one who recognized the deep sense of war-weariness that still affected the British public a decade and a half after the First World War. He also recognized through his speeches that the aerial bomber was a special threat to the tight little island, and that were Britain to rearm it must do so with a bomber force for what today might be called "massive retaliation." He found a rearmament policy based on the aim of indiscriminate slaughter of civilians almost as repulsive as a similar act done to Britain by her enemies. In addition, as a practical politician, Baldwin understood the dangers of moving too far ahead of public opinion on the issue of rearmament when the Labour Party was endeavoring to present itself as the "peace party." Finally, Britons were divided along ideological lines, some fearing Soviet Russia more than Nazi Germany.

According to Mr. Wightman, Baldwin actually did a great deal for Britain's defense within the narrow confines of his own convictions and what he believed the public would tolerate. The impact of the Great Depression left spare plant capacity and unemployed labor for the purposes of rearmament, but a Conservative Party was not eager to embrace Keynesian economics. Indeed, the Conservative prescription was to cut taxes further and economize in government. Still, according to Wightman, Baldwin favored more funds for defense by mid-1934 than Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer. Moreover, when more defense monies were provided, the services themselves quarreled over allocation and priorities. By a narrow margin, the Royal Air Force received preference in the mid-1930's, in retrospect a vital point in Britain's rearmament decisions. And only in 1937 did the Labour Party lend its support to rearmament.

The chief defects in Mr. Wightman's presentation have little to do with his thesis. They are primarily failures to include a little of what was actually happening on the other side of the Channel at specific times when Baldwin is quoted on the issue of rearmament, and how these actions affected both his and the public judgment. More important, Mr. Wightman gives us a convincing case study of how an astute politician coped with an unpopular issue, both in terms of his party's fortunes and his personal conscience. Certainly, Mr. Wightman makes it abundantly clear that Baldwin was not aware of the growing danger to Britain, and that he coped with the problem as best he could within the climate of his times.

THE AUTHOR-PLANTER WILLIAM ELLIOTT (1788-1863)

Beverly Scafidel

William Elliott of Beaufort lived from 1778 to 1863. He was nephew to Stephen Elliott, the botanist and bank president, and cousin to the son of Stephen Elliott (also named Stephen), who was Bishop of Georgia.

William Elliott was a planter, sportsman, author, and legislator. Today he is best known as the author of a volume of hunting and fishing stories entitled Carolina Sports by Land and Water, first published in 1846. This is a collection of sketches written for various magazines and newspapers; its literary value is in the order of the sketches and their cumulative effect, rather than in the individual pieces.

Here we read of Elliott's encounters with a fish previously unknown in Carolina waters, the "devil fish," or manta ray. Action-filled fish stories, with some disclaimers, give way, as the narrative progresses, to more philosophical accounts of hunting in Carolina, then to descriptions of Carolina hunters, the animals and birds they pursue, and their methods of hunting, legal and illegal. The book ends on an intellectual plane with the presentation of what he calls "random" thoughts on hunting, which, of course, are anything but random.

His own opinion of his book appears in a letter to his wife:

> I think that if any thing I have written will live after me--it will be these 'sports' ...At the worst--they can only drop into oblivion--but should they acquire notoriety--it will be a sort of legacy of honor to my posterity who need not then be ashamed of claiming descent--from old "Venator!"
>
> (October 9, 1859)

Although Carolina Sports was obviously his favorite literary work, his other publications reveal other aspects of his life and show him to be a true product of his education and his time.

Elliott's education at the College of Beaufort and then at Harvard cultivated his taste for literature. Throughout his life he enjoyed drama, novels, and poetry. He was sufficiently well-versed in drama and in the novel to write reviews for The Southern Review, edited by his uncle Stephen, and by H.S. Legare. For this journal he reviewed Scott's novel Anne of Geierstein,[3] and Gifford's edition of Ben Jonson.[4]

He encouraged his children to develop their own tastes by taking them to plays, to the opera, and to the ballet in Charleston, and when they travelled in the North. It is likely that at least once in his life he felt that his efforts in behalf of his children backfired: in 1849 his 19-year-old son William, like his father, went to Harvard. Moreover, William, like his father, appreciated the arts. But the young man went too far. A letter from Elliott explains the situation:

> You ask me, (as if it were proper for me to determine, without knowing what your bent or fitness might be)--what profession you were to pursue? I answer that it will be time enough to determine, when you have spent four years in mastering those elementary studies--which are useful and needful in all ...I could not suppress a smile when you spoke of poetry as a profession--the poorest in its returns--the most thankless--the readiest to starve by--and the most difficult to succeed--in all the whole aisle of liberal pursuits--It is the most difficult of all literary triumphs--the last to be attempted by the most gifted.
>
> (June 19, 1849)

He offers to read whatever his son might have written, but concludes his letter by suggesting that his son pursue the art of preserving his health rather than the art of poetry.

Although his tastes inclined him toward the arts, Elliott was, after all, an 18th century man. That is to say, he was a practical man, interested in his business, which was that of being a low-country planter of rice and cotton. At one time he owned as many as eight plantations in South Carolina and Georgia, and boasted to his son William, "I have not squandered, but on the contrary have trebled my paternal inheritance." (June 19, 1849). Lest the young man become too complacent, Elliott goes on to say in the same sentence, "such is the unproductive state of our agriculture that our incomes are reduced to almost nothing--and no debts can be paid. A new order of things prevails and young men of the first families must work or starve."

In spite of his fears, his business philosophy was simple and, obviously, effective. He personally supervised the management of his plantations, spending a great part of the year travelling from one to another. His regular duties were to inspect the crops and slave houses, and to act as doctor, or, in cases he couldn't handle, to employ a trained physician for his sick slaves. In his eyes the absentee landlord was not only a bad manager of his own property, but a menace to his neighbors in failing to regulate the behavior of his employees. One of the hunting sketches in Carolina Sports describes the fire hunter as an overseer whose employer is an absentee landlord. This overseer kills his employer's game, damages his property and crops, and inadvertently kills his slaves and livestock. Elliott once wrote to his mother that "planters should not be absentees. If they cannot reside near their interests ...they should sell to those who can." (January 10, 1854)

Another tenet of Elliott's business philosophy was the value of the scientific method in matters of planting. Always concerned with improving his crops, he studied the techniques of others. For example, when a

neighbor discovered the secret of growing good quality sea island cotton, his success was at first attributed to his being a good salesman. However, Elliott discovered that the secret was in the selection of good seed.

Likewise, he believed that a planter should not overwork his land. In doing so, he would wear the land out and at the same time lower the price of his cotton by increasing the supply.

As always, when Elliott possessed knowledge and opinions that he believed would be useful to others, he published them. In 1828 and 1829 he published his opinions on planting in the Southern Agriculturist,[5] and in 1855 presented them in a speech delivered in Paris to the Imperial Agricultural Society of France.[6] He was very proud of his invitation to speak to the Society, but he was even more proud of the fact that he delivered the speech in French. He says in a letter to his wife that the audience applauded him, a count invited him to dinner, and the Society gave him a medal in return for his efforts.

Since Elliott lived in years of political upheaval, and since he was given to expressing his opinions, he could scarcely avoid becoming involved in politics. He was Intendant (Mayor) of Beaufort in 1824-25, at the time of LaFayette's visit, and he served in both the South Carolina House of Representatives and the Senate. In 1832 he resigned from the Senate because he could not comply with the wishes of his constituents by voting for nullification. His "Address to the People of St. Helena Parish,"[7] which was written to explain his resignation, compares nullification to Civil War, and states his belief that nullification was unconstitutional.

Along the same lines, his play Fiesco[8] (1850), a blank verse political play set in Renaissance Italy, portrays the dangers of Civil War. Perhaps it is just as well that he published the play privately. Though marked by competent blank verse and an acceptable plot,

the play is characterized by lack of action. In fact, the only thing we see happen on stage is that Fiesco, after deciding to defend his city, puts on his armor. Soon afterwards, he falls into the surf and because of the weight of the armor, is drowned.

Some of Elliott's most interesting writing was unpublished. The letters he wrote during his travels to the north, to Europe, to Cuba, and to his plantations show him as a fascinated observer of human nature.

The letters from his travels serve a double function, one immediate and the other long range. They communicated his whereabouts, his health, and his activities, and after he returned home they would serve as reminders of the trips. As one last example of his writing, here is what I believe is the most charming example. He writes to his wife from Paris in 1855, during the Universal Exhibition:

> The last week--all Paris has been turned up side down with the visit of her majesty of England ...I had three near views of her: and I speak by the book, for I had an excellent opportunity of judging--as, being directly behind her majesty--(accidently caught there--) when she alighted at the entrance of the Exhibition of the fine arts. On being handed from the open barouche by the Emperor she forgot--(as ladies are prone to forget)--her train--and <u>that</u> remained in the Carriage while her majesty's feet were on the pavement. Of course I looked--and without flattery I saw--two delicate <u>mince</u> feet--two ditto-ditto ankles--two superb calves--(royal George stock) and stockings of flesh colored silk--worthy of the entourages--I think I have seen more of her majesty than any man in France--except perhaps Prince Albert ...it was but a happy accident that placed me where I was--and I know--that they who choose to open their eyes, as they pass through the world--can hardly help seeing--some things worthy of being remembered.
>
> (August 27, 1855)

Indeed, because of a happy combination of temperament, education, position, experience, intellect, and talent, a great deal of what Elliott saw was worthy of being remembered.

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[1]William Elliott, Carolina Sports by Land and Water (Charleston, S.C.: Burgess and James, 1846).

[2]Beverly Scafidel. "The Letters of William Elliott," (The University of South Carolina, 1978). Subsequent quotations from Elliott's letters are taken from this source.

[3]William Elliott, Review of Scott's Anne of Geierstein, The Southern Review, 4 (November 1829), 498-522.

[4]William Elliott, Review of Gifford's edition of Ben Jonson, The Southern Review, 5 (August 1830), 91-116.

[5]See Elliott's "Examination of Mr. Edmund Rhett's Agricultural Address," The Southern Agriculturist, 1 n.s. (March 1841), 113-120, 281-289; "On the Cultivation and High Prices of Sea-Island Cotton," The Southern Agriculturist, 1 (April 1828), 151-163; "On the Cultivation of Fine Cotton," The Southern Agriculturist, 2 (March 1829), 116-119; and "On the Cultivation of Male Cotton," The Southern Agriculturist, (August 1829), 352-355.

[6]William Elliott, Address to the Imperial and Central Agricultural Society of France, Read Before Them at Paris, July 4, 1855, (Columbia, S.C.: Edward H. Britton, 1857).

[7]William Elliott, Address to the People of St. Helena Parish (Charleston, S.C.: Charleston Press, 1832).

[8][William Elliott] Fiesco; a Tragedy (New York: Trehern & Williamson, 1850).

A BEAUFORT PLANTER'S RHETORICAL WORLD: THE CONTEXTS AND CONTENTS OF WILLIAM HENRY TRESCOT'S ORATIONS

David Moltke-Hansen

Historians continue to turn to antebellum southern oratory in their effort to understand Southerners' motives and beliefs, actions and character in the fateful years before secession. Their assumption is that many of these addresses, given the purposes for which they were composed, were intentional expressions--more or less sensitive, more or less just--of ruling feelings and attitudes towards the subjects commanding public attention at the time: death and taxes, law and order, education and drink, the family and the community, religion and revolution, the roles of government, industry, and agriculture, and the relations between the regions and races making up the United States.[1]

The assumption, often made, is seldom questioned. The ruling ethos of the Old South is heard in the speech of almost every antebellum planter and in the harangue of almost every politician elevated to oratorical prominence in Dixie before the Civil War. It has been heard--frequently--in the handful of addresses Beaufort planter and diplomat William Henry Trescot delivered: one before the Washington Light Infantry in 1847, one before the Beaufort Volunteer Artillery in 1850, and others before the Calliopean and Polytechnic Societies of the Citadel Academy in 1856, the South Carolina Historical Society in 1859, the South Carolina House of Representatives in 1863 and 1866, and the College of Charleston Alumni Association in 1889.[2] Yet Trescot, for one, does not seem at first glance a likely candidate for a position as spokesman for the regime under which he lived. Author of pioneering studies of American foreign policy during the Revolution and the administrations of Washington and Adams, he stood virtually alone among his contemporaries in the South as a diplomatic historian.[3] Furthermore, his closest friends were

college professors, yankee diplomats, and miscellaneous literati--not his fellow planters.[4] In fact, plantation society mostly bored Trescot. After evenings spent with his social peers, he would write witty letters about the dullness of the company.[5] He preferred to be in his study at the plantation on Barnwell Island outside Beaufort which his wife brought him as part of her marriage portion. There he read avidly, took an occasional glass of sherry, and wrote--essays, speeches, two books in all, and often a dozen or more letters a day. The writing, he claimed, helped him both "avoid being idle ... and avoid the reputation of idleness." It also gave him an audience of like-minded men, something he felt he did not get in Beaufort District.[6]

Trescot's enthusiasms and interests, then, set him apart from his society. So did his ambition. He did not work or aspire, as did so many of the ambitious among his neighbors and associates, for great wealth or political power or popular acclaim. What he did want was "that easy sort of greatness that is the charm of Diplomatic Service--the intense throbbing life of a great capital--the grace of that exquisite refinement which belongs only to the combination of culture, wealth and power-- ...the conversation of all that is famous in the world of men and fascinating in the world of women--the unrivalled opportunity for observation which is ...the great pleasure of life." Politics, on the other hand, he disdained, because in his view it makes its practitioners too often "ready, fluent, versatile, shallow, and ...selfish."[7]

Trescot, like many of the South's intellectuals and, for that matter, intellectuals in other times and places, was out of step with the majority of his social peers in his rejection. He was on other matters as well. For instance, he thought that John C. Calhoun was, however brilliant, both misguided and misleading in his policies. Part of this dislike of Calhoun was merely a matter of taste. As Trescot's own style reflected, he liked deliberateness, clarity, simplicity, directness, and polish in thought and presentation. While he agreed that

"every great statesman must be to some extent a theologian, ...must know whither he is going, what is the great end of national life," he disliked a metaphysical style in argument--the style he attributed to Calhoun. He also distrusted Calhoun, thought him self-serving. Trescot's fundamental disagreement with Calhoun, however, was one of political goals. Calhoun worked to preserve the union and insure southern rights within the framework of the United States Constitution. Trescot, on the other hand, "so far from regretting the dissolution of the union," looked forward to the formation of the North and the South into different republican systems, each "individual enough for a species and yet alike enough for a genus." Such a development, he thought, would be "a most triumphant vindication" of federal representative government and, at the same time, proof that the South had been misled by Calhoun.[8] In sharing this view of Calhoun with James Henry Hammond and William Gilmore Simms among others, Trescot was still distinctly in the minority. The majority of South Carolina voters, politicians, and political commentators as well as other Southerners accorded Calhoun the position as chief spokesman and architect of their cause and course.[9]

There are numerous reasons, in short, to question Trescot's fitness as an exponent of his class in the antebellum South and, even, in the Carolina lowcountry. He was bookish and cosmopolitan; how could he have spoken for the small planters, such as fellow Beaufort District planter Thomas Chaplin, who never went to college or to Europe and who ruled--at least numerically--southern plantation culture?[10]

* * *

The fundamental reason that Trescot can legitimately be read--with due regard for his idiosyncracies--as a man who spoke in some sense for as well as to the ruling caste of which he was a member is that he shared with his audiences of wealthy, politically connected, and socially established South Carolina planters, lawyers, merchants, ministers, and their sons a rhetorical world,

a sphere of preoccupations and preconceptions, references and ratiocinations. He spoke the same language, in every sense of the word, as did his hearers. Where he and other spokesmen for his society and culture disagreed, he and they nevertheless understood each other. Those, such as the abolitionists, who read different meanings into common words and reasoned from different assumptions and with a different logic, neither understood nor were understood by Trescot and fellow spokesmen for the South. They, in effect, spoke a different language.

Trescot, watching a dramatization of Uncle Tom's Cabin in London, was conscious of this gulf.[11] He was, at the same time, quite sure where his allegiance lay and why. His boredom in the company of his fellow planters, his yearning for the glitter of life in Europe, and his feelings of intellectual and social isolation on Barnwell Island did not make Trescot feel at odds with either himself or his society. As his active membership in numerous South Carolina social and cultural organizations suggests, he was a vigorous, if also fastidious, participant in the life of his community. Why else would he have spent what appeared to him to be endless evenings in the vapid company of his peers?

Trescot carried his identification of himself with plantation culture even into his correspondence with yankee friends about diplomatic history and affairs.[12] He also illustrated this self-identification in his orations. There his sense of, and rapport with, his audiences are reflected both in his approach to, and definition of, his subject matter and in his style. They are also reflected in the nature of the themes he emphasized and in the cast of his thought.

All Trescot's known published orations were prepared for communal rituals--the annual meetings of civic and cultural organizations, memorials in the halls of the legislature, and the like. In each case, the orations's purpose was to mark a public occasion appropriately. It was not, as in the case of many (particularly political) orations, to galvanize a faction for support

of a partisan program of action or thought. Trescot did not, as had that other South Carolina classicist, Hugh Swinton Legare, go canvassing for votes among the farmers of the state wearing a coonskin and speaking "in the idiom of a backcountry redneck."[13] Rather he addressed himself to his peers and for and to the consensus ruling them.

This purpose is reflected in his style. As he could presume that even the dullest in audiences of his peers shared with him elements of classical education and taste, he could--and did--use the measured, Ciceronian periods, far-ranging historical allusions, and occasional flights of highly polished eloquence on which he and his audiences had been reared.[14] Like his style, Trescot's subject matter in his orations illustrates his sense of the community for and to which he spoke as well as his education and taste. Addressing the annual George Washington anniversary meeting of the Washington Light Infantry (a volunteer militia troop whose ranks were filled with Charleston notables), he spoke of Washington and his role in American history. Addressing a similar company in Beaufort one July 4th, he focussed attention on the relationship of Americans--and particularly Southerners--to their government in the wake of American independence. In addresses before college audiences, he turned from politics and political history to education and its role in shaping the South's future. On the floor of the South Carolina House of Representatives, when speaking to and for the legislature on the deaths of friends and colleagues, he mingled "reminiscence, history, political theory, and elegy" in addresses which eulogize not only individuals but the culture and society to which they had belonged.[15]

These diverse orations, in addition to sharing similar audiences, occasional and ceremonial origins, and stylistic traits, have several themes in common. The themes themselves--patriotism, nationalism, social and cultural development, sectionalism, the nature of history--are hardly peculiar to Trescot, his class, his region, or the times. No more is Trescot's understanding of these themes specific to antebellum southern

planters. Trescot at most gave individual expression to common themes and understandings. What he believed and invited his audiences to think is nevertheless revealing of how and why he identified himself with the community of interest in which he was born, married, and lived. It also suggests the logic behind his and that community's eventual embrace of secession.

Trescot, like many others in his generation, not only in the South, but in the North and Europe, believed that the urge to national self-identity and self-expression is the underlying motivation of long range political, cultural, and social developments.[16] He therefore paid homage to the patriot, the citizen who devotes himself to his nation's defense and destiny. While believing in national development and historical progress--that is, history as linear movement--Trescot also held that nations have life cycles: they are born, develop, flourish, weaken, wither, and finally, are absorbed within new and aggressively developing nations. History for Trescot, then, was cyclical as well as linear. It rolled like a wheel down the road to the future. These "revolutions of history" which saw new nations, new classes, new economies rise as others fell were, in his eyes, the basis of historical progress and the proper object of historical understanding.[17]

Men, in Trescot's view, do not direct history; they merely act in the drama. His view was diametrically opposed to that of such romantic historians as Carlyle, whose assumption that history is changed by great men dominated the thinking of many of the contemporaries of Trescot (and Nietzsche and Wagner). The Carlyle view was derived from hagiographic traditions in Christianity, from the successes of revolutionaries in late eighteenth-century America and France, and from romantic notions of heroism. It fostered great expectations in many would-be revolutionaries throughout the nineteenth century. The opposite view led Trescot to explain history in impersonal terms not unlike, in some ways, those being used by Karl Marx at the same time. Like such later historians as Ulrich B. Phillips, Eugene Genovese,

and Raimondo Luraghi, Trescot saw the South as a matter of "class and race."[18] This definition of the South--indeed, of the western world--as a seething cauldron of national, racial, and class interests led Trescot to consider politics and diplomacy, not as the expression or pursuit of ideals, but as the interplay of different groups with competing aims. His vision was like that Richard Hofstadter attributed--some scholars say erroneously--to Trescot's bugbear, John C. Calhoun, when he called Calhoun "The Marx of the Master Class."[19]

It was that vision which brought Trescot to preach the inevitability--and desirability--of secession, having weighed intersectional relationships in the same manner in which he evaluated international relations, he decided finally that the South and the North had grown apart to the point where their competing social, cultural, and economic aims and their growing mutual incomprehension necessitated their separating politically, becoming distinct nations. Similar arguments, Trescot contended, had finally led American reformers to revolution against Britain in 1776.[20] If the logic was inherited, it was also inescapable, given Trescot's assumptions and his evolving perceptions of America and the sectional conflict. His views were the views of the decision makers of the South in 1860. In that year, using his post as Assistant (and, for a time, Acting) Secretary of State in the Buchanan administration, Trescot gave vital information to the secessionists and helped coordinate secessionist activity in order to facilitate the successful withdrawal of the South from the Union.[21]

* * *

Consistently, whether in Charleston or Beaufort, London or Washington, Trescot was a highly self-conscious and conscientious representative of his class and interests. His published orations, while few in number, bear eloquent testimony to this identity to the sense of responsibility Trescot felt to the community with which he shared the identity. In doing so, the orations give

us access to the world antebellum slaveholders inherited and lost, while, in Trescot's words

> True to the instincts of their birth /,/
> Faithful to the teaching of their fathers /,/
> Content in their love for the state ...[22]

Trescot died in 1898, after nearly half a life time in the aftermath of slavery. With slight changes, the lines he had penned in 1864 for the epitaph of political ally James Henry Hammond, one-time Governor of South Carolina and United States Senator, could have become as fitting a tribute to himself.

> Called from early manhood
> to fill
> Social and political position
> Of the Highest eminence
> .....
> He sustained the reputation
> Which the great Orators and Statesmen
> Of former days
> Had achieved for South Carolina ...[23]

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[1]See Waldo W. Braden, "The Emergence of the Concept of Southern Oratory," Southern Speech Journal, 26 (Spring 1961), 173-83; Waldo W. Braden, ed., Oratory in the Old South (Baton Rouge, La., 1970); Drew Gilpin Faust, "The Rhetoric and Ritual of Agriculture in Antebellum South Carolina," Journal of Southern History, 45 (Nov. 1979), 541-68; A.V. Huff, Jr., "The Eagle and the Vulture: Changing Attitudes Toward Nationalism in Fourth of July Orations Delivered in Charleston, 1778-1860," South Atlantic Quarterly, 73 (Winter 1974), 10-22; Karl L. Kell, "A Rhetorical History of James Hamilton, Jr.: The Nullification Era in South Carolina, 1816-1834" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas,

1971); and William Martin Reynolds, "Deliberative Speaking in Antebellum South Carolina: The Idiom of a Culture" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1960).

[2]In chronological order by date of publication, the following are the known, published orations of Trescot (other than legel arguments): Oration Delivered before the Washington Light Infantry, on the 22d February, 1847 (Charleston, 1847); Oration Delivered before the Beaufort Artillery on July 4th, 1850 (Charleston, 1850); The Annual Address before the Calliopean and Polytechnic Societies of the Citadel Academy (Charleston, 1856); " ...Oration, Delivered before the South Carolina Historical Society, Thursday, May 19, 1859," Russell's Magazine, 5 (July 1859), 289-307, also in Collections of the South Carolina Historical Society, 3 (1859), 9-34; "Remarks, Delivered in the House of Representatives of South Carolina on Thursday, the 26th Day of November on Colonel James B. Perrin, deceased, late a member of the House," Columbia (S.C.) Daily Southern Guardian, 19 Dec. 1863; Address /on General Stephen Elliott of Beaufort/ Delivered ...in the House of Representatives of South Carolina, September 8, 1866 (Columbia, 1926); Oration ...Delivered before the Alumni of the College of Charleston, June 23, 1889 (Charleston, 1889). The Memorial of the Life of J. Johnston Pettigrew, perhaps Trescot's single best known composition, is often considered an oration but has not been conclusively shown to be one. On Trescot's life and reputation, see for instance, Leroy F. Youmans, "William Henry Trescot," Columbia (S.C.) State, May 6, 1898; Ludwig Lawisohn, "Books We Have Made," Charleston (S.C.) News and Courier, Aug. 30, 1903; William Peterfield Trent, Southern Writers (New York, 1905), 288-89; A. Burnet Rhett, "William Henry Trescot," Library of Southern Literature, 15 vols. (New Orleans and elsewhere, 1907), 12: 5485-86; Rose Miller Betts, "William Henry Trescot" (M.A. thesis, University of South Carolina, 1929); Robert Nicholas Olsberg, "William Henry Trescot" (M.A. thesis, University of South Carolina, 1967);

Robert Nicholas Olsberg, "A Government of Class and Race: William Henry Trescot and the South Carolina Chivalry, 1860-1865" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1972).

[3]Among Trescot's separately published, diplomatic writings are An American View of the Eastern Question (Charleston, 1854); The Diplomacy of the Revolution (New York, 1852); The Diplomatic History of the Administrations of Washington and Adams, 1789-1801 (Boston, 1857); A Few Thoughts on the Foreign Policy of the United States (Charleston, 1849); and A Letter ...on the Diplomatic System of the United States (Charleston, 1853).

[4]See William Henry Trescot correspondence with classicist William Porcher Miles in the William Porcher Miles Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (hereinafter, Southern Historical Collection); with J.C. Bancroft Davis in the Bancroft Davis Papers and Richard Rush in the William Henry Trescot Papers at the Library of Congress (hereinafter, LC); with his wife, from England, in the William Henry Trescot Papers at the South Caroliniana Library at the University of South Carolina at Columbia (hereinafter, SCL); and with Henry Shelton Sanford in Richard J. Amundson, "Trescot, Sanford and Sea Island Cotton," South Carolina Historical Magazine, 68 (Jan. 1967), 31-36.

[5]See, for instance, Trescot to William Porcher Miles, 20 Aug. 1853, William Porcher Miles Papers, Southern Historical Collection.

[6]Trescot to James Henry Hammond, 4 Apr. 1858, James Henry Hammond Papers, LC.

[7]Trescot to James Henry Hammond, 5 Dec. 1858, Hammond Papers, LC; /William Henry Trescot/, "The Bench and Bar," Russell's Magazine, 6 (Jan. 1860), 296.

[8]Trescot to James Henry Hammond, 2 Sept. 1850, 20 Mar. 1858, 5 Dec. 1858, James Henry Hammond Papers,

LC; William Henry Trescot, The Position and Course of the South (Charleston, .850). On antebellum southern intellectuals' relationships with their society, see Drew Gilpin Faust, A Sacred Circle (Baltimore, 1977).

[9]On Simms's and Hammond's deprecation of Calhoun, see, for instance, Mary C. Simms Oliphant et al., The Letters of William Gilmore Simms, 5 vols. to date (Columbia, 1956-), 2: 288-95, and Selections from the Letters and Speeches of the Hon. James H. Hammond of South Carolina (New York, 1966), 244.

[10]A plantation journal (1845-86) of Thomas B. Chaplin (1822-90), Trescot's exact contemporary, is in the South Carolina Historical Society (34-198).

[11]Trescot described the performance of Uncle Tom's Cabin in a letter of 16 Feb. 1853 to his wife transcribed in the William Henry Trescot Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia.

[12]See, for instance, the letters from Richard Rush to Trescot of 7 June 1851, 24 June 1851, 31 Oct. 1851, and 18 Oct. 1852 in the William Henry Trescot Papers, LC; also "Letter from William Henry Trescot, Esq. of South Carolina to Hon. J.R. Ingersoll of Pennsylvania," Record (27 Aug. 1863, 99 ff., copy in the William Henry Trescot Papers, South Caroliniana Library.

[13]Robert G. Gunderson, "The Southern Whigs," in Waldo W. Braden, ed., Oratory in the Old South, 113.

[14]See Ota Thomas, "The Teaching of Rhetoric in the United States During the Classical Period of Education," in William Norwood Brigance, ed., A History and Criticism of American Public Address, 2 vols. (New York, 1960), 1: 193-210; James H. Thornwell, "Semi-Centennial Address, December, 1856," in Semi-Centennial Celebration of the South Carolina College (Charleston, 1856).

[15]Olsberg, "A Government of Class and Race," xi.

[16]See David Moltke-Hansen, "A Whig Philosophy of History in the Writings of William Gilmore Simms," forth-

coming; Carlton J.H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New York, 1926); Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism (New York, 1955); Louis L. Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism (New Brunswick, N.J., 1954); and Arthur A. Ekirck, Jr., Idea of Progress in America, 1815-1860 (New York, 1944).

[17]Trescot, Oration Delivered before the Beaufort Volunteer Artillery, 9.

[18]The phrase comes from Trescot's Oration ...Delivered before the Alumni of the College of Charleston, 5: "Ours was essentially a government of class and race." Olsberg took the phrase for the title to his dissertation, "A Government of Class and Race." See Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, American Negro Slavery (New York, 1933) and Life and Labor in the Old South (Boston, 1930), also The Slave Economy of the Old South, ed. by Eugene D. Genovese (Baton Rouge, La., 1968); Eugene D. Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery (New York, 1965) and The World the Slaveholders Made (New York, 1969); Raimondo Luraghi, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation South (New York, 1978).

[19]Richard Hofstadter, "John C. Calhoun: The Marx of the Master Class," in The American Political Tradition (New York, 1957), 68-92. For one critique of Hofstadter's reading of Calhoun, see Pauline Maier, "The Road Not Taken: Nullification, John C. Calhoun and the Revolutionary Tradition in South Carolina," South Carolina Historical Magazine, 82 (Jan. 1981), 1-19.

[20]Trescot, The Diplomacy of the Revolution and Position and Course of the South.

[21]See Gaillard Hunt, ed., "Narrative and Letter of William Henry Trescot, concerning the Negotiations between South Carolina and President Buchanan in December, 1860," American Historical Review, 13 (Apr., 1908), 528-56, for Trescot's account of his Washington sojourn in 1860. See also W.A. Swanberg, First Blood: The Story of Fort Sumter (New York, 1957), 52ff.; and M. Foster

Farley, ed., "Three Letters of W.H. Trescot to Howell Cobb," South Carolina Historical Magazine, 68 (Jan., 1967), 22-30.

[22]The text of the inscription from which this quotation is taken is given in full in the Library of Southern Literature, 15: 6427-28.

[23]The text of the inscription from which this quotation is taken is given in full in Betts, "William Henry Trescot," 88-89.

URBANE BOURBON: JOSEPH W. BARNWELL AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW ARISTOCRACY

A.V. Huff, Jr.

The Old South constructed a hierarchical society at whose apex was a planter aristocracy which dominated its economic, social, political, and cultural life. With the possible exception of the rice kingdoms along the Atlantic seaboard, it was never a closed, entirely hereditary oligarchy, except to the great mass of blacks beyond the pale. As one of the planters put it, the aristocracy "remained open to talent accompanied by good manners and money to keep pace."[1] The history of the two and a half centuries before the Civil War is replete with enterprising, hard-driving new men who, within a single generation, had entered the planter class. The urban bourgeoisie--the merchant, banker, and professional groups--became wealthy and respected, but not until they became plantation masters through purchase, marriage, or inheritance had they arrived at the highest level of society. By 1860, however, the two groups were closely intertwined by a network of personal, economic, and social relationships. Not only did upwardly-mobile men become planters, but sons of the planters, often planters themselves, entered the business and professional world as well.

The Civil War and Reconstruction brought profound changes to the Old South. Emancipation rocked the economic foundations of the aristocracy, and these "masters without slaves" found it increasingly difficult to dominate the society they had established. Until the 1930's, however, it was customary for historians to interpret the rise of the Bourbons in 1876 as a restoration of the old order. Dominating the revisionist view, which soon became accepted, was C. Vann Woodward, whose Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 was published in 1951, portrayed the Redemption not as "a return of an old system nor the restoration of an old ruling class." It was "in the main ...of middle-class, industrial, capitalistic outlook, with little but a nominal connection with the old planter regime."[2]

Now the Woodward synthesis has been seriously questioned. William J. Cooper's The Conservative Regime: South Carolina, 1877-1890 has returned to the older picture of Bourbons "who clung obstinately to the past ... who looked forward not to a better world but to a re-created one." However, John K. Bettersworth argued that there was an "urbane Bourbon," but he was "one and the same person as the South's antebellum ruling class, the planter oligarchy:" "The same men who had become gentlemen in the Old South by virtue of their unabashed spirit of enterprise were to be the very gentlemen whose irrepressible enterprising would create a New South." Dewey Grantham has suggested more study before a new synthesis can emerge: "Perhaps we have been too quick to categorize Southern leaders ...it would be helpful ...if we knew more about their program and methods and *how they changed with the passage of time* (italics mine).[3]

Perhaps more useful now than the traditional state studies would be community studies of those urban areas where the planter and the factor and the banker met and often lived side by side. Perhaps, too, the historian's eagerness to construct an ideal type, such as planter or Bourbon, has not been helpful in understanding the subtle differences between individuals and the changes which can occur within a relatively short period of time. If Bettersworth is correct, then historians of the New South have interpreted the Bourbons from a simplistic understanding of antebellum society. And if Grantham is correct, we might learn more by distinguishing what appears to be two generations within the Bourbon group--the older planter-generals and the younger generation who were forced to create a new Southern aristocracy out of the ruins of the old.

Charleston, which had been the capital of the planter aristocracy of the South Carolina low country and one of the major urban centers of the Old South, is crucial to the study of the Southern Bourbon. And within the Charleston community there has been almost no study of the younger generation of Bourbons which included men like Captain Samuel Gaillard Stoney, Augustine T. Smyth,

and Joseph W. Barnwell. None has left a larger accumulation of papers than Barnwell. His correspondence and business papers fill 136 boxes in the South Carolina Historical Society, and his "Life and Recollections" are 469 pages in typescript and cover only forty-four of his eighty-four years. Barnwell is hardly typical, that is, an ideal type, of the younger Bourbons, for unlike Stoney and Smythe he never became a planter. But he was a prominent member of his generation which helped to forge a New South aristocracy.[4]

Joseph Walker Barnwell belonged to the last generation who shared in the planter aristocracy of the Old South. He was born October 31, 1846, in Charleston, a son of the distinguished Barnwell family of Beaufort whose roots stretched back to "Tuscarora Jack" Barnwell who came to Carolina in 1701. Joseph's parents, the Reverend William Hazzard Wigg Barnwell and Catherine Osborn Barnwell, were cousins. William had been educated at Harvard and Judge Tapping Reeve's Law School. He practiced law in Beaufort until he was ordained to the Episcopal priesthood. He was one of the leaders of the evangelical party in the Diocese of South Carolina, and eventually became rector of St. Peter's Parish in Charleston.[5]

As a child Joseph Barnwell lived in Charleston, except for holidays in December and April, when the family went to Laurel Bay, their plantation just outside Beaufort. He grew up in the economically hopeful decade and a half before the Civil War in which Southern society, increasingly on the defensive, fashioned Charleston into what Professor George Rogers has described as "a closed city."

When William Barnwell's health broke in 1853, he and his family moved to Laurel Bay. They lived on the plantation each year from November to May and resided in their Beaufort town house the remaining months. In 1857 the elder Barnwell went to Philadelphia for his health; there he died in 1863. After the Federal invasion of Port Royal, the Barnwells left Beaufort to live with Joseph's elder brother in Columbia where he

was a professor in South Carolina College. Then in January 1864, with the financial assistance of George A. Trenholm, Confederate Secretary of the Treasury and a former vestryman of St. Peter's Church, Joseph entered the Citadel. At the battle of Honey Hill in December he fought with the corps of cadets and was wounded in the knee. He returned to Columbia and refugeed with his family to Yorkville when Sherman invaded the state.

After the war Barnwell enrolled in the re-opened University of South Carolina and was graduated in June 1868. He began to read law in Charleston in the office of Charles Richardson Miles and was admitted to the bar in 1869. In June he received a gift from his cousin, James Lowndes, and two friends, William L. Trenholm and Theodore D. Wagner, to study in Germany. He traveled first to Goettingen and then to Berlin, but the Franco-Prussian War cut short his studies. Back in Charleston, Barnwell opened an office on Broad Street. Except for a decade when he practiced with William H. Brawley, he worked alone. He became a notable trial lawyer, but it was in corporate law that he spent most of his career. He was counsel for the South Carolina Railroad, the Plant System (which became the Atlantic Coast Line), and Southern Railway.

Though it was in the heat of Reconstruction, Barnwell became interested in politics, and he became secretary of the Young Carolina Association, a secret group of young men in Charleston. Composed of younger businessmen and attorneys like Edward McCrady, Jr., they joined forces with the reform wing of the Republican Party as the only hope of securing election to office. In the fall of 1874 the fusion ticket included five carefully balanced Conservative candidates for the state legislature--George Trenholm, representing the older Bourbon generation; Barnwell, the younger; a German merchant; an Irish merchant; and a planter from outside the city. All five were elected and served with thirteen Republicans.[6]

In Columbia the Charleston Conservatives worked very closely with the Reform Republicans and their new governor, Daniel H. Chamberlain. Barnwell later commented: "I never found any difficulty in getting on with them ...and I was always treated with respect by Republicans, black and white, and may say I was careful to give no cause of offense myself, although expressing my opinion with some freedom." Trenholm became the spokesman for the group in its negotiations with the governor. Barnwell remembered that /he/ "tried to do my part and officially became very close to the Governor, but I never visited at his house." Trenholm died in 1875, and Barnwell continued his cooperation with Chamberlain.[7]

Sentiment began to develop throughout the state that the Democrats should end their cooperationist tactics and adopt a "straightout" ticket as the only way to end Reconstruction. Initially, Barnwell adopted a wait-and-see attitude, but when the state Democratic Convention adopted the Mississippi Plan, Barnwell agreed. "When I got to Columbia," he wrote, "I saw very evident signs that the state would be united ...and therefore acquiesced very cheerfully in the result of the convention's work."[8]

In Charleston Barnwell indicates that there was a difference of opinion along generational lines. The older Bourbons preferred the course of cooperation with Chamberlain as the safest way; the younger group, the straightout ticket.

> I met my friend /Barnwell later recalled/ and my father's friend, Mr. Wm. C. Bee, who had been a prominent member of St. Peter's Church and who had been one of the most successful factors of the city and was still a man of means. "Oh," he said, "I am afraid you have made a great mistake in Columbia. I cannot see success before you." "Mr. Bee," I said, "just please wait, and before the

> campaign is over you will be throwing up your hat with the youngest of us for Hampton and his ticket."[9]

Barnwell became chairman of the Charleston District Democratic Executive Committee and directed its efforts to elect Wade Hampton and the straightout ticket. After the election of 1876 Hampton regularly consulted Barnwell on Charleston affairs.

In 1890 when Ben Tillman seized control of the state party machinery, Barnwell supported the candidacy of Alexander C. Haskell for governor and was nominated for attorney-general. But their defeat did not end Barnwell's interest in politics. In 1894 he was elected a state senator. When his seat was eliminated by the Constitution of 1895, he stood for the remaining seat and served in the Senate until 1902.

Turning back to his law practice, Barnwell renewed at least one Republican acquaintance he had made during Reconstruction. In 1890 former Governor Chamberlain became Receiver of the South Carolina Railway Company. Brawley and Barnwell became counsel to the Receiver. "I again," Barnwell wrote, "was thrown into intimate official relations with Governor Chamberlain. I do not remember, however, to have ever taken a meal with him or sat at the same table with him during his life. Nevertheless, it was through his influence that I was subsequently made counsel for the new corporation which succeeded the corporation of which he was Receiver ... and probably the last letter ever written by him was one to me."[10]

In his efforts to forge a new aristocracy in the South Carolina low country, Joseph Barnwell never let go of the traditions of the old. He was an active member of the Charleston Library Society, eventually serving as president. The new library building on King Street was largely the product of his work. He was likewise active in the Carolina Art Association and procured the legacy from James S. Gibbes which made

possible the gallery on Meeting Street. To preserve the memory of the past, he served longest as president of the South Carolina Historical Society from 1904 to 1930.

Perhaps his most important effort to shape post-war Charleston society was as an officer of the St. Cecilia Society. Elected to membership in 1871, Barnwell became a member of the Board of Managers in 1874. He served as president from 1919 to 1922. A.S. Salley, Barnwell's former law clerk who with his mentor's help eventually became State Historian, wrote that while Barnwell "delighted in the pleasures afforded by music, dancing, food and drink, he was most punctilious in his demands that the rules of the society, the amenities of polite company and the dignity becoming ladies and gentlemen be always strictly observed ...For that reason no other member of the society made a deeper impression on the social life of Charleston during the fifty, or more, years that Mr. Barnwell took an active part in the management of the St. Cecilia Society."[11]

As soon as the pressures of business permitted him, in the summer of 1880, he began summering in Flat Rock, reviving with other members of his generation the venerable custom of planting families of escaping from the low country during the summer months. He also took his responsibility toward the church seriously. Besides active membership in St. Michael's in Charleston, he served on the vestry of St. Peter's Parish, his father's old church, from 1878 to 1927, in charge of several trusts.

When he died on June 8, 1930, at the age of eighty-four, Joseph Barnwell represented one of the last links of the Charleston aristocracy with its antebellum planter past. Unlike the older Bourbons who did not, in Cooper's words, "envision a future--either distant or near--that held greater benefits, rewards, and challenges ...than had the past," he represented the "urbane Bourbons," the builders of a new aristocracy for the New South on the old foundation.[12]

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[1]William J. Grayson, James Louis Petigru: A Biographical Sketch (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1866), p. 61.

[2](Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), pp. 20-22.

[3](Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 207; Bettersworth, "The Urbane Bourbon," Mississippi Quarterly 10 (Spring 1957): 84; Grantham, "The Southern Bourbons Revisited," South Atlantic Quarterly 60 (1961): 289.

[4]The biographical information which follows comes primarily from the "Life and Recollections of Joseph W. Barnwell," Joseph W. Barnwell Collection, 34-50, South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, S.C. and Alexander S. Salley, "Joseph W. Barnwell," in David Duncan Wallace, The History of South Carolina (New York: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1935) 4: 186-88.

Appreciation is hereby expressed to Project QUILL of the American Association of Colleges and the Furman University Mellon Steering Committee for grants for the summer of 1979 which allowed me to examine the entire Barnwell Collection in the S.C. Historical Society.

[5]The most thorough account of the Barnwell family can be found in Stephen B. Barnwell, The Story of An American Family (Marquette, Illinois: Stephen B. Barnwell, 1969).

[6]Barnwell, "Life and Recollections," pp. 305-7, 318-19.

[7]Ibid., pp. 318-19, 325.

[8]Ibid., p. 404.

[9]Ibid., pp. 406-7.

[10]Ibid., pp. 325-26.

[11]Salley, pp. 187-88.

[12]Cooper, Conservative Regime, p. 207.

FROM GREATER GERMAN REICH TO GREAT REGION ECONOMY: WERNER DAITZ AND NAZI POSTWAR PLANNING, 1939-1944

Robert Edwin Herzstein

During the Second World War, the Nazi leadership found it expedient to make grandiose but vague promises about the unification of Europe under Axis leadership. Some were directed at the Germans, others at the peoples of Axis-occupied Europe. Institutes were founded for the express purpose of formulating postwar German continental policy. The long war of attrition, however, made postwar planning a very "iffy" thing. More importantly, policy directives were not forthcoming from Hitler. By 1942, it was clear to even the most obtuse Nazi planners that the regime had no intention of making specific promises, nor of formulating detailed plans for postwar reconstruction and unification. With the reverses on the Eastern Front and in North Africa, the European idea became one more propaganda theme expressed in increasingly desperate and unreal tones.

Werner Daitz took this work seriously. He hoped to secure prestige and power by providing the regime with detailed plans for postwar policy, and his fate is most instructive. Daitz's career is illuminating, for it allows us to explore the nature of a significant Nazi "think tank." Daitz was an intellectual opportunist, serving the regime in an important way. He helped to boost public morale by making vague promises about a utopian future--that Hitler had no intention of creating. Daitz was the kind of political servant who sublimated doubts about the regime by indulging in fond dreams about the future happiness of the peoples of Europe. Thus, he rarely referred to Hitler or to the Jews in his speeches and articles, though he was serving the former and contributing to the destruction of the latter.

Werner Daitz's type was common in Germany during the war, and so was the peculiar nature of his disillusionment. Unltimately turned into a propagandist, he did not blame the regime for his political demise. Daitz continued to serve it to the end. He was disappointed by the unhappy course of the war and by Hitler's lack of a true European policy, but he never saw that these two factors were both related to the nature of the regime.

Werner Daitz is interesting in another sense. His rise and fall reflected the infighting that was endemic to the regime. Daitz's ascent in the 1930's mirrored his ability to make himself useful to Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg and Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess. The collapse of his grandest ambitions in 1942 stemmed from the decline of Rosenberg and the disappearance of Hess. It took Daitz some time to realize that he was no match for a wily, contemptuous Martin Bormann, who used an indifferent Joseph Goebbels to wreck his bid for real power within the Nazi party. Daitz's pathetic attempt to use Rosenberg to block one of Himmler's men in 1943 marked the end of his political career as a would-be policy-maker.

Werner Daitz's career reflected a combination of political opportunism and economic expertise. He was born in Lübeck in 1884, and received a degree in chemical engineering from the University of Jena in 1907. Daitz became a successful industrialist, specializing in mineral and pharmaceutical technology. He early demonstrated an interest in philosophical and political subjects, and his writings in this area later stood him in good stead with the Nazis. After 1930 Daitz used his industrial experience to forge connections with leading Nazis: advisor to the Reich leadership of the party in 1931, member of the Reichstag in 1933, director of the foreign policy division of the Reich leadership in the same year. He was a member of the board of directors of four Lübeck banks and industrial concerns. Daitz had not been involved in municipal politics in his hometown, but in April, 1933, the good fathers of the Hanseatic City of Lübeck saw fit

to bestow the title of "diplomatic emissary upon their native son, now a prominent local Nazi.

By 1934 the clever Daitz was advising Rudolf Hess on foreign trade matters. Germany still had large numbers of unemployed workers and had not begun to rearm in a massive way, but Daitz was already telling Hitler's Deputy Führer that Germany's goal must be leadership of the European continent, reorganized as a largely self-sufficient region. Germany's recovery, and her rearmament after 1935, confirmed Daitz's vision--and intensified his ambitions. He wanted to use his access to Hess and other Nazis to mold the economic structure of the New Order. Unfortunately, Daitz's entreé to Hess and the foreign policy officers of the party did not provide him with a real power base. He realized this by 1939. One can thus understand Daitz's enthusiasm in 1939-1940, when events seemed to have born out his theories, when it looked as if his hour had struck.[1]

After the invasion of Poland in 1939, Daitz founded his most important organization, the Society for European Economic Planning and Great Region Economy (Grossraumwirtschaft). He was its Reich director, and his good friend Hanns Grosser became general secretary. Daitz was careful to put important figures from relevant ministries and party agencies on his board of trustees, men such as State Secretary Backe of the Food Ministry, State Secretary Roland Freisler of Justice, Wilhelm Stuckart of Interior, and Leopold Gutterer of Propaganda. Daitz carefully outlined the tasks of the organization: "The society has the aim and the task of furthering the orderly economic and cultural collaboration of the peoples and states of the greater European region, through research into their varying basis of existence and their economic institutions, in order to see Europe arise as a political idea through inquiries into reciprocal growth possibilities." The society would plan nothing less than the future unification of the continent. This drive towards continental autarchy under German leadership was being inadvertantly furthered by the English blockade, and the day of the proclamation of "Europe as a political idea" was near at hand. Daitz went all

the way back to the medieval Hanseatic League of German trading cities as he tried to prove that the unity of the continent was emerging as an historical, organic development.

Werner Daitz, a great self-promoter, soon published a list of all the foreign newspapers which had written about the foundation of his society. But peace did not come during the long winter of 1939-1940, and Daitz was anxious lest his plans be laid aside. Then his great hour seemed to come: the occupation of Denmark and Norway, later of Western Europe. German hegemony was a fact, and "great region economy" would guide the Nazis in their reconstruction of the continent.

These German triumphs inspired Daitz to write a flurry of memoranda at the end of May, only weeks before the final French collapse. He concluded that Denmark and Norway would now have to orient themselves towards Europe and the Reich. Daitz argued that these countries had allowed themselves to be manipulated by "powers alien to the region" (raumfremde Mächte). Germany had the task of stabilizing the currencies of the occupied countries by tying them to the mark in a way favorable to the Reich. "On the basis of numerous investigations ..." as Daitz modestly put it, the director advocated price controls for much of occupied Western Europe, a form of currency union with Germany, control of foreign trade, oversight of stock markets, and regulation of commerce. Some of his ideas were indeed adopted, but perhaps they would have been even without Daitz's pressure. And despite his optimism, he was disturbed by the lack of political guidelines from Hitler, the tendency to put off major decisions about European reorganization until the war was over. Daitz had to cover himself, so he cautiously noted that none of his recommendations would compromise possible political decisions.[3]

While the Belgium army was capitulating to the Nazis, Werner Daitz drafted yet another memorandum. He was becoming almost arrogant in his enthusiasm, and for the moment put aside his doubts about the Nazi commitment to

his ideas. Now he wanted the German government to establish a Reich Commissariat for Great Region Economy, the directorship of which he would no doubt have accepted. Borrowing freely from the geopolitical theories of Munich Professor Karl Haushofer, Daitz predicted that the world would soon be divided into great currency regions, such as the dollar block, the yen bloc, the rupee bloc, and the continental European or mark bloc. Coining a slogan that Hitler soon borrowed, Daitz called for "Europe to the Europeans." He defined the continent as stretching from the Urals and the North Cape to Cyprus, with natural outlets for colonization in Siberia and Africa. Daitz boasted that his society was ready to contribute to the unification of Europe. It had already established the necessary liaison offices with relevant ministries and agencies.[4]

In a revealing aside, Daitz argued against using the phrase "German great region economy," since it would be "politically inopportune." Not one to show himself "weak" or lacking in the Nazi lust for domination, however, Daitz acknowledged that it was "obvious" that Greater Germany would absorb the dependent economies of nearby nations. Yet some tact was in order, at least until peace returned to Europe: "We must basically always speak only of Europe ..." Daitz may well have felt that he needed to use these cynical Nazi-style phrases in order to secure an appointment as Reich Price Commissar. Other Nazis were wary of his ambitions, which were surfacing for the first time in so blatant a manner. Daitz never received the call.

Werner Daitz could not convert his society into a real power base, so he tried another route. His "think tank" now produced a massive outpouring of propagandistic materials. They boldly proclaimed a new Europe under German leadership. Daitz edited and contributed to series such as "Economics in the New Europe," and established new journals and research institutes. The most significant of these was the Central Research Institute, founded in Dresden early in 1941. Daitz also took steps to work closely with, even to "guide" other institutes, particularly the Vienna-based "Southeast Europe Society," headed by Dr. August Heinrichsbauer.

Daitz, Heinrichsbauer, and Economics Minister Walther Funk all believed that German cultural, economic, and political domination of the Balkans was the natural outcome of historical and racial facts. The southeast would supply raw materials and food to Germany, and would in return receive massive German economic assistance. This exchange would facilitate the triumph of the German war machine and the postwar hegemony of the Reich in Europe. Even before the war, Funk had spoken of "an economic region reaching from the German frontiers to the Black Sea."[5]

Daitz's publicity mania extended to countries under German domination. He sought out allies and followers from France to Latvia, and encouraged publication of their work by houses such as the Meinhold Verlag in Dresden. Daitz secured the publication of Italian and Dutch books, and he sometimes saw to it that these works appeared in German translation. The Latvian journalist and editor Adolf Ratenieks showed himself to be especially cooperative, so Daitz wrote a lavish introduction to his book on What the New Order in Europe Brings to the European Peoples. He praised Ratenieks for putting the press of his country at the disposal of the "goals of the New Europe." Ratenieks had learned the European gospel as narrated by Werner Daitz quite well, and his book illustrates the nature of Daitz's propaganda network.

The Latvian collaborator began by speaking of the "community of peoples" fighting shoulder to shoulder against the red menace. Those scholars who were contributing to the New Europe were engaged in detailed studies of the countries and peoples of the continent. Their ultimate aim was to create a great region economy. In carrying out this task, these workers were assisting in the birth of a continental Europe consciousness. People were now asking, "What is good for Europe?" and that was progessive thinking. Greater Germany was the logical leader of the New Order. It alone possessed the power, territory, and central location vital for the total reorganization of the continental economy.

Ratenieks argued that it was natural and healthy for small nations to become part of an economy led by a great central power, for it would enable them to find outlets for their products. These countries would produce goods and foodstuffs which were complementary to those of their neighbors and allies. The great state would protect the small state, and tariffs could be lowered or abolished since the small state would no longer fear for its markets. Nor would it spend monies in a futile attempt to guarantee its own security. The competitive, wasteful liberal world economy would be replaced by an "organization system." Peoples would think of the common good, not of egotism, profiteering, and swindling. As Hitler put it, "The nation is not there for the economy, and the economy is not there for capital, rather capital is there for the economy, and the economy is there for the people."[6]

Ratenieks concluded that this New Order would inaugurate an era of "European socialism." Daitz himself chose less euphoric words, but even when the war turned against Germany he continued to write about the "European family of peoples" and its desire to exclude "alien powers" from intervening in the European "regional economy." The entire continent was being mobilized for this task; thus becoming a true "community of destiny."[7]

Daitz's political fortunes declined as the Greater German Reich's prospects of victory receded. He owed some of his political failures to the opposition or jealousy of other Nazis, men who cared little about his theories but feared his ambitions. An ominous note occurred as early as the autumn of 1940, when Martin Bormann wrote Daitz a rather nasty letter. The director's attempt to involve the Gau economic advisors of the party in advisory councils of his society brought forth a sharp rebuke from Rudolf Hess's ambitious deputy. Bormann reminded Daitz that he headed a <u>private</u> society, and thus could not send circular letters to party officials without party permission. In rude language he warned Daitz not to try such maneuvers again.[8]

Werner Daitz could not outflank Bormann when it came to contacting local Nazi officials, but he continued to fight a paper war against the man who soon became director of the party chancellory. Indeed, his failure only strengthened Daitz's determination to prevail in the internal Nazi struggle for prestige and authority. In the summer of 1942 he defensively reminded Bormann, who had once again put him down badly, that the society did not make demands or take positions, rather, it was a "research" organization concerned with the bases of the economic new order in Europe. It worked with other Reich and party agencies, and all its published work was subject to prior censorship by the ministries of propaganda, foreign affairs, and economics. Getting in a dig at rival research institutes, Daitz argued that the society was unique in that it alone was not a product of the Weimar days. It reflected the Nazi world-view. Furthermore, it was doing useful work in influencing economic and political thought in other countries.[9]

It was a sure sign of Daitz's decline that he asked the hapless Alfred Rosenberg to support him in his fight against Bormann. Rosenberg, a man who could not even win an argument with Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, wrote to Bormann in September on Daitz's behalf, reaffirming the director's claim that research into the greater European economy should be carried out by a good Nazi. Rosenberg could not resist a snide comment to the effect that Daitz may have had some weaknesses, but he did endorse his work.[10]

Bormann, nevertheless, moved to undermine Daitz even further. He made use of his uneasy alliance with Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, who passed the word to the Reich propaganda central office of the party. In November, 1942 a circular went out which was clearly directed against Daitz. It concerned the "misuse of the concepts 'great region,' 'great region policy,' and 'great region economy,' " the keys to Daitz's political and economic vocabulary. The memorandum reminded party propaganda workers that the definition of these concepts was dependent upon the course of the war and upon Hitler's decisions. Daitz was particularly vulnerable on the

following point: "The partition /of the world/ into continental great regions is ...most impractical." The memorandum explained that by using North America/ South America as an example of these regions, certain Germans were supplying the Americans with an argument in favor of their own spurious claims to hegemony in the "Western Hemisphere." Daitz had at times separated South America from the northern continent and turned it into an autonomous "great space," but his staff was not always so cautious.

Two days after the completion of this hostile party memorandum, the German Sixth Army was surrounded at Stalingrad.[11]

While Daitz was engaged in his losing bouts with Bormann and Goebbels, a new danger emerged. Dr. Boyens, a director of the Reich Working Group for Territorial Research (RAGRF), was involved in a plan to mobilize the support of the Ministry of the Interior and the Reich Security Main Office in his bid to make the RAGRF the main planning institute in a German-dominated Europe. If Boyens succeeded, Daitz, already greatly weakened, was finished. What would he and the society have left to do?

The REGRF dated back to 1936, and was currently headed by Professor Paul Ritterbusch. It published a monthly journal and concentrated upon research into the eastern territories of the continent. Ratenieks praised it in his book, not knowing that the rival group would soon attempt to undermine Daitz's society. Boyens had the support of the powerful State Secretary Stuckart, and his ties to Himmler, the RSHA, and Reich Marshal Hermann Goering meant that his group had the inside track in postwar planning. Unlike Daitz, Boyens was practical enough to emphasize the "Greater Germanic" (rather than "European") theme as to the key to his research. Boyens was casting his lot with the police state, while Daitz relied upon Rosenberg and drifted into political oblivion. Had Himmler prevailed in a post-Hitler power struggle, Boyens' position would have been a potent one. Daitz might then have said the wrong thing and wound up in Sachsenhausen concentration camp.

But these shadow fights were increasingly irrelevant, not merely because Hitler had no intention of proclaiming Europe, but because Germany was losing the war. While Boyens buttered up Stuckart, Montgomery smashed Rommels' Afrika Korps at El Alamein.[12]

His political ambitions crushed, Werner Daitz continued to function as a sort of travelling salesman for the Nazis. His foreign connections, laboriously collected over the years, meant that he was still of some use to the regime. Daitz attempted to encourage Germany's remaining collaborators by putting the concept of European unification in its historical setting. Like other Nazi propagandists, he argued that working for Germany was working for Europe, hence for one's own nation.

By 1944 France was undergoing the horrors of civil war. An invasion by the Allies was imminent, the revulsion against the German occupation almost universal. Yet the Nazis continued to stress their themes of European solidarity, indeed, they used them more frequently than ever in the German-controlled French media. The occupation authorities believed that Werner Daitz could encourage their beleaguered French collaborators by offering them a flattering vision of "Franco-German solidarity." Daitz arrived at the House of Chemistry in Paris on March 4, and delivered an address under the auspices of a group known as "Collaboration, a Grouping of French Energies for European Unity." This organization promoted "French renewal, Franco-German reconciliation, and European solidarity," and later published Daitz's talk in its magazine, Collaboration. Daitz's theme was "The Continental Policy of Napoleon, Anticipation of the European Policy of the Reich." His French editors later declared that Daitz was the first man to throw real light on "the future of our continent and the role that France can and should play in it."[13]

Daitz developed an interesting philosophy of history in the early part of his address. He argued that there were four great historical families of peoples, and that these had prospered only when they remained in their own geographical regions. When a nation departed from this rule and migrated or reached out beyond

its own vital space, it became weak and rootless. Friendship between these basically autarchic regions was the key to world peace. The first truly European economy had developed in the Middle Ages, culminating in the late medieval period, when the entire region from Lübeck to the Black Sea, from Lake Ladoga to the Upper Rhine prospered due to the trade and legal forms established by Hanseatic merchants. This prosperity did not endure, however, for too many Europeans became obsessed with the wealth of the Indies and the discovery of the Americas. Valuable people migrated to the new continents and became North Americans and South Americans, thus depriving Europe of their energies. Far from building a new Europe, these Americans went their own way after 1776. Residual ties to the old continent led to a widespread, but unhealthy misconception, namely, that the New World/England/Western Europe comprised a sort of vital unity of peoples. This was not so, for such a combination of regions was "inauthentic" by its very nature. The belief that Eastern Europe/Central Asia comprised a natural unit was equally false.

These so-called regions did not represent vital living spaces, they resulted from the disintegration of healthy units. This is why the Jew flourished in them. Eastern Europe, increasingly abandoned by the West, became prey to Tartar or Russian despotism. When Europe was vital, England was peripheral; when "inauthenticity" triumphed, Great Britain was suddenly (and "without merit") the bridge to the Americas. England could never retain her empire if Europe or the Americas pursued an independent policy, hence her interest in their disunity. In this she was like the Jews, but she too had finally failed, for the British Empire was finished, in part thanks to the avarice of Franklin D. Roosevelt. America and England were trying to fight to each other's last man; they had no social conscience, nor could they have any, being unnatural entities pursuing unsound policies.

Daitz flattered his French audience when he launched into a celebration of Napoleon, who was the first modern

ruler to pursue a "Greater European" policy based upon the separation of Europe from America. He had wanted to found a "United States of Europe," but the English did not let him. Motivated entirely by calculations based upon states, not peoples, Napoleon failed in his continental blockade against England, though he was on the right track. Unfortunately, he could not conceive of the new European unity except in dynastic terms, and in this too he was a product of his age. Yet he began a work which Adolf Hitler was trying to finish, in alliance with France: "It depends upon France alone whether or not she completes this work in common with Germany." Germany was fighting against Bolshevism and for the right of each European people to develop within the framework of the European family of nations. Soviet Russia was entering a violent phase of self-destruction, and this heralded the end of the inauthentic Eastern Europe/Central Asis "space." The same thing was happening to the false Western Europe/America equation, as Britain and America showed by their egotistical and imperialistic policies.

Happy Europe! "For the Führer, this great political seer, called by destiny to complete the rebirth of Europe, begun in France by Napoleon, knows how, as Goethe put it, 'To sustain onself in defiance of all hostile forces, never yielding, always showing oneself to be strong. That is what is known as aid provided by the arms of the gods.' " Alfred Rosenberg would soon turn Friedrich Nietzsche into a Nazi "Good European;" his friend Werner Daitz did the same for Goethe.

Werner Daitz continued to go through the motions even as the Third Reich crumbled around him. He was nearing sixty years of age, and his ambitions were in ruins, but this intelligent spokesman for the Nazi/industrial complex continued to accept invitations to speak on the economics of the New Order. He mouthed the same phrases and offered his faded theories to increasingly bored and perplexed audiences.

Werner Daitz had hoped to have a major hand in molding the New Europe. As late as 1942 his future looked

bright, hopeful enough to incur more reprimands from Martin Bormann for overstepping his bounds. Now, in 1944, Daitz was washed up. Like other "good German" technocrats, he wound up justifying policies, not making them, used until the end by men who held his kind in contempt.

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[1]For biographical material on Daitz, see Degeners Wer Ists's (Berlin: 1935), p. 267; Daitz to Hess, April 3, 1934, Archives de centre de documentation juive contemporaine (ACDJC, Paris), CXLV-517.

[2]National Archives Microcopy (NAM) T-120/752/339397-412. A more detailed comment on Daitz's historical concepts may be consulted below, pp. 14-15.

[3]"Erste grundsätzlische Massnahme für die wirtschaftliche Stützung der unter deutschem militärischen Schütz genommenen Länder," ibid., frs. 405-407.

[4]"Errichtung eines Reichskommissariats für Grossraumwirtschaft," (May 31, 1940), ibid., frs. 408-412.

[5]The basic economic precepts of the Southeast Europe Society are contained in the document "Südosteuropa als wirtschaftlicher Ergänzungsraum für Deutschland: Gutachten des Mitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftstages August-Dezember 1939," T-71/60/727 ff. Also, see Dietrich Orlow, The Nazis in the Balkans (Pittsburgh; 1968), pp. 117, 122-123, 127.

[6]Was bringt die Neuordnung Europas den europäischen Völkern (Dresden: 1942).

[7]Daitz, "Völkischer Sozialismus," NS Monatshefte (July/Aug., 1942).

[8]Bormann to Daitz, Nov. 18, 1940, T-71/60/558384-385.

[9]Daitz memorandum of Aug. 27, 1942, T-454/77/796-799.

[10]Rosenberg to Bormann, Sept. 8, 1942, T-454/67/111-112.

[11]For an example of the separation of the Americas into two independent regions, see T-454/36/302. Two days after the composition of this hostile circular, the German Sixth Army was surrounded at Stalingrad.

[12]Ratenieks, pp. 43-44; Boyens to Stuckart, Oct. 16 and Nov. 3, 1942.

[13]"La politique continentale de Napoléon, anticipation de la politique européenne du Reich," Collaboration (March-April, 1944). The copy I have consulted contains a handwritten dedication to Alfred Rosenberg (ACDJC, CXLIV-423). Until the very end, Daitz was a courtier, not a power player. Rosenberg, after all, no longer had the slightest access to power, nor was he permitted to publish another "masterpiece." Worse still, the copy is filled with pencilled-in question marks, probably Rosenberg's. The arrogant, insecure Reichsleiter could not brook intellectual rivalry, which he took as an insult. One wonders if either man understood why things had gone so badly since the halcyon days of 1940 and 1941.

PURGING NAZIS: THE POSTWAR TRIALS OF FEMALE GERMAN DOCTORS AND NURSES

Donald M. McKale

One of the survivors of Buchenwald said it best. Kurt Sitte wrote to The New York Times in 1948, protesting the clemency granted to a female Nazi war criminal by the American military authorities. "All that we who survived know and can tell," Sitte noted, "is no more than a faint reflection of the actual horrors we experienced. The full truth is known to no living man. Is justice to the victims ...so much less important than technical justice to this pack of /Nazi/ murderers?" Since World War II, this question has characterized the trials of Germans for war crimes. How could justice be achieved for the victims of the Nazis, including millions of Jews tortured and murdered in the Holocaust along with others, while also ensuring procedural justice for the criminals?

The controversy persists today over Nuremberg and other war crimes trials. Werner Maser, the German historian, echoing earlier critics, has called Nuremberg a "victor's tribunal."[1] On the other hand, legal proceedings against Nazi war criminals, some of them women, continue.[2] Compared to their male counterparts, only a small number of German women were involved in war crimes. Even fewer were captured by the Allies and tried. Adolf Hitler's state had been a totally male-dominated one. The woman's place was in the home, Nazi ideology had preached, bearing and rearing allegedly "superior" Aryan children for the Führer. Only late in World War II, as Germany ran out of manpower, were women mobilized to fill jobs in the military and SS held by men.[3]

The most notorious female Nazi war criminals, such as Ilse Koch, sadistic wife of the SS commandant at Buchenwald, and Irma Grese, the SS guard at Auschwitz and Belsen, were tried soon after the war by the Allies.

They were convicted under international law of violating the rules of war by participating in a "common design" or conspiracy to commit atrocities against non-Germans and Allied prisoners of war.[4]

Aside from these more sensational instances, however, there have been other German women convicted for war crimes. Several were doctors and nurses. Their trials raised some questions. How and why had such women become part of Hitler's male-oriented and sadistic system? What were their motives? How did justice administered to German women by the Allies compare to that meted out to German men? And what might their trials suggest to us about Hitler's Germany and about the post-war legal process used to purge the country of Nazism?

One of the women doctors, Herta Oberheuser, told American interrogators at her trial in Nuremberg in 1946 and 1947 why she had performed medical experiments, some deadly, on defenseless inmates at the main Nazi concentration camp for women at Ravensbrück. Because of her role in the torture and deaths of non-German nationals, she was sentenced by the tribunal in August 1947 to twenty years in prison.

Reared the daughter of an engineer in Düsseldorf who had suffered dearly from the Great Depression, she had been forced to finance her own ambition of becoming a physician. After Hitler became chancellor of Germany, Oberheuser had joined the Nazi League of German Girls and eventually entered the Nazi party in 1937. "Most of all," she recalled about her career, "it was hard for a woman to endure the professional competition for jobs. Salaried positions were given to /male/ colleagues sooner than to a woman."

Oberheuser had also succumbed to the ideology of Nazi racism and to obeying blindly the orders of her superiors. Though she denied believing that Germans were the "master race," she admitted to an interrogator that she had preferred experimenting most at Ravensbrück with Polish women. "Against that," she said, "/I worked/ less gladly with Czechs, because the Poles are

more honorable as people, the Czechs are cunning." And what did she think of Jews? "I can say that the religious Jew in general was acceptable to me; this was contrary to those who were not attached to their beliefs, as they were unacceptable to me." And why? On what basis had she made that judgment? "I have had very few bad experiences with the concerned, who were religious," she replied, "because they were not in any way insidious. With the others one never really knew what to think." And what had happened to the Jews once the Nazis had seized power? "One no longer got together with them," was the answer.[5]

However, other testimony at her trial revealed that Oberheuser had known much more precisely what Nazism and the war had meant for Europe's Jews and for non-Germans. The American prosecution alleged and the judgment confirmed that while a physician at Ravensbrück during the war and an assistant to Karl Gebhardt, the personal doctor of Heinrich Himmler and chief surgeon of the SS and German police, she had participated in a variety of ghastly medical experiments on prisoners. These were carried out with particular cruelty, often disregarding all established medical practice.

While on the witness stand, Oberheuser maintained that Gebhardt had told her that the experiments were to be performed on women inmates condemned to death. The state had ordered it, he had said, "everything was legal." " 'Nurse according to our directions,' " she recalled her superior's words, " 'and do not worry about anything else,' and I tried to do so." She had trusted Gebhardt implicitly: "If Professor Gebhardt carries it out, it will probably be right."[6]

The experiments had included testing the effect of the drug, sulfanilamide, in bone muscle and nerve regeneration and bone transplantation. Wounds inflicted on Polish and Czech women were infected with bacteria such as streptococcus, gas gangrene, and tetanus. Circulation of blood was interrupted by tying off blood vessels at both ends of the cut to create a condition similar to a battlefield wound. Wood shavings and ground glass

forced into the wounds aggravated the infection. One victim of this experiment, Kladislawa Karolewska, testifying with others at Nuremberg against Oberheuser and the doctors who had operated on them, showed the tribunal the huge scar on the back of her leg. "I did not know what was done with my leg," she said, "but I felt great pain and I had the impression that something must have been cut out of my leg ...The incision went so deep that I could see the bone."[7]

Oberheuser admitted assisting Gebhardt and another physician, Fritz Fischer, in the operations. She had also supervised the post-operative care, which had hardly existed.[8] Some of the patients, she conceded, had died from infection caused by the operations and neglect. Witnesses testified to her beating and whipping camp inmates, including elderly women who had pleaded for medical treatment.[9]

But her hand in death at Ravensbrück had not been limited to these circumstances. She had assisted the surgeon, Ludwig Stumpfegger, who had worked at Gebhardt's clinic nearby at Hohenlychen and specialized in the regeneration of bones. During 1942 and 1943, Stumpfegger had performed brutal bone transplant operations at Ravensbrück on perfectly healthy Polish prisoners. As with the sulfanilamide experiments, some of the women had died because of the bone operations. Others had been given lethal injections by the doctors, including Oberheuser. Still others had suffered from syphilis and cancer and were injected. "It was no rarity at Ravensbrück," she told interrogators, "that persons who were already approaching death, were killed by injections. I myself have given 5 or 6 such injections."[10]

Like so many other Nazis, Oberheuser defended the killings. She argued, with a grotesquely exaggerated sense of righteousness and civic duty, that they were missions of mercy and compassion. Amidst the death, she maintained at her trial, she had sympathy for the victims. "In a few cases," she said, "perhaps four or five, I sat down by the beds of patients who had asked for my help and in the presence of the prisoner nurses

I gave them an intravenous injection so they would go to sleep. I used morphine and a mixture I received from the post physician. These women had described their suffering and their pain to me exactly ..In this hopeless situation, in view of the hopeless suffering, I did that and had to act as I did."[11]

Such "mercy killings" of non-Germans had not been limited by the Nazis to Ravensbrück. Hitler had issued a directive dated 1 September 1939, the day on which World War II began, establishing the euthanasia program. This law resulted in the secret killing during the war of the aged, insane, incurably ill, and deformed citizens in sanatoriums in Germany. In addition, the Nazis carried out euthanasia in clandestine fashion on ethnic and racial groups. Thousands of foreign workers were murdered. The killing in gas chambers and by injection in the sanatoriums served as a proving ground for these forerunners of much larger installations in the mass extermination camps.

Because of the need for nurses and similar medical staff, it was in such euthanasia institutes that German women became involved in war crimes. After the war, eleven female nurses and two physicians employed in the mercy killing program were convicted by American and German courts.[12] The bulk of the nurses had worked at the sanatorium at Hadamar, located near Wiesbaden. Through most of the war at this small and bleak facility, partially obscured from public view by trees, large numbers of German mental patients were put to death. Their remains were cremated or buried in a nearby cemetery. But the deaths soon became known among the public and elicited a protest, especially from Catholic church leaders like Cardinal Faulhaber and Bishop Galen of Münster.

Beginning in August 1944, several hundred Russian and Polish workers were transported to Hadamar, allegedly for treatment of tuberculosis. Within hours of their arrival at the sanatorium, the laborers were dead. The remains of some of the workers exhumed at the end of the war by American army pathologists revealed that none of

the victims had incurable tuberculosis. From laboratory analysis of the remains, testimony of the medical staff captured at Hadamar, and death records of the sanatorium seized by the Americans, the latter established that the workers had died from lethal injections of morphine and scopolamine or overdoses of veronal and chloral.[13]

The Hadamar nurses were convicted by German courts in 1947 and 1948. Under the orders of supervisors, the court records illustrated, they had administered the poison tablets and injections to German mental patients. Their punishments ranged from five year prison sentences to two and a half years.[14] The head nurse at Hadamar, Irmgard Huber, having selected with the sanatorium doctor those German patients who would die and having directed the other nurses to give the "mercy poison," received an eight year sentence. Moreover, because of Huber's role in preparing the rooms and dispensing the drugs used to murder the non-Germans, the Polish and Russian workers, she was convicted by the Americans. They sentenced Huber to twenty-five years in prison; but a review of her case, which was automatic for all war criminals sentenced by the Allies, brought her clemency in 1950.[15]

What had prompted the Hadamar nurses to commit such crimes? More than half, including Huber, had not belonged to the Nazi party.[16] They had come mainly from lower middle class families, and their education, except for primary school, had been chiefly technical in nature. All but one were unmarried and supported themselves financially; one had become a nurse to help her mother. The nurses had also been sworn to silence about their work by the Nazi authorities, who threatened them with death or imprisonment in a concentration camp if their oaths were broken.

When the head nurse, Huber, for example, had confided about the killing of the non-Germans to the wife of a judge in Hadamar, she was told, "I should remain silent and not get into anybody's way." She had even tried to resign her position, but the Nazi governor for Hesse-Nassau had refused her request. He informed Huber "that

during the war there would be no release and that I had to stay there and that the soldiers at the front had to stick to their posts too."

Such circumstances, Huber and her fellow nurses testified at their trials, had absolved them of guilt. They had been forced to follow orders, they said. "I did nothing to the Russians or Poles," Huber told the Americans, "and I do not know of any guilt. The transport was there already and it had to be received. It was already standing in front of the door." On the other hand, she admitted having realized that if Germany lost the war, everyone at Hadamar would be in serious difficulty. Before the first shipment of foreign workers had arrived at the sanatorium, Huber conceded, she knew that they were to be killed. She also gave the morphine to the male nurse who administered the poison. "He came often for it," she testified.[17]

The mistreatment and deaths of foreign workers were also the focus of the war crimes trial in 1947 of Erika Flocken. Though tried by the Americans and originally sentenced to death, the automatic review of her case and Flocken's repeated appeals for clemency produced her release from prison in 1957.[18] Though she had not been a member of the Nazi party, Flocken had served during the final year of the war as chief doctor for the Mühldorf concentration camp in Bavaria. The camp, including four nearby subcamps, provided after July 1944 roughly 8300 prisoners for the construction by the German government agency, the Organisation Todt, of a large underground aircraft factory. Nearly all of the inmates were foreigners (Hungarians, Poles, Greeks, Czechs, Yugoslavs, Lithuanians, Italians, Dutch, French, and Russians); some were prisoners of war.

The appalling working and living conditions of the laborers and their torture by camp guards had resulted in the deaths of nearly fifty percent of the prisoners.[19] The Americans had overrun the camps in April 1945. To their horror, they discovered three mass graves containing the nude, largely decomposed bodies of 2,249 inmates.

Some had their heads smashed, others had bullet wounds, and most showed evidence of severe beatings.

Prisoners had also died from an absence of medical treatment, for which Flocken, the head doctor for the local Organisation Todt, had been responsible. Malnutrition and disease, especially typhus, had been epidemic; some had died from unsanitary operations and blood poisoning. Most medical supplies had gone to the SS guards at the camp. The blocks at Mühldorf used for primitive hospitals barely had scissors, knife, forceps, gauze, and blankets. Odor hung like a suffocating cloud over the wards. Patients were skeletons. They wore little clothing, lay on plain boards, and often relieved themselves in their rooms. And dead inmates lay among the living.

Lajos Grunbaum, one of the inmate doctors at Mühldorf, testified that Flocken had purposefully neglected the prisoners and demanded that no more than two percent of the inmates could be patients at one time. "Don't be too serious about getting these people well," Grunbaum quoted her as saying, "let them die." Another witness, Ester Almosnines, recalled how Flocken had refused to allow her to be operated on for a growth under her arm at the larger Organisation Todt hospital in Schwindegg, a few miles from Mühldorf. "That is out of the question," Flocken had said, "no Jewish prisoner is going to be sent to Schwindegg. Let her die here without instruments."[20]

What added to the tragedy at Mühldorf and to the crimes of Flocken and other officials was that plenty of medicine and supplies were available in nearby warehouses. Two days before American forces liberated Mühldorf, the hospital was given supplies, surgical instruments, and operating tables--enough to outfit a sizeable medical center. Moreover, when the Americans reached a supply depot in Schwindegg, a few miles away, where Flocken had kept her office, they found vast stores of medical equipment. There was enough serum, American doctors estimated to innoculate 600,000 persons against typhus.

Testimony at Flocken's trial also indicated that she had selected inmates, mainly those too sick to work, for transport to Auschwitz to be gassed. Two such invalid transports had left Mühldorf in the fall of 1944. The witness Grunbaum recalled how Flocken had been present in October at a roll call of prisoners. She had walked down the lines of inmates, saying, "This fellow is weak; take down his number. This one. This one." A friend of Grunbaum's had been selected; camp records later showed that he had been sent to Auschwitz. Other witnesses testified similarly. One, Genia Sapir, had lost her sister after the latter had been selected by Flocken for the trains to the east.[21]

The phrase on camp records, "transferred to Auschwitz," had carried an importance equal to a formal death certificate. It was common knowledge at Mühldorf that those shipped to Auschwitz were intended for the gas chamber. One witness, Max Kiliwecz, who had been removed from one of the trains to Poland to become the chauffeur for the SS camp commander, was told by Flocken, "You can thank the Camp Commandant that he saved your life."[22]

Given the magnitude of her crimes and the quality and bulk of the evidence against her, it is difficult to believe that ten years after her trial, the United States paroled Flocken. The military review board which considered her many appeals for clemency admitted that "for her willing participation in atrocities such as the selection of sick inmates for the transports no excuse is possible." Nevertheless, the board eventually cited her "excellent record" in prison and her "fine reputation before entering" the Organisation Todt.[23]

Less shocking, but surely curious, was the parole granted by the United States to the nurse, Huber. Post-trial petitions by her lawyers, which included statements favorable to her by friends, and evidence from her trial, persuaded Huber's review board that she was "not basically of criminal inclination and was opposed to the practices carried on at Hadamar and attempted by every possible means at the time to be relieved of her assignment there."[24]

Despite this conclusion, Huber, like the physician at Ravensbrück, Oberheuser had followed the orders of her superiors. The defendants had chosen death for others, most of them innocent civilians, before punishment for themselves. Their trials illustrate that contrary to the charge by critics that the war crimes tribunals were merely instruments of Allied revenge against Germany, the courts and their automatic review systems functioned equitably, and even leniently, for the accused. The courts based their evidence on direct, eyewitness testimony, not hearsay, and on captured German records and the remains of those tortured and murdered. Justice for the defendants was also provided by the reviews of each case. Not only did the review boards examine original trial materials and evidence, but they considered post-trial affidavits from friendly witnesses and the prison records of the condemned.

In the cases of Oberheuser and Huber, furthermore, the Americans did consider carefully the defendants' controversial argument that they had merely obeyed orders from above. Critics of the postwar trials have charged that the Germans were denied by the Allies the use of that argument in their defense. But Oberheuser, for example, because the evidence had clearly demonstrated that her involvement in the medical experiments had not been as direct as that of her supervisors, Gebhardt and Fischer, had received a sustantially less punishment. Gebhardt was executed, Fischer sentenced to life in prison, and Oberheuser to twenty years. The punishment of the nurse, Huber, was based on the extent of her involvement in euthanasia and on the pressure that had been placed on her by Nazi administrators to perform her duties.

These particular trial records, moreover, remind us that while the German machine of mass murder was manned by fanatical Nazis and pure sadists, it was also served by persons, whom the sociologist-historian, Hannah Arendt, for want of a more precise expression, called "John Citizen."[25] The nurses and doctors described above came from apparently normal, middle class environments. Less than half were Nazi party members. They were

generally well-educated and had passed state examinations to practice their profession. But through whatever doubts they may have had about what they were doing, one anchor remained to them: they had received an order. Indeed, the Nazi state had measured morality by how faithfully its servants executed directives from above.

On the other hand, the cases discussed here illustrate that American policy toward German war criminals was based on a different moral standard, but one that was not solely designed to avenge what the Nazis had done. Technically, the criminals were tried according to international law, under which they were charged with violating the laws and usages of war. But where international law failed to provide guidelines on evidence and procedure for convicting individual persons, as opposed to nations, Anglo-American law was applied. This stressed equality before the law and sought justice not only for the victims, but for the criminals.

Added to the democratic system employed in the war crimes trials and reviews, there were other reasons in the 1950's for the parole of German criminals like Flocken and Huber. The Allies now transferred considerable jurisdiction to the German courts. Difficulties had risen in producing sufficient evidence for prosecuting war criminals. Many of the victims and foreigners who had suffered in the Nazi camps could not be located. Some had returned to their homelands, emigrated overseas, or changed names. Nor could one discount the international political situation as a motive for the pardons. The "Cold War" had resulted in calls after 1950 in America and Britain for the rearmament of West Germany as an added bulwark against the Soviet Union.[26]

The examples of Oberheuser, Flocken, and Huber seem to suggest that democratic law and the changing political atmosphere worked to the Germans' advantage. The careful use of evidence and sentencing, the automatic reviews of sentence, and the subsequent clemencies seem somehow unfair to those thousands who had suffered and

even died at their hands. Perhaps it is only now, nearly a generation after the bulk of the war crimes trials and punishments have been concluded that we can really begin estimating whether the controversial trials served justice.

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[1]Werner Maser, Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial, trans. by Richard Barry (New York: Scribners, 1979). This is an old argument, advanced for example by Reinhold Niebuhr, "Victor's Justice," Common Sense, January 1946, pp. 6-9. Also, see Warren B. Morris, The Revisionist Historians and German War Guilt (New York: Revisionist Press, 1977), pp. 100-07; and Sitte's letter to the editor, The New York Times (hereafter NYT), 18 October 1958. A good summary of the Nuremberg controversy is Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. xiii-xviii.

[2]On trial in Düsseldorf are SS guards from the Nazi extermination camp at Maidanek, two of them women. They stand accused of murdering thousands of Soviet prisoners of war, Jews, and inmates from other Nazi camps. See Bund der Antifaschistischen und Präsidium der Vereinigungen der Verfolgten des Naziregimes, Statistik über NS-Prozesse, 14 (10-12/1979) and 15 (2-3/1980).

[3]Ursula von Gersdorff, Frauen im Kriegsdienst, 1914-1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1969), pp. 52-71; and Jill Stephenson, Women in Nazi Society (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1975).

[4]On Koch, see for instance, "Lady mit Lampenschirm," Der Spiegel, 16 February 1950, p. 12; "22 Nazis Will Die for Prison Crimes," NYT, 15 August 1947; and "Neues Verfahren gegen Ilse Koch," Der Morgen (Berlin), 28 December 1948. Giles Playfair and Derrick Sington, The Offenders: Society and the Atrocious Crime (London: Secker and Warburg, 1957), pp. 147-85, discuss Grese's trial.

[5]"Vernehmung von Frl. Dr. Oberheuser," 28 December 1946, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C. (hereafter NA), Microcopy M-1019 (Records of the United States Nuremberg War Crimes Trials Interrogations, 1946-49)/Roll 50/Frames 0670-0704. Her sentence is in "Official Transcript," 20 August 1947, NA, Microcopy M-887 (Records of the United States Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, United States of America v. Karl Brandt et al., November 1946-August 1947)/Roll 11/Frame 1212.

[6]Testimony of Oberheuser, 3 April 1947, NA, M-887/6/1122, 1125.

[7]Testimony of Karolewska, 20 December 1946, NA, M-887/2/1041-42; and Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke, Doctors of Infamy: The Story of the Nazi Medical Crimes, trans. by Heinz Norden (New York: Schuman, 1949), pp. 60-63.

[8]"Affidavit," Zofia Maczka, 16 April 1946, Document No. NO-861, NA, M-887/2/1179. Maczka, a former Polish prisoner at Ravensbrück who had helped x-ray the sulfanilamide patients, stated: "They /the operations/ were carried out under horrible conditions. After operations the patients were left in shocking rooms without nursing or supervision. The dressings were made according to the whim of the doctors with unsterilized instruments and compresses."

[9]As, for example, "Affidavit," Zofia Baj, 12 August 1946, NO-871, Ibid., frame 1155; and on Oberheuser's admission, "Affidavit," 1 November 1946, NO-487, Ibid., frame 0993.

[10]"Affidavit," 1 November 1946, NO-487, Ibid., frame 0994.

[11]Testimony of Oberheuser, 3 April 1947, NA, M-887/6/1137.

[12]This number is taken from Adelheid L. Rüter-Ehlermann and C.F. Rüter, ed., Justiz and NS-Verbrechen:

Sammlung deutscher Strafurteilen wegen nationalsozialistische Tötungsverbrechen, 1945-1966 (19 vols.; Amsterdam: University Press Amsterdam, 1968-). It does not include the trials, if any, held by the British for such medical personnel. Also, note Helmut Ehrhardt, Euthanasie und Vernichtung "lebensunwerten" Lebens (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1965), pp. 24-44. The largest euthanasia establishments were Hadamar and Grafeneck (Württemberg).

[13]Note, for example, the American prosecution summary against the Hadamar staff, and especially the death records (Prosecution Exhibit No. 9), in U.S. v. Alfons Klein et al., 8-15 October 1945, Case No. 12-449, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland (hereafter FRC), Record Group 153 (Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, War Crimes Trial Records; hereafter RG 153). Regarding the knowledge of Germans about euthanasia, despite the secrecy under which the Nazis tried to operate the program, and the criticism by church officials, see Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 263-67.

[14]Margarete Borkowski (2 years, 6 months), Lydia Thomas (5 years), Agnes Schrankel (3 years, 6 months), and Christel Zielke (3 years, 9 months); see Landgericht Frandfurt/Main, "Im Namen des Gesetzes," 21 March 1947, Justiz and NS-Berbrechen, I:307-08. The others were Pauline Kneissler (4 years), Minna Zachow (3 years, 6 months), Edith Korsch (3 years, 4 months), and Käthe Gumbmann (3 years, 1 month); Landgericht Frankfurt/Main, "Im Namen des Gesetzes," 28 January 1948, Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, II:187-88.

[15]See her clemency records in FRC, RG 153, Case No. 12-449.

[16]Kneissler, Gumbmann, Thomas, and Zielke (see note 14) had joined the party.

[17]Testimony of Huber, FRC, RG 153, Case No. 12-449. She later confirmed her knowledge of what had gone on at the institute in "Vernehmung der Irmgard Huber

am 25.4.1947," NA, M-1019/29/0744-0748; and in her trial by the Germans, Landgericht Frankfurt/Main, "Im Namen des Gesetzes," 21 March 1947, Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, I:321, 327-28, 351.

[18]"Disposition Form," 19 April 1957, in U.S. v. Franz Auer et al., Case No. 000-50-136, FRC, Record Group 338 (United States Army Commands, 1939-).

[19]The Americans estimated that 3934 died, or 47% of the total number of inmates (from July 1944-April 1945); Ibid., "Review and Recommendations of the Acting Deputy Judge Advocate for War Crimes," 1 February 1948.

[20]Testimony of Grunbaum and Almosnines, Ibid.

[21]Testimony of Sapir and Grunbaum, Ibid.

[22]Testimony of Kiliwecz, Ibid.

[23]Ibid., "Recommendation of the Mixed Board on the Application of Erika Flocken for Clemency that her Sentence be Commuted from Life Imprisonment to Imprisonment for 38 Years," n.d. (but is August 1956).

[24]See her clemency records in FRC, RG 153, Case No. 12-449, which include affidavits favorable to Huber from friends.

[25]Hannah Arendt, "Organisierte Schuld," Die Wandlung, No. 4, 1945-6, p. 341.

[26]Adalbert Rückerl, ed., NS-Prozesse: Nach 25 Jahren Strafverfolgung: Möglichkeiten-Grenzen-Ergebnisse (2nd ed.; Karlsruhe: C.F. Müller, 1972), pp. 14-41.

Commentaries On

"The Nazis: Sadism and Escapism in Wartime"

Peter Becker - University of South Carolina

Generations of students and the public at large have accustomed us to the question about Hitler and his Third Reich, "Why was he so successful in imposing his rule on Germany?" In the first two to three decades following the Second World War, this question, also asked by historians, generated hundreds of volumes on Hitler, his closest aides, his military campaigns, and his foreign and domestic policies. Basic to them was the assumption that like a spider in a web Hitler controlled and directed every move made by the people, the party, and the military.

To a large extent this was true, of course, but it is not the entire truth. Peterson in his book The Limits of Hitler's Power destroyed the myth that the Nazi state was a monolithic one, obeying only the beat of one drummer. Instead, a world of infighting, of struggles over jurisdictions and competencies, of conflicting aims and objectives was revealed.

In the meantime studies have also been conducted of the more important second-echelon people in Nazi Germany, helped along, for example, by Speer's memoirs and his insights into the Nazi hierarchy and Hitler's psyche. But what has been done only imperfectly so far is to look closely at the rank and file of the German people, Nazis and non-Nazis alike.

It was the victor's accusation in 1945 that all Germans were guilty of what had transpired during the 12 years of Hitler's regime. This assertion of Kollektivschuld was immediately rejected by most Germans and was cogently refuted by the philosopher Karl Jaspers. There was also the realization by most Germans that the rejection of such an assertion very conveniently deflected the

spotlight of attention from them to their former leaders. This is in part responsible for the preoccupation of scholars and laymen alike with the more obvious aspects of the Third Reich.

* * *

The two papers by Professors Herzstein and McKale represent a welcome look at a number of actually very minor figures involved in the Hitler drama, whose ideas and activities, however, are significant far beyond their own personalities. They are significant because they permit a limited extrapolation to more numerous segments of the German population without whom Hitler and his closest collaborators could not have achieved their objectives.

Professor Herzstein's paper deals with Werner Daitz, an industrialist-turned-economic-philosopher in search of the holy grail of political power. He never reached the innter sanctum, not because he was too ambitious--so were many others who were more successful--but because he hitched his wagon to the wrong horses, Rosenberg and Hess. Purely on the basis of his views he should have succeeded, because in them he expressed ideas which struck a responsive chord in the minds of many ordinary Germans as well as in the practices actually employed by the Nazis during the war. On the other hand, these views do not appear so outlandish if one realizes that Daitz's slogan of "Europe to the Europeans" and a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals is not much different from DeGaulle's concepts.

Even superficial reading of Daitz's book Der Weg zur völkischen Wirtschaft, europäischen Grossraumwirtschaft und gerechten Weltordnung--actually a collection of some four dozen essays mainly composed between 1933 and 1942--reveals to a rational, objective observer that the basis of his economic philosophy stands on clay feet. Essentially Daitz's views were anti-capitalist and anti-liberal. In this sense he did not differ from other fascist economists. But there are two aspects which distinguish Daitz from them and make him intriguing. For one, the founda-

tion for his ideas was laid as early as 1916, when he argued that the conditions created by the economic warfare of the First World War were the first signs of a revolution away from the extremes of individual economic liberalism toward a continental economy. His ideas were the result of the ravages inflicted on Germany by the British blockade and his intention was to promote a reorganization of the German economy in such a way that it would never again be vulnerable to blockade.

These views were, of course, not new. The concept of a Mitteleuropa was common currency at the time, at least in Germany, and was also part of Bethmann Hollweg's political plans. Whatever Daitz may have intended came to nought, and only the arrival of the Nazis produced a revival of his ideas. For this reason I would hesitate to call him an opportunist if by that term we understand someone who has no principles and is willing to shift and tack with the prevailing wind. Misguided as many of his suggestions were, they were at least of long standing. Thus I would think of him more as a man obsessed with a certain way of thinking, unable to adjust his thinking to new realities.

The Second World War drove home the realization that the German economy was still vulnerable and could only be secured by a European-wide reorganization. Once again invention and necessity seem to be intertwined, just as much as theory and practice. Germany could not survive without the resources of other European states, realizations which Daitz cloaked with thoughts about a European Grossraumwirtschaft, led and dominated, of course, by Germany. But he was merely expressing in thought what others, for more practical reasons, were doing in deed. Albert Speer, for instance, was aware that he needed the economic resources, both raw material and productive, of such countries as France. In his French administrative counterpart, Jean Bichelonne, he encountered a man who seemed to consist of the same strange mixture of pragmatist and idealist, someone with whom he could dream of a cooperative New Economic Order of Europe in which national differences would be overcome. At any other time such musings might have been realistic, but given the circum-

stances of a Europe dominated by Nazi Germany and Hitler, their hopes were nothing but delusions as long as it was unclear what shape Hitler ultimately intended Europe to assume.

Unlike other fascist economic writers, Daitz is distinguished by an additional aspect which Professor Herzstein was not able to mention. Daitz incorporated a racial factor into his economic views. He held that the only true basis for the new economic order was racial similarity, thereby relying on völkisch elements so dear to the Nazi racists.

* * *

Where the racial arguments advanced by people like Daitz could end in practice was demonstrated by the extermination of millions of Jews. Professor McKale's paper is concerned with the trial and punishment of female doctors and nurses for aiding, assisting, and abetting medical experiments performed on and fatal injections given to concentration camp inmates, mental patients, prisoners of war, and forced laborers from Russia and Poland.

There is basically no difference between the killings of Jews and the killings of others that took place in German institutions, inasmuch as both were caused by the same attitudes toward what were called racially inferior people and those who were considered "unworthy" of life. This latter term was applied to the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, and the physically incurable. The basic conviction was that they were not worth being supported at public expense for the rest of their natural lives. One is not surprised to find such views among convinced Nazis, but what was so shocking is that these views were held and acted on by members of the supposedly most humane profession--medical doctors and nurses.

As Professor McKale points out, some of them were Nazis and consequently their actions are comprehensible from that perspective. But what about the others? There the answer seems to lie in the sheep-like trust that they

had in their superiors and the consoling thought that they were merely following orders and therefore absolved of culpability.

We now know that it was actually possible to refuse to carry out such superior orders--there is no known case of reprisal against any SS concentration camp guard who refused to participate in atrocities--but no one seems to have tried very hard. The worst indictment is, indeed, that extremely few appear to have made the attempt at all.

As Professor McKale mentions, the nurses cited in his paper had only technical training and apparently no schooling in medical ethics. Yet was it really necessary to have taken a course in medical ethics for them to have acted more humanely? I doubt it. What they did was so patently wrong that their common sense should have informed their actions. But it did not, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that essentially they shared the prevailing attitude of the Nazis toward Jews, Slavs, and the incurably sick.

When put on trial they received due process according to Anglo-American law. It is more difficult to understand why they received such relatively mild sentences and were released so prematurely. The answer, it seems to me, is supplied by the excessive concern which American jurisprudence has for the offender and which is demonstrated daily in American courts. Secondly, they all were reprieved during the 1950's when the relationship of the United States was changing from one of victor over Nazi Germany to one of ally of the Federal Republic. Early releases during this period were granted not only to nurses and doctors but also to convicted and sentenced military personnel, party members, and industrialists. It seemed a small price to pay--erroneously, I believe--for the sake of improved relations between the two countries.

* * *

These two papers, then, deal with the "little people;" people without whose support and assistance the regime could not have survived. And that is the answer, in part at least, to the question with which I opened my comment. There were enough of those--and by no means do I wish to be understood to speak of collective guilt--who acted without sufficient regard to their consciences and who individually were responsible for their actions.

In conclusion, I think that both of these papers are valuable contributions to our growing body of knowledge about the Third Reich and I hope that both scholars will continue their labors.

Michael Barrett - The Citadel

The papers presented at this session have focused on two seemingly different aspects of the Third Reich, namely post-war plans and the criminality of female medical practitioners convicted of war crimes. The papers afford an interesting glimpse into the Nazi labyrinth and, above all, expose the mentality of Nazi fellow travelers. In providing this view, the authors have given us commendable pieces of solid craftsmanship.

Professor Herzstein relates the career of Werner Daitz, arguing convincingly that he was "an intellectual opportunist" bent on spreading his concept of the New Order. Daitz, " ...one of the more curious figures of National Socialist diplomacy" (G. Weinberg) advocated German hegemony over a Europe divided into vague autarkic regions. Founding propaganda institutes "more prolific than lucid" (Weinberg) to plead his ideas, Daitz happily envisioned a prominent place for himself in a putative Reich Commissariat for the Greater Region Economy. Although scoring one or two minor triumphs in the early 1930's, the author argues that Daitz fell by the wayside owing to the gradual realization that post-war planning was superfluous and to Daitz's ineptitude in choosing as a patron the hapless Rosenberg.

Professor Herzstein tells us that Hitler's failure to issue postwar planning directives disturbed and discouraged Daitz, but perhaps one could argue that swamped by military matters, the Führer doubtless felt that he had long made clear his post-war aims: acquiring Lebensraum in the East with a concommitant extermination of the inhabitants. Hitler admired boldness and decisiveness, and Daitz's reluctance to employ the term "German Great Region" and his insistence that one "speak only of Europe," even if only for reasons of tact, might have suggested timidity to leading Nazis. Even worse, it implied a profound misunderstanding of the racial question. Daitz's plans resemble strongly the goals of World War I annexationists and the Vaterlandspartei. In fact, this is one area in which further research might prove useful. Investigating Daitz's pre-Nazi ties could lead to some interesting comments on the issue of continuity of German foreign policy.

Besides Daitz's advocacy of unpalatable ideas, Professor Herzstein attributes his downfall to his inability to find a suitable sponsor, an assessment I share. Rosenberg, whose ineptness was party lore, proved disastrous. The author does an excellent job of illustrating this byzantine nature of Nazi administration, showing that a system of clientella instantly recognizeable to any Roman had superseded the formal organizational apparatus of party and state.

Professor McKale's paper discusses a number of complex issues, salient of which are questions of how and why women became a part of the Nazi organization of genocide as well as the justice subsequently meted out to these women when they came before the bar. By focusing on a small number of female physicians and nurses, Professor McKale gives us some idea of the motivation of his subjects and confirms conclusions reached by others working in this area.

Of the fifteen women mentioned in his study, the author indicates that all worked for reasons of self-sufficiency. Since all but one or two were unmarried, a refusal to carry out their odious tasks would have

entailed grave professional, personal and financial consequences. In the case of the Hadamar nurses, moreover, one suspects that they found themselves, at least initially, in a situation allowing little, if any, time to contemplate the dreadful nature of their actions. In other words, for the nurses, I think one could say they were coopted into the system. The insistence of the authorities that all was in order aided their capitulation of conscience. In head nurse Huber's case, and by extension the others, authorities blocked her resignation, citing the needs of the state. Both German and U.S. courts rejected these excuses in adjudicating guilt and found the defendants culpable of murder, although, as the author notes, the courts did consider the defense of acting under orders in determining the sentence.

More shocking, and utterly indefensible, were the actions of the two physicians, Oberheuser and Flocken. Oberheuser implied that she joined the Nazi Party to further her medical career, an interesting commentary about a party that supposedly relegated women to a secondary role. How she progressed from mere party member to a research assistant for the SS the author unfortunately does not make clear. Nonetheless, she too defended her participation in heinous experiments with the excuse of following orders. What defense Flocken offered the author does not say, but her crime of willful neglect resulting in the death of hundreds of patients entrusted to her care merited the severe penalty she received.

In a section that easily could be expanded, Professor McKale discusses the post-trial reviews and appeals. Like Bradley Smith in his recent work on the major war crimes trials, McKale rejects the charge that the trials aimed at revenge. He shows instead that the defendants received enormous benefit from Anglo-Saxon concepts of jurisprudence. Moreover, the controversial defense of obeying orders did receive consideration and was a factor in sentencing. As John Mendelsohn has noted, the longer one could delay or prolong trial and sentencing, the better one's chances for due process, so the lenghty appeal process, the Cold War, Anglo-

American legal concepts, and the transfer of jurisdiction over some of the cases to German courts all tended to favor the defendants. A recent work authored by Weingartner on the Malmedy massacre and the fate of the perpetrators of that infamous deed affirms this point.

What does not emerge, however, is the answer to whether or not the defendants' sex played a role in sentencing. In the one comparison offered, namely between Oberheuser and her male superiors, she received a lesser sentence not because of her sex, but "because the evidence clearly demonstrated that her involvement ...had not been as direct."

But we must return to the searing question posed at the beginning of the paper by Kurt Sitte: was "technical justice to this pack of murderers ...justice to the victims?" The author illustrates that technical justice, i.e., due process, review and entertaining appeals, was conducted and undeniably benefited the defendants, a far cry from the summary treatment meted out to their victims. Still, to ignore due process was to emulate Nazi methods. "Be ruthless," said Göring in 1933, for "my measures will not be rendered anemic by judicial considerations. My business is not to dispense justice but to destroy and exterminate." That quote is the essence of Nazism and its victims, I hope, would forbear Nazi methods.

While both papers before us differ markedly in focus, they provide insight into the type we can call the Nazi fellow traveler. None of the personalities under discussion made policy; only Daitz had some input to those who made decisions; yet each, with the exception of the nurses, seems to have lusted for power. Daitz, who dressed up World War I annexationist ravings with Nazi racial trim, desperately and pathetically longed to be at the center. A true believer or a fellow traveler? I am not sure. True, he was an "Alter Kämpfer, but when he joined the party, people with his background were uncommon and still commanded attention. By 1933, Daitz's were plentiful, especially ones who understood the racial question, and when he teamed up with Rosenberg, his career lay behind him.

Opportunism led Oberheuser to the party, and while mouthing Nazi racial nonsense, she clearly relished power. Shipping and flogging patients and inflicting pain fed a pathological hunger for domination. Dr. Flocken, while not a Parteigenossin, also thrived on power, revelling in withholding medical treatment and exulting in selecting prisoners for transport to a certain fate.

Daitz and the women physicians were not technicians; they came from unexceptionally average middle class backgrounds, received university educations, and as academically trained professionals, enjoyed social prestige. Their careers are instructive, for one would expect just this sort of person to have discerned the moral corruption of Nazism.

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